The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence

None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 1. Panpsychism and Emergentism

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 1. Panpsychism and Emergentism

Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 6. From Constitutive Panpsychism to Emergentism Must micro--subjects survive in the higher--level subject?Perhaps it wouldn't be 'combination', as defined, but what would be wrong with the antecedent subjects generating the über--subject and in the process going out of existence?Then their various points of view wouldn't be around to stick out like such sore thumbs for the single--perspective macro--subjectivity we aim to construct.Panpsychists inclined to reply thus have something like Humphreys' fusion in mind.41 Humphreys offers fusion as a model of the generation of higher--level items by sets of lower--level items.The lower--level items 'fuse' together, producing the higher--level item, and in the process are obliterated.All that 40 Nagel apparently spies the problem: 'How could a single self be composed of many selves?' (1979:194).The preceding section, and the next, seek to bring Nagel's difficulty into focus.41 Humphreys 1997.remains in existence is the higher--level product.In this vein, panpsychists might propose that lower--level subjects fuse to form one higher--level subject, a subject like one of us.After fusion, what remains is the single higher--level subject, with the lower--level subjects of the 'fusion--base' having ceased to exist.42 This seems what Seager intends with his concept of panpsychic 'combinatorial fusion', 43 and Goff briefly entertains the same idea: Perhaps the parts of my brain, before they came together to form my brain, had their own individual phenomenal lives.But when they…form my brain they lose their individual conscious identities, and somehow morph into o--experience had by the whole brain.44 But fusion cannot help the panpsychist.The problem lies in something already emphasised: the essentially isolated nature of individual subjects with their independent experiential points of view.This feature of subjects ensures their fusion could only provide for the emergence of a macro--subject, implying a violation of panpsychism's core metaphysical commitments.To see why this is, we must further examine the constitution of structural (i.e.non--emergent) properties. Consider as a possible case of fusion the melting of several gold ingots into one big gold lump.The masses of the ingots fuse: Each ingot has its own mass before melting, but having been formed into one chunk of gold, these individual masses no longer exist.Only the mass of the whole exists, formed by the fusion of the antecedent ingots and their respective masses.45 What is important to note is this.In general, to avoid emergence, lower--level properties must contribute to their novel product in virtue of their metaphysical nature, or, otherwise put, while 42 Humphreys allows fusion of properties and fusion of things.43 'Perhaps we can regard the parts as infusing their properties into the whole and by so doing effacing themselves.' (MS:14).44 2009:308.45 Someone might dispute this as an example of fusion-it might be thought the mass of the chunk is a straightforward combination: perhaps the product of the (persisting) masses of the ingots, or the masses of constituent gold molecules, which certainly do not cease to exist.Not much hangs on the choice of case, however.The example is only illustrative of the deeper point developed below: that for a structural (i.e.non--emergent) property to result, whether by fusion or otherwise, there needs to be an intelligible contribution by the antecedent properties to the product. remaining true to what they are.In the formation of a structural property, its lower--level antecedent properties, belonging to multiple lower--level bearers, interact with one another due to their character, and the upshot of this self-expressive interaction is the higher--level property.There is thus a requirement of metaphysical sense--making in the production of a structural property. Antecedents generate the novel structure by interacting according to, and abiding by, what they already are-so that there is a corresponding lack of surprise in the product: it is intelligible.If we look back to the anti--emergence principle as expressed by Nagel and Strawson, in particular, we can see both gesturing towards this idea.46 Fusing masses meet this constraint: the masses simply add up, they amass, to form the fused mass.The lower--level masses express their nature in producing the larger mass; amassing is a characteristic thing masses do.Other intuitive examples of structural properties conform.We considered earlier the combination of atomic charges into a dipole in water molecules.When charges interact to yield some resultant, group charge, they do so, affect one another, as charges.Nothing blocks or defies the influence of each component in respect of being charged-each lower--level charge is at liberty to contribute its nature to the atomic interaction, and the resultant molecular dipole is simply the structural upshot of this free, self--expressive interaction.Another example is shape: one can see that in building a Lego penguin, say, the overall shape has the relation of the shapes of the blocks to one another to thank for its determinate nature: their relation in virtue of their shape.When colors blend to produce a new color, as with mixing red and blue into purple, it is a colorful interaction with a colorful product. Contrastingly, paradigm cases of emergence involve the metaphysical defiance or thwarting of the natures of the lower--level properties.Consider two examples Strawson employs: the emergence of the concrete from the abstract, and of 46 Nagel,recall, properties of complex systems…derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined ' (1979:182, my emphasis).These interactions between constituents of the system are expressions of their metaphysical nature, i.e. of their characteristic powers.

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 4. The Combination Problem

It may state two separate claims as one.

