The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral consideration
Open accessAbstract
Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to grant some degree of moral consideration to some intelligent social robots: it sketches a novel argument for moral consideration based on social relations. It is shown that to further develop this argument we need to revise our existing ontological and social-political frameworks. It is suggested that we need a social ecology, which may be developed by engaging with Western ecology and Eastern worldviews. Although this relational turn raises many difficult issues and requires more work, this paper provides a rough outline of an alternative approach to moral consideration that can assist us in shaping our relations to intelligent robots and, by extension, to all artificial and biological entities that appear to us as more than instruments for our human purposes.
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Cited by
Robots in the Workplace: a Threat to—or Opportunity for—Meaningful Work?
Smids, J., Nyholm, S., & Berkers, H. (2020) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-019-00377-4 · Cited by 297
Patiency is not a virtue: the design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics
Bryson, J. J. (2018) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-018-9448-6 · Cited by 285
Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents
van Wynsberghe, A., & Robbins, S. (2019) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8 · Cited by 161
“In other words, a machine with moral reasoning capabilities might be thought to deserve moral consideration in the form of rights and/or protections (Coeckelbergh 2010; Darling 2012; Gunkel 2014).”
BackgroundMoral consideration for AI systems by 2030
Sebo, J., & Long, R. (2025) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-023-00379-1 · Cited by 80
Moral consideration of nonhumans in the ethics of artificial intelligence
Owe, A., & Baum, S. D. (2021) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-021-00065-0 · Cited by 73
Metadata
- Authors
- Coeckelbergh, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Twente (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Coeckelbergh, Mark
- ORCID
- Coeckelbergh, Mark
- Venue
- Ethics and Information Technology
- Published
- 2010-06-27
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 209-221
- ISSN
- 1388-1957 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8439
- OpenAlex
- W2116547831
- Cited by
- 391
- References
- 60
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 48 · 2023: 49 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 43 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 39.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc
- Locations
- Ethics and Information Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- University of Twente Research Information (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
- University of Twente Research Information (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- robot rights, moral considerations, artificial intelligence, social robots, relational ethics, virtue ethics, deontology, utilitarianism, social ecology, human-robot relationships
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