Cited by 1,118Auction Theory and ApplicationsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesNames, Identity, and Discrimination Research

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment

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Abstract

We conducted the first randomized controlled field experiment of an Internet reputation mechanism. A high-reputation, established eBay dealer sold matched pairs of lots— batches of vintage postcards—under his regular identity and under new seller identities (also operated by him). As predicted, the established identity fared better. The difference in buyers’ willingness-to-pay was 8.1% of the selling price. A subsidiary experiment followed the same format, but compared sales by relatively new sellers with and without negative feedback. Surprisingly, one or two negative feedbacks for our new sellers did not affect buyers’ willingness-to-pay.

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Metadata

Authors
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K.
Affiliations
  • University of Michigan (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Northwestern University (US)
Venue
Experimental Economics
Published
2006-06
Volume
9
Issue
2
Pages
79-101
ISSN
  • 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-6938
OpenAlex
W3121755630
Cited by
1,118
References
36
Citations by year
2026: 25 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 38 · 2020: 40 · 2019: 66 · 2018: 41 · 2017: 55 · 2016: 44 · 2015: 60 · 2014: 62 · 2013: 60 · 2012: 91
FWCI
109.70
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Experimental Economics (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation
  • Carnegie Mellon University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research
Keywords
online reputation, eBay, online auctions, willingness to pay, negative feedback, buyer behavior, online marketplaces

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