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There really are human subjects, robustly real, and they are not merely splinters of a greater, universe-sized subject.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 6. From Constitutive Panpsychism to Emergentism Must micro--subjects survive in the higher--level subject?Perhaps it wouldn't be 'combination', as defined, but what would be wrong with the antecedent subjects generating the über--subject and in the process going out of existence?Then their various points of view wouldn't be around to stick out like such sore thumbs for the single--perspective macro--subjectivity we aim to construct.Panpsychists inclined to reply thus have something like Humphreys' fusion in mind.41 Humphreys offers fusion as a model of the generation of higher--level items by sets of lower--level items.The lower--level items 'fuse' together, producing the higher--level item, and in the process are obliterated.All that 40 Nagel apparently spies the problem: 'How could a single self be composed of many selves?' (1979:194).The preceding section, and the next, seek to bring Nagel's difficulty into focus.41 Humphreys 1997.remains in existence is the higher--level product.In this vein, panpsychists might propose that lower--level subjects fuse to form one higher--level subject, a subject like one of us.After fusion, what remains is the single higher--level subject, with the lower--level subjects of the 'fusion--base' having ceased to exist.42 This seems what Seager intends with his concept of panpsychic 'combinatorial fusion', 43 and Goff briefly entertains the same idea: Perhaps the parts of my brain, before they came together to form my brain, had their own individual phenomenal lives.But when they…form my brain they lose their individual conscious identities, and somehow morph into o--experience had by the whole brain.44 But fusion cannot help the panpsychist.The problem lies in something already emphasised: the essentially isolated nature of individual subjects with their independent experiential points of view.This feature of subjects ensures their fusion could only provide for the emergence of a macro--subject, implying a violation of panpsychism's core metaphysical commitments.To see why this is, we must further examine the constitution of structural (i.e.non--emergent) properties. Consider as a possible case of fusion the melting of several gold ingots into one big gold lump.The masses of the ingots fuse: Each ingot has its own mass before melting, but having been formed into one chunk of gold, these individual masses no longer exist.Only the mass of the whole exists, formed by the fusion of the antecedent ingots and their respective masses.45 What is important to note is this.In general, to avoid emergence, lower--level properties must contribute to their novel product in virtue of their metaphysical nature, or, otherwise put, while 42 Humphreys allows fusion of properties and fusion of things.43 'Perhaps we can regard the parts as infusing their properties into the whole and by so doing effacing themselves.' (MS:14).44 2009:308.45 Someone might dispute this as an example of fusion-it might be thought the mass of the chunk is a straightforward combination: perhaps the product of the (persisting) masses of the ingots, or the masses of constituent gold molecules, which certainly do not cease to exist.Not much hangs on the choice of case, however.The example is only illustrative of the deeper point developed below: that for a structural (i.e.non--emergent) property to result, whether by fusion or otherwise, there needs to be an intelligible contribution by the antecedent properties to the product. remaining true to what they are.In the formation of a structural property, its lower--level antecedent properties, belonging to multiple lower--level bearers, interact with one another due to their character, and the upshot of this self-expressive interaction is the higher--level property.There is thus a requirement of metaphysical sense--making in the production of a structural property. Antecedents generate the novel structure by interacting according to, and abiding by, what they already are-so that there is a corresponding lack of surprise in the product: it is intelligible.If we look back to the anti--emergence principle as expressed by Nagel and Strawson, in particular, we can see both gesturing towards this idea.46 Fusing masses meet this constraint: the masses simply add up, they amass, to form the fused mass.The lower--level masses express their nature in producing the larger mass; amassing is a characteristic thing masses do.Other intuitive examples of structural properties conform.We considered earlier the combination of atomic charges into a dipole in water molecules.When charges interact to yield some resultant, group charge, they do so, affect one another, as charges.Nothing blocks or defies the influence of each component in respect of being charged-each lower--level charge is at liberty to contribute its nature to the atomic interaction, and the resultant molecular dipole is simply the structural upshot of this free, self--expressive interaction.Another example is shape: one can see that in building a Lego penguin, say, the overall shape has the relation of the shapes of the blocks to one another to thank for its determinate nature: their relation in virtue of their shape.When colors blend to produce a new color, as with mixing red and blue into purple, it is a colorful interaction with a colorful product. Contrastingly, paradigm cases of emergence involve the metaphysical defiance or thwarting of the natures of the lower--level properties.Consider two examples Strawson employs: the emergence of the concrete from the abstract, and of 46 Nagel,recall, properties of complex systems…derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined ' (1979:182, my emphasis).These interactions between constituents of the system are expressions of their metaphysical nature, i.e. of their characteristic powers.

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 2. Constitutive Panpsychism

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 2. Constitutive Panpsychism

It may state two separate claims as one.

The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 1. Panpsychism and Emergentism

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 2. Constitutive Panpsychism

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 5. Subjects do not Combine

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 5. Subjects do not Combine

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

Probably not a substantial claim.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 5. Subjects do not Combine

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

It may state two separate claims as one.

