The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Open accessAbstract
We conducted the first randomized controlled field experiment of an Internet reputation mechanism. A high-reputation, established eBay dealer sold matched pairs of lots— batches of vintage postcards—under his regular identity and under new seller identities (also operated by him). As predicted, the established identity fared better. The difference in buyers’ willingness-to-pay was 8.1% of the selling price. A subsidiary experiment followed the same format, but compared sales by relatively new sellers with and without negative feedback. Surprisingly, one or two negative feedbacks for our new sellers did not affect buyers’ willingness-to-pay.
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“Further, prior research suggests that it is difficult for new complementors who have just joined a new platform to collect good ratings. These new complementors often find themselves competing with more established complementors who have already built a track record (Gutt and Herrmann 2015; Resnick et al. 2006).”
From In Stars We Trust – A Note on Reputation Portability Between Digital Platforms (2022) · cites this paper as Resnick et al. 2006
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“They estimate an 8% price premium to having 2,000 positive and 1 negative feedback over a reputation of 10 positive and no negative feedbacks.”
From Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets (2016) · cites this paper as Resnick et al. (2006)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“This is highlighted by the puzzlement of economists that find evaluative infrastructures to be capable of sustaining markets despite being plagued by factual inaccuracies, misleading claims, and unrepresentative assessments (Tadelis, 2016;Resnick, et al., 2006).”
From Evaluative infrastructures: Accounting for platform organization (2017) · cites this paper as Resnick, et al., 2006
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K.
- Affiliations
- University of Michigan (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Northwestern University (US)
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2006-06
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 79-101
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W3121755630
- Cited by
- 1,118
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 38 · 2020: 40 · 2019: 66 · 2018: 41 · 2017: 55 · 2016: 44 · 2015: 60 · 2014: 62 · 2013: 60 · 2012: 91
- FWCI
- 109.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Experimental Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Carnegie Mellon University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research
- Keywords
- online reputation, eBay, online auctions, willingness to pay, negative feedback, buyer behavior, online marketplaces
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