The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper Basing?
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“Third, Preemptionism has been criticised for requiring individuals to unhinge their own epistemic bases and replace them entirely with the authority's belief, which can lead to epistemic regress rather than progress (Jäger 2016; Dormandy 2018, Keren 2020).”
From Epistemic Deference to AI (2026) · cites this paper as Dormandy 2018
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Cites
Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
Zagzebski, L. T. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001 · Cited by 489 · cited 4×
“Doing anything other than total-preempting, she says, ‘‘will worsen my track record in getting the truth’’ (Zagzebski 2012), 114.”
BackgroundInfluentialEPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, PREEMPTIVE REASONS, AND UNDERSTANDING
Jäger, C. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.38 · Cited by 144
Research works printed but not linked: 22
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- Audi, R. (1986). Belief, reason and inference. Philosophical Topics, 14(1), 27–65. · doi:10.5840/philtopics198614113
- Bunzl, M. (1979). Causal overdetermination. The Journal of Philosophy, 76(3), 134–150. · doi:10.2307/2025525
- Dougherty, T. (2014). Zagzebski, authority, and faith. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4), 47–59. · doi:10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.144
- Dretske, F. (1999). Knowledge and the flow of information. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
- Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and disagreement. Noûs, 41(3), 478–502. · DOI · Paper page
- Funkhouser, E. (2002). Three varieties of causal overdetermination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 83(4), 335–351. · doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00154
- Goldman, A. (2001). Internalism exposed. In H. Kornblith (Ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and externalism (pp. 207–230). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- James, W. (1921). The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.
- Joyce, J. (2005). How probabilities reflect evidence. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 153–178. · DOI · Paper page
- Joyce, J. (2007). Epistemic deference and the case of chance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVII, 187–206. · DOI
- Keren, A. (2007). Epistemic authority, testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Episteme, 4(3), 368–381. · DOI
- Keren, A. (2014). Zagzebski on authority and preemption in the domain of belief. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4), 61–76. · DOI
- Korcz, K. A. (2000). The causal doxastic theory of the basing relation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 30(4), 525–550. · doi:10.1080/00455091.2000.10717542
- Raz, J. (1977). Promises and obligations. In P. M. S. Hacker & J. Raz (Eds.), Law, morality and society (pp. 210–228). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raz, J. (1988). The morality of freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. · DOI · Paper page
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- Schaffer, J. (2003). Overdetermining causes. Philosophical Studies, 114, 23–45. · DOI
- Swain, M. (1981). Reasons and knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Zagzebski, L. (2014). Epistemic authority and its critics. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4), 169–187. · DOI
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Cited by
Artificial Epistemic Authorities
Hauswald, R. (2025) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2025.2449602 · Cited by 46
“Publications discussing preemption include Benton (2014), Bokros (2021), Boyd (2022), Constantin and Grundmann (2020), Croce (2018, 2019), Dormandy (2018), Grundmann (2021a, 2021b), Jäger (2016), Keren (2014a, 2014b, 2020), Lackey (2016, 2018, 2021), Leefmann and Lesle (2020), McMyler (2014),…”
For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach
Croce, M. (2019) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2019.1577511 · Cited by 27
Lange, B. (2026) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-01377-4_9 · Cited by 12
AI and the Philosophy of Expertise and Epistemic Authority
Hauswald, R. (2025) · A Companion to Applied Philosophy of AI · doi:10.1002/9781394238651.ch5 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Dormandy, K.
- Venue
- Erkenntnis
- Published
- 2017-07-19
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 773-791
- ISSN
- 0165-0106
- 1572-8420
- Cited by
- 34
- References
- 2
- Language
- en
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.