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There really are human subjects, robustly real, and they are not merely splinters of a greater, universe-sized subject.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 1. Panpsychism and Emergentism

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 6. From Constitutive Panpsychism to Emergentism Must micro--subjects survive in the higher--level subject?Perhaps it wouldn't be 'combination', as defined, but what would be wrong with the antecedent subjects generating the über--subject and in the process going out of existence?Then their various points of view wouldn't be around to stick out like such sore thumbs for the single--perspective macro--subjectivity we aim to construct.Panpsychists inclined to reply thus have something like Humphreys' fusion in mind.41 Humphreys offers fusion as a model of the generation of higher--level items by sets of lower--level items.The lower--level items 'fuse' together, producing the higher--level item, and in the process are obliterated.All that 40 Nagel apparently spies the problem: 'How could a single self be composed of many selves?' (1979:194).The preceding section, and the next, seek to bring Nagel's difficulty into focus.41 Humphreys 1997.remains in existence is the higher--level product.In this vein, panpsychists might propose that lower--level subjects fuse to form one higher--level subject, a subject like one of us.After fusion, what remains is the single higher--level subject, with the lower--level subjects of the 'fusion--base' having ceased to exist.42 This seems what Seager intends with his concept of panpsychic 'combinatorial fusion', 43 and Goff briefly entertains the same idea: Perhaps the parts of my brain, before they came together to form my brain, had their own individual phenomenal lives.But when they…form my brain they lose their individual conscious identities, and somehow morph into o--experience had by the whole brain.44 But fusion cannot help the panpsychist.The problem lies in something already emphasised: the essentially isolated nature of individual subjects with their independent experiential points of view.This feature of subjects ensures their fusion could only provide for the emergence of a macro--subject, implying a violation of panpsychism's core metaphysical commitments.To see why this is, we must further examine the constitution of structural (i.e.non--emergent) properties. Consider as a possible case of fusion the melting of several gold ingots into one big gold lump.The masses of the ingots fuse: Each ingot has its own mass before melting, but having been formed into one chunk of gold, these individual masses no longer exist.Only the mass of the whole exists, formed by the fusion of the antecedent ingots and their respective masses.45 What is important to note is this.In general, to avoid emergence, lower--level properties must contribute to their novel product in virtue of their metaphysical nature, or, otherwise put, while 42 Humphreys allows fusion of properties and fusion of things.43 'Perhaps we can regard the parts as infusing their properties into the whole and by so doing effacing themselves.' (MS:14).44 2009:308.45 Someone might dispute this as an example of fusion-it might be thought the mass of the chunk is a straightforward combination: perhaps the product of the (persisting) masses of the ingots, or the masses of constituent gold molecules, which certainly do not cease to exist.Not much hangs on the choice of case, however.The example is only illustrative of the deeper point developed below: that for a structural (i.e.non--emergent) property to result, whether by fusion or otherwise, there needs to be an intelligible contribution by the antecedent properties to the product. remaining true to what they are.In the formation of a structural property, its lower--level antecedent properties, belonging to multiple lower--level bearers, interact with one another due to their character, and the upshot of this self-expressive interaction is the higher--level property.There is thus a requirement of metaphysical sense--making in the production of a structural property. Antecedents generate the novel structure by interacting according to, and abiding by, what they already are-so that there is a corresponding lack of surprise in the product: it is intelligible.If we look back to the anti--emergence principle as expressed by Nagel and Strawson, in particular, we can see both gesturing towards this idea.46 Fusing masses meet this constraint: the masses simply add up, they amass, to form the fused mass.The lower--level masses express their nature in producing the larger mass; amassing is a characteristic thing masses do.Other intuitive examples of structural properties conform.We considered earlier the combination of atomic charges into a dipole in water molecules.When charges interact to yield some resultant, group charge, they do so, affect one another, as charges.Nothing blocks or defies the influence of each component in respect of being charged-each lower--level charge is at liberty to contribute its nature to the atomic interaction, and the resultant molecular dipole is simply the structural upshot of this free, self--expressive interaction.Another example is shape: one can see that in building a Lego penguin, say, the overall shape has the relation of the shapes of the blocks to one another to thank for its determinate nature: their relation in virtue of their shape.When colors blend to produce a new color, as with mixing red and blue into purple, it is a colorful interaction with a colorful product. Contrastingly, paradigm cases of emergence involve the metaphysical defiance or thwarting of the natures of the lower--level properties.Consider two examples Strawson employs: the emergence of the concrete from the abstract, and of 46 Nagel,recall, properties of complex systems…derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined ' (1979:182, my emphasis).These interactions between constituents of the system are expressions of their metaphysical nature, i.e. of their characteristic powers.

