The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives
Open accessAbstract
This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors' exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly monitoring of the issuer. Optimal incentives to monitor the issuer may involve restricting the monitor's right to sell her claims on the firm's cash-flow early. But the monitor will then require a liquidity premium for holding such an illiquid claim. In general, therefore, there will be a trade off between incentives and liquidity. The paper highlights a fundamental complementarity between speculative monitoring in financial markets (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active monitoring inside the firm: in financial markets where price discovery is better and securities prices reflect the fundamentals of the issuer better, the incentive cost of greater liquidity may be smaller and active monitoring incentives may be preserved. The paper spells out the conditions under which more or less liquidity is warranted and applies the analysis to shed light on common exit provisions in venture capital financing.
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Citations
Cites
Why new issues are underpriced
Rock, K. (1986) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(86)90054-1 · Cited by 2,788
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261893 · Cited by 1,719
The role of venture capital in the creation of public companies
Barry, C. B., Muscarella, C. J., Peavy, J. W., & Vetsuypens, M. R. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90064-7 · Cited by 1,167
New issues in corporate finance
Mayer, C. (1988) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(88)90077-3 · Cited by 716 · cited 1×
“4In particular, see Co®ee (1991); other authors such as Mayer (1988), Bhide (1993), Roe (1994) and Kojima (1995), further suggest that a strength of Japanese and German corporate governance systems is that they ensure better involvement in ¯rms of large (institutional) shareholders by restricting…”
Background
Cited by
Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans
SUFI, A. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01219.x · Cited by 1,566
Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia
EDMANS, A. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01508.x · Cited by 1,258
The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp037 · Cited by 907
Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders
Edmans, A., & Manso, G. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq145 · Cited by 876
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
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Metadata
- Authors
- Aghion, P., Bolton, P., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Review of Finance
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-01-01
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 327-353
- ISSN
- 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-692X
- 1572-3097
- OpenAlex
- W2131859993
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 43.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.