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Cited by 163Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsEmbodied and Extended Cognition

Why panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness

Goff, Philip·2009·dialectica
DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x
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Abstract

This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x

Cites

41 of 41 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims other papers make about this one

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  • What Penrose and Hameroff meant by the 'binding problem' is the combination problem of panpsychism.

    “I submit that what Penrose and Hameroff meant by the “binding problem” is referring to what has become known as the “combination problem of panpsychism” by philosophers (Seager 1995, Goff 2009).”

    From A quantum microtubule substrate of consciousness is experimentally supported and solves the binding and epiphenomenalism problems (2025) · cites this paper as Goff 2009

  • The Combination Problem is just as daunting as the Problem of Consciousness.

    “Critics of PP argue that the problem of explaining how microphenomenal properties, states, or processes might merge to form macro-phenomenal properties, states, or processes is just as daunting as POC itself (e.g., Goff 2009).”

    From Priority Cosmopsychism and the Advaita Vedānta (2019) · cites this paper as Goff 2009

  • By Goff's argument, we cannot see how the combination of micro-subjects could provide for the existence of a macro-subject.

    “By Goff's argument we cannot see how the combination of micro--subjects could provide for the existence of a macro--subject.”

    From The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence (2014) · cites this paper as Goff 2009

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Related

Authors
Goff, P.
Affiliations
University of Birmingham (GB)
Corresponding author
Goff, Philip
ORCID
Goff, Philip
Venue
dialectica
Publisher
Verein philosophie.ch
Published
2009
Volume
63
Issue
3
Pages
289-311
ISSN
0012-2017 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x
OpenAlex
W2109455157
Cited by
163
References
43
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 41 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 1
FWCI
0.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 2434 d)
Locations
  • dialectica (publishedVersion)
  • University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
panpsychism, consciousness, metaphysics of mind

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