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 6. From Constitutive Panpsychism to Emergentism Must micro--subjects survive in the higher--level subject?Perhaps it wouldn't be 'combination', as defined, but what would be wrong with the antecedent subjects generating the über--subject and in the process going out of existence?Then their various points of view wouldn't be around to stick out like such sore thumbs for the single--perspective macro--subjectivity we aim to construct.Panpsychists inclined to reply thus have something like Humphreys' fusion in mind.41 Humphreys offers fusion as a model of the generation of higher--level items by sets of lower--level items.The lower--level items 'fuse' together, producing the higher--level item, and in the process are obliterated.All that 40 Nagel apparently spies the problem: 'How could a single self be composed of many selves?' (1979:194).The preceding section, and the next, seek to bring Nagel's difficulty into focus.41 Humphreys 1997.remains in existence is the higher--level product.In this vein, panpsychists might propose that lower--level subjects fuse to form one higher--level subject, a subject like one of us.After fusion, what remains is the single higher--level subject, with the lower--level subjects of the 'fusion--base' having ceased to exist.42 This seems what Seager intends with his concept of panpsychic 'combinatorial fusion', 43 and Goff briefly entertains the same idea: Perhaps the parts of my brain, before they came together to form my brain, had their own individual phenomenal lives.But when they…form my brain they lose their individual conscious identities, and somehow morph into o--experience had by the whole brain.44 But fusion cannot help the panpsychist.The problem lies in something already emphasised: the essentially isolated nature of individual subjects with their independent experiential points of view.This feature of subjects ensures their fusion could only provide for the emergence of a macro--subject, implying a violation of panpsychism's core metaphysical commitments.To see why this is, we must further examine the constitution of structural (i.e.non--emergent) properties. Consider as a possible case of fusion the melting of several gold ingots into one big gold lump.The masses of the ingots fuse: Each ingot has its own mass before melting, but having been formed into one chunk of gold, these individual masses no longer exist.Only the mass of the whole exists, formed by the fusion of the antecedent ingots and their respective masses.45 What is important to note is this.In general, to avoid emergence, lower--level properties must contribute to their novel product in virtue of their metaphysical nature, or, otherwise put, while 42 Humphreys allows fusion of properties and fusion of things.43 'Perhaps we can regard the parts as infusing their properties into the whole and by so doing effacing themselves.' (MS:14).44 2009:308.45 Someone might dispute this as an example of fusion-it might be thought the mass of the chunk is a straightforward combination: perhaps the product of the (persisting) masses of the ingots, or the masses of constituent gold molecules, which certainly do not cease to exist.Not much hangs on the choice of case, however.The example is only illustrative of the deeper point developed below: that for a structural (i.e.non--emergent) property to result, whether by fusion or otherwise, there needs to be an intelligible contribution by the antecedent properties to the product. remaining true to what they are.In the formation of a structural property, its lower--level antecedent properties, belonging to multiple lower--level bearers, interact with one another due to their character, and the upshot of this self-expressive interaction is the higher--level property.There is thus a requirement of metaphysical sense--making in the production of a structural property. Antecedents generate the novel structure by interacting according to, and abiding by, what they already are-so that there is a corresponding lack of surprise in the product: it is intelligible.If we look back to the anti--emergence principle as expressed by Nagel and Strawson, in particular, we can see both gesturing towards this idea.46 Fusing masses meet this constraint: the masses simply add up, they amass, to form the fused mass.The lower--level masses express their nature in producing the larger mass; amassing is a characteristic thing masses do.Other intuitive examples of structural properties conform.We considered earlier the combination of atomic charges into a dipole in water molecules.When charges interact to yield some resultant, group charge, they do so, affect one another, as charges.Nothing blocks or defies the influence of each component in respect of being charged-each lower--level charge is at liberty to contribute its nature to the atomic interaction, and the resultant molecular dipole is simply the structural upshot of this free, self--expressive interaction.Another example is shape: one can see that in building a Lego penguin, say, the overall shape has the relation of the shapes of the blocks to one another to thank for its determinate nature: their relation in virtue of their shape.When colors blend to produce a new color, as with mixing red and blue into purple, it is a colorful interaction with a colorful product. Contrastingly, paradigm cases of emergence involve the metaphysical defiance or thwarting of the natures of the lower--level properties.Consider two examples Strawson employs: the emergence of the concrete from the abstract, and of 46 Nagel,recall, properties of complex systems…derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined ' (1979:182, my emphasis).These interactions between constituents of the system are expressions of their metaphysical nature, i.e. of their characteristic powers.

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 1. Panpsychism and Emergentism

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 1. Panpsychism and Emergentism

Probably not a substantial claim.

