The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 66 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents
Open accessAbstract
Many industry leaders and academics from the field of machine ethics would have us believe that the inevitability of robots coming to have a larger role in our lives demands that robots be endowed with moral reasoning capabilities. Robots endowed in this way may be referred to as artificial moral agents (AMA). Reasons often given for developing AMAs are: the prevention of harm, the necessity for public trust, the prevention of immoral use, such machines are better moral reasoners than humans, and building these machines would lead to a better understanding of human morality. Although some scholars have challenged the very initiative to develop AMAs, what is currently missing from the debate is a closer examination of the reasons offered by machine ethicists to justify the development of AMAs. This closer examination is especially needed because of the amount of funding currently being allocated to the development of AMAs (from funders like Elon Musk) coupled with the amount of attention researchers and industry leaders receive in the media for their efforts in this direction. The stakes in this debate are high because moral robots would make demands on society; answers to a host of pending questions about what counts as an AMA and whether they are morally responsible for their behavior or not. This paper shifts the burden of proof back to the machine ethicists demanding that they give good reasons to build AMAs. The paper argues that until this is done, the development of commercially available AMAs should not proceed further.
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“Whilst useful in creating debate, these tend to present either no solutions at all or overly simplified single solutions [13, 15, 19, 29, 32, 35, 56, 60, 64, 89, 96, 104].”
From AI bias: exploring discriminatory algorithmic decision-making models and the application of possible machine-centric solutions adapted from the pharmaceutical industry (2022) · cites this paper as [89]
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“the current literature is a dichotomy with studies originating from the contrasting fields of study of either philosophy and sociology or data science and programming”
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- van Wynsberghe, A., & Robbins, S.
- Affiliations
- Delft University of Technology (NL)
- Venue
- Science and Engineering Ethics
- Published
- 2018-02-19
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 719-735
- ISSN
- 1353-3452 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-5546
- PMC
- PMC6591188
- OpenAlex
- W2792732529
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 66
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 24.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- Locations
- Science and Engineering Ethics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Research Repository (Delft University of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (275-20-054)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Keywords
- artificial moral agents, machine ethics, moral reasoning, harm prevention, public trust, research funding
- MeSH terms
- Artificial Intelligence, Humans, Morals, Robotics, Ethical Analysis, Ethicists, Moral Development
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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