The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 6. From Constitutive Panpsychism to Emergentism Must micro--subjects survive in the higher--level subject?Perhaps it wouldn't be 'combination', as defined, but what would be wrong with the antecedent subjects generating the über--subject and in the process going out of existence?Then their various points of view wouldn't be around to stick out like such sore thumbs for the single--perspective macro--subjectivity we aim to construct.Panpsychists inclined to reply thus have something like Humphreys' fusion in mind.41 Humphreys offers fusion as a model of the generation of higher--level items by sets of lower--level items.The lower--level items 'fuse' together, producing the higher--level item, and in the process are obliterated.All that 40 Nagel apparently spies the problem: 'How could a single self be composed of many selves?' (1979:194).The preceding section, and the next, seek to bring Nagel's difficulty into focus.41 Humphreys 1997.remains in existence is the higher--level product.In this vein, panpsychists might propose that lower--level subjects fuse to form one higher--level subject, a subject like one of us.After fusion, what remains is the single higher--level subject, with the lower--level subjects of the 'fusion--base' having ceased to exist.42 This seems what Seager intends with his concept of panpsychic 'combinatorial fusion', 43 and Goff briefly entertains the same idea: Perhaps the parts of my brain, before they came together to form my brain, had their own individual phenomenal lives.But when they…form my brain they lose their individual conscious identities, and somehow morph into o--experience had by the whole brain.44 But fusion cannot help the panpsychist.The problem lies in something already emphasised: the essentially isolated nature of individual subjects with their independent experiential points of view.This feature of subjects ensures their fusion could only provide for the emergence of a macro--subject, implying a violation of panpsychism's core metaphysical commitments.To see why this is, we must further examine the constitution of structural (i.e.non--emergent) properties. Consider as a possible case of fusion the melting of several gold ingots into one big gold lump.The masses of the ingots fuse: Each ingot has its own mass before melting, but having been formed into one chunk of gold, these individual masses no longer exist.Only the mass of the whole exists, formed by the fusion of the antecedent ingots and their respective masses.45 What is important to note is this.In general, to avoid emergence, lower--level properties must contribute to their novel product in virtue of their metaphysical nature, or, otherwise put, while 42 Humphreys allows fusion of properties and fusion of things.43 'Perhaps we can regard the parts as infusing their properties into the whole and by so doing effacing themselves.' (MS:14).44 2009:308.45 Someone might dispute this as an example of fusion-it might be thought the mass of the chunk is a straightforward combination: perhaps the product of the (persisting) masses of the ingots, or the masses of constituent gold molecules, which certainly do not cease to exist.Not much hangs on the choice of case, however.The example is only illustrative of the deeper point developed below: that for a structural (i.e.non--emergent) property to result, whether by fusion or otherwise, there needs to be an intelligible contribution by the antecedent properties to the product. remaining true to what they are.In the formation of a structural property, its lower--level antecedent properties, belonging to multiple lower--level bearers, interact with one another due to their character, and the upshot of this self-expressive interaction is the higher--level property.There is thus a requirement of metaphysical sense--making in the production of a structural property. Antecedents generate the novel structure by interacting according to, and abiding by, what they already are-so that there is a corresponding lack of surprise in the product: it is intelligible.If we look back to the anti--emergence principle as expressed by Nagel and Strawson, in particular, we can see both gesturing towards this idea.46 Fusing masses meet this constraint: the masses simply add up, they amass, to form the fused mass.The lower--level masses express their nature in producing the larger mass; amassing is a characteristic thing masses do.Other intuitive examples of structural properties conform.We considered earlier the combination of atomic charges into a dipole in water molecules.When charges interact to yield some resultant, group charge, they do so, affect one another, as charges.Nothing blocks or defies the influence of each component in respect of being charged-each lower--level charge is at liberty to contribute its nature to the atomic interaction, and the resultant molecular dipole is simply the structural upshot of this free, self--expressive interaction.Another example is shape: one can see that in building a Lego penguin, say, the overall shape has the relation of the shapes of the blocks to one another to thank for its determinate nature: their relation in virtue of their shape.When colors blend to produce a new color, as with mixing red and blue into purple, it is a colorful interaction with a colorful product. Contrastingly, paradigm cases of emergence involve the metaphysical defiance or thwarting of the natures of the lower--level properties.Consider two examples Strawson employs: the emergence of the concrete from the abstract, and of 46 Nagel,recall, properties of complex systems…derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined ' (1979:182, my emphasis).These interactions between constituents of the system are expressions of their metaphysical nature, i.e. of their characteristic powers.

It may state two separate claims as one.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 5. Subjects do not Combine

Probably not a substantial claim.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 4. The Combination Problem

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 6. From Constitutive Panpsychism to Emergentism Must micro--subjects survive in the higher--level subject?Perhaps it wouldn't be 'combination', as defined, but what would be wrong with the antecedent subjects generating the über--subject and in the process going out of existence?Then their various points of view wouldn't be around to stick out like such sore thumbs for the single--perspective macro--subjectivity we aim to construct.Panpsychists inclined to reply thus have something like Humphreys' fusion in mind.41 Humphreys offers fusion as a model of the generation of higher--level items by sets of lower--level items.The lower--level items 'fuse' together, producing the higher--level item, and in the process are obliterated.All that 40 Nagel apparently spies the problem: 'How could a single self be composed of many selves?' (1979:194).The preceding section, and the next, seek to bring Nagel's difficulty into focus.41 Humphreys 1997.remains in existence is the higher--level product.In this vein, panpsychists might propose that lower--level subjects fuse to form one higher--level subject, a subject like one of us.After fusion, what remains is the single higher--level subject, with the lower--level subjects of the 'fusion--base' having ceased to exist.42 This seems what Seager intends with his concept of panpsychic 'combinatorial fusion', 43 and Goff briefly entertains the same idea: Perhaps the parts of my brain, before they came together to form my brain, had their own individual phenomenal lives.But when they…form my brain they lose their individual conscious identities, and somehow morph into o--experience had by the whole brain.44 But fusion cannot help the panpsychist.The problem lies in something already emphasised: the essentially isolated nature of individual subjects with their independent experiential points of view.This feature of subjects ensures their fusion could only provide for the emergence of a macro--subject, implying a violation of panpsychism's core metaphysical commitments.To see why this is, we must further examine the constitution of structural (i.e.non--emergent) properties. Consider as a possible case of fusion the melting of several gold ingots into one big gold lump.The masses of the ingots fuse: Each ingot has its own mass before melting, but having been formed into one chunk of gold, these individual masses no longer exist.Only the mass of the whole exists, formed by the fusion of the antecedent ingots and their respective masses.45 What is important to note is this.In general, to avoid emergence, lower--level properties must contribute to their novel product in virtue of their metaphysical nature, or, otherwise put, while 42 Humphreys allows fusion of properties and fusion of things.43 'Perhaps we can regard the parts as infusing their properties into the whole and by so doing effacing themselves.' (MS:14).44 2009:308.45 Someone might dispute this as an example of fusion-it might be thought the mass of the chunk is a straightforward combination: perhaps the product of the (persisting) masses of the ingots, or the masses of constituent gold molecules, which certainly do not cease to exist.Not much hangs on the choice of case, however.The example is only illustrative of the deeper point developed below: that for a structural (i.e.non--emergent) property to result, whether by fusion or otherwise, there needs to be an intelligible contribution by the antecedent properties to the product. remaining true to what they are.In the formation of a structural property, its lower--level antecedent properties, belonging to multiple lower--level bearers, interact with one another due to their character, and the upshot of this self-expressive interaction is the higher--level property.There is thus a requirement of metaphysical sense--making in the production of a structural property. Antecedents generate the novel structure by interacting according to, and abiding by, what they already are-so that there is a corresponding lack of surprise in the product: it is intelligible.If we look back to the anti--emergence principle as expressed by Nagel and Strawson, in particular, we can see both gesturing towards this idea.46 Fusing masses meet this constraint: the masses simply add up, they amass, to form the fused mass.The lower--level masses express their nature in producing the larger mass; amassing is a characteristic thing masses do.Other intuitive examples of structural properties conform.We considered earlier the combination of atomic charges into a dipole in water molecules.When charges interact to yield some resultant, group charge, they do so, affect one another, as charges.Nothing blocks or defies the influence of each component in respect of being charged-each lower--level charge is at liberty to contribute its nature to the atomic interaction, and the resultant molecular dipole is simply the structural upshot of this free, self--expressive interaction.Another example is shape: one can see that in building a Lego penguin, say, the overall shape has the relation of the shapes of the blocks to one another to thank for its determinate nature: their relation in virtue of their shape.When colors blend to produce a new color, as with mixing red and blue into purple, it is a colorful interaction with a colorful product. Contrastingly, paradigm cases of emergence involve the metaphysical defiance or thwarting of the natures of the lower--level properties.Consider two examples Strawson employs: the emergence of the concrete from the abstract, and of 46 Nagel,recall, properties of complex systems…derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined ' (1979:182, my emphasis).These interactions between constituents of the system are expressions of their metaphysical nature, i.e. of their characteristic powers.

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 5. Subjects do not Combine

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 4. The Combination Problem

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 2. Constitutive Panpsychism

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

It may state two separate claims as one.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 6. From Constitutive Panpsychism to Emergentism Must micro--subjects survive in the higher--level subject?Perhaps it wouldn't be 'combination', as defined, but what would be wrong with the antecedent subjects generating the über--subject and in the process going out of existence?Then their various points of view wouldn't be around to stick out like such sore thumbs for the single--perspective macro--subjectivity we aim to construct.Panpsychists inclined to reply thus have something like Humphreys' fusion in mind.41 Humphreys offers fusion as a model of the generation of higher--level items by sets of lower--level items.The lower--level items 'fuse' together, producing the higher--level item, and in the process are obliterated.All that 40 Nagel apparently spies the problem: 'How could a single self be composed of many selves?' (1979:194).The preceding section, and the next, seek to bring Nagel's difficulty into focus.41 Humphreys 1997.remains in existence is the higher--level product.In this vein, panpsychists might propose that lower--level subjects fuse to form one higher--level subject, a subject like one of us.After fusion, what remains is the single higher--level subject, with the lower--level subjects of the 'fusion--base' having ceased to exist.42 This seems what Seager intends with his concept of panpsychic 'combinatorial fusion', 43 and Goff briefly entertains the same idea: Perhaps the parts of my brain, before they came together to form my brain, had their own individual phenomenal lives.But when they…form my brain they lose their individual conscious identities, and somehow morph into o--experience had by the whole brain.44 But fusion cannot help the panpsychist.The problem lies in something already emphasised: the essentially isolated nature of individual subjects with their independent experiential points of view.This feature of subjects ensures their fusion could only provide for the emergence of a macro--subject, implying a violation of panpsychism's core metaphysical commitments.To see why this is, we must further examine the constitution of structural (i.e.non--emergent) properties. Consider as a possible case of fusion the melting of several gold ingots into one big gold lump.The masses of the ingots fuse: Each ingot has its own mass before melting, but having been formed into one chunk of gold, these individual masses no longer exist.Only the mass of the whole exists, formed by the fusion of the antecedent ingots and their respective masses.45 What is important to note is this.In general, to avoid emergence, lower--level properties must contribute to their novel product in virtue of their metaphysical nature, or, otherwise put, while 42 Humphreys allows fusion of properties and fusion of things.43 'Perhaps we can regard the parts as infusing their properties into the whole and by so doing effacing themselves.' (MS:14).44 2009:308.45 Someone might dispute this as an example of fusion-it might be thought the mass of the chunk is a straightforward combination: perhaps the product of the (persisting) masses of the ingots, or the masses of constituent gold molecules, which certainly do not cease to exist.Not much hangs on the choice of case, however.The example is only illustrative of the deeper point developed below: that for a structural (i.e.non--emergent) property to result, whether by fusion or otherwise, there needs to be an intelligible contribution by the antecedent properties to the product. remaining true to what they are.In the formation of a structural property, its lower--level antecedent properties, belonging to multiple lower--level bearers, interact with one another due to their character, and the upshot of this self-expressive interaction is the higher--level property.There is thus a requirement of metaphysical sense--making in the production of a structural property. Antecedents generate the novel structure by interacting according to, and abiding by, what they already are-so that there is a corresponding lack of surprise in the product: it is intelligible.If we look back to the anti--emergence principle as expressed by Nagel and Strawson, in particular, we can see both gesturing towards this idea.46 Fusing masses meet this constraint: the masses simply add up, they amass, to form the fused mass.The lower--level masses express their nature in producing the larger mass; amassing is a characteristic thing masses do.Other intuitive examples of structural properties conform.We considered earlier the combination of atomic charges into a dipole in water molecules.When charges interact to yield some resultant, group charge, they do so, affect one another, as charges.Nothing blocks or defies the influence of each component in respect of being charged-each lower--level charge is at liberty to contribute its nature to the atomic interaction, and the resultant molecular dipole is simply the structural upshot of this free, self--expressive interaction.Another example is shape: one can see that in building a Lego penguin, say, the overall shape has the relation of the shapes of the blocks to one another to thank for its determinate nature: their relation in virtue of their shape.When colors blend to produce a new color, as with mixing red and blue into purple, it is a colorful interaction with a colorful product. Contrastingly, paradigm cases of emergence involve the metaphysical defiance or thwarting of the natures of the lower--level properties.Consider two examples Strawson employs: the emergence of the concrete from the abstract, and of 46 Nagel,recall, properties of complex systems…derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined ' (1979:182, my emphasis).These interactions between constituents of the system are expressions of their metaphysical nature, i.e. of their characteristic powers.

Probably not a substantial claim.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 6. From Constitutive Panpsychism to Emergentism Must micro--subjects survive in the higher--level subject?Perhaps it wouldn't be 'combination', as defined, but what would be wrong with the antecedent subjects generating the über--subject and in the process going out of existence?Then their various points of view wouldn't be around to stick out like such sore thumbs for the single--perspective macro--subjectivity we aim to construct.Panpsychists inclined to reply thus have something like Humphreys' fusion in mind.41 Humphreys offers fusion as a model of the generation of higher--level items by sets of lower--level items.The lower--level items 'fuse' together, producing the higher--level item, and in the process are obliterated.All that 40 Nagel apparently spies the problem: 'How could a single self be composed of many selves?' (1979:194).The preceding section, and the next, seek to bring Nagel's difficulty into focus.41 Humphreys 1997.remains in existence is the higher--level product.In this vein, panpsychists might propose that lower--level subjects fuse to form one higher--level subject, a subject like one of us.After fusion, what remains is the single higher--level subject, with the lower--level subjects of the 'fusion--base' having ceased to exist.42 This seems what Seager intends with his concept of panpsychic 'combinatorial fusion', 43 and Goff briefly entertains the same idea: Perhaps the parts of my brain, before they came together to form my brain, had their own individual phenomenal lives.But when they…form my brain they lose their individual conscious identities, and somehow morph into o--experience had by the whole brain.44 But fusion cannot help the panpsychist.The problem lies in something already emphasised: the essentially isolated nature of individual subjects with their independent experiential points of view.This feature of subjects ensures their fusion could only provide for the emergence of a macro--subject, implying a violation of panpsychism's core metaphysical commitments.To see why this is, we must further examine the constitution of structural (i.e.non--emergent) properties. Consider as a possible case of fusion the melting of several gold ingots into one big gold lump.The masses of the ingots fuse: Each ingot has its own mass before melting, but having been formed into one chunk of gold, these individual masses no longer exist.Only the mass of the whole exists, formed by the fusion of the antecedent ingots and their respective masses.45 What is important to note is this.In general, to avoid emergence, lower--level properties must contribute to their novel product in virtue of their metaphysical nature, or, otherwise put, while 42 Humphreys allows fusion of properties and fusion of things.43 'Perhaps we can regard the parts as infusing their properties into the whole and by so doing effacing themselves.' (MS:14).44 2009:308.45 Someone might dispute this as an example of fusion-it might be thought the mass of the chunk is a straightforward combination: perhaps the product of the (persisting) masses of the ingots, or the masses of constituent gold molecules, which certainly do not cease to exist.Not much hangs on the choice of case, however.The example is only illustrative of the deeper point developed below: that for a structural (i.e.non--emergent) property to result, whether by fusion or otherwise, there needs to be an intelligible contribution by the antecedent properties to the product. remaining true to what they are.In the formation of a structural property, its lower--level antecedent properties, belonging to multiple lower--level bearers, interact with one another due to their character, and the upshot of this self-expressive interaction is the higher--level property.There is thus a requirement of metaphysical sense--making in the production of a structural property. Antecedents generate the novel structure by interacting according to, and abiding by, what they already are-so that there is a corresponding lack of surprise in the product: it is intelligible.If we look back to the anti--emergence principle as expressed by Nagel and Strawson, in particular, we can see both gesturing towards this idea.46 Fusing masses meet this constraint: the masses simply add up, they amass, to form the fused mass.The lower--level masses express their nature in producing the larger mass; amassing is a characteristic thing masses do.Other intuitive examples of structural properties conform.We considered earlier the combination of atomic charges into a dipole in water molecules.When charges interact to yield some resultant, group charge, they do so, affect one another, as charges.Nothing blocks or defies the influence of each component in respect of being charged-each lower--level charge is at liberty to contribute its nature to the atomic interaction, and the resultant molecular dipole is simply the structural upshot of this free, self--expressive interaction.Another example is shape: one can see that in building a Lego penguin, say, the overall shape has the relation of the shapes of the blocks to one another to thank for its determinate nature: their relation in virtue of their shape.When colors blend to produce a new color, as with mixing red and blue into purple, it is a colorful interaction with a colorful product. Contrastingly, paradigm cases of emergence involve the metaphysical defiance or thwarting of the natures of the lower--level properties.Consider two examples Strawson employs: the emergence of the concrete from the abstract, and of 46 Nagel,recall, properties of complex systems…derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined ' (1979:182, my emphasis).These interactions between constituents of the system are expressions of their metaphysical nature, i.e. of their characteristic powers.

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 1. Panpsychism and Emergentism

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 5. Subjects do not Combine

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 0. Introduction

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There really are human subjects, robustly real, and they are not merely splinters of a greater, universe-sized subject.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 5. Subjects do not Combine

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.

The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

Probably not a substantial claim.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 8. Conclusion

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 8. Conclusion

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 7. The Neutral Monist Alternative Panpsychism's internal tension is encapsulable as follows.Panpsychists hold, effectively, that all non--fundamental properties are structural: they are reducible to more basic properties plus the arrangement of their bearers.This is the non-emergence principle.It drives theorists to panpsychism since they consider that, short of bearing phenomenal properties, physical micro--matter is an inadequate basis for consciousness.If physical micro--matter lacked phenomenal properties, macro--phenomenal properties could not be structural-they would, unacceptably, have to emerge.Yet panpsychists also insist that phenomenal properties-qualia-necessarily exist for someone, a subject who experiences 53 MS:4.54 There are panpsychists whose main motivation is not aversion to emergence.Some are moved by Russell's idea that physics doesn't describe the intrinsic natures of its theoretical postulates, and that phenomenal properties provide a parsimonious way of filling this gap (e.g.Rosenberg 2004).Such theorists might evade the thrust of my argument; however it is clear that the 'intrinsic nature argument' (see Seager 2006) is highly controversial-far more so than the mundane thought that conventional physicalism lacks the conceptual resources to account for consciousness.Moreover the explanatory (anti--emergentist) motive has been by far the main driver for panpsychism historically, so most panpsychists are vulnerable to the present argument.55 Someone might claim that since panpsychist emergence at least occurs within a class of properties, i.e. the emergence of (unified) subjectivity from (plural) subjectivity, such emergence is in better shape than 'physicalist emergence'-and not the unacceptable option I deem it.But the relevant contrast is between structural and non--structural generation of a property.Macro-subjectivity is not a structural property with respect to the postulated micro--subject base.'Structurality'-or non--emergence-is an all or nothing affair; once we say a property is non-structural, it doesn't matter what it happens to have in common with its base (it will also have 'being spatio--temporal' in common, if we are non--dualists; in the physicalist case both properties count as cognitive, on the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is cognitive).The point is that the new property is not derived from its base; its instantiation is more than a matter of the organization of the basal items.Panpsychist and physicalist versions of emergence equally violate the structurality requirement, and once the panpsychist relinquishes this she has no solid ground upon which to dismiss the physicalist version, which, lest it be forgotten, is ontologically cheaper in not positing all--pervading micro--subjects.To this soft reply might be added a harder one: talk of 'subjectivity' at higher and lower levels disguises the deeper contrast-what really is required to emerge is essential unity from essential diversity, and this shatters the illusion of 'intra--property emergence'. them.Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.But a macro--subject cannot be a structural entity with respect to a lower--level basis of micro--subjects, as we've seen.It transpires, therefore, that the panpsychist's commitment to micro-subjects is at war with her commitment to all higher--level propertiesparticularly consciousness-being structural.Something has to give.

It may state two separate claims as one.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 8. Conclusion

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.

§ The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism > 8. Conclusion

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.