Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
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In repeated public goods games, only a few individuals tend to be altruists or free-riders.
“Moreover, it has also been observed that, in repeated public goods games, most people behave like conditional cooperators—individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so—and only a few individuals tend to be altruists (i.e., unconditional cooperators) or free-riders16,17,27,75,76.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [16]
Most people behave like conditional cooperators, individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so.
“Moreover, it has also been observed that, in repeated public goods games, most people behave like conditional cooperators—individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so—and only a few individuals tend to be altruists (i.e., unconditional cooperators) or free-riders16,17,27,75,76.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [16]
Behavioural experiments on the PGG have shown that most people contribute to the common pool, and only a few individuals free ride.
“However, contrary to the predictions made by standard game theory, behavioural experiments on the PGG have shown that most people contribute to the common pool, and only a few individuals free ride16,16,26,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [16]
People are also more likely to cooperate when they believe that others are cooperating.
“People are also more likely to cooperate when they believe that others are cooperating 191 .”
From Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response (2020) · cites this paper as [191]
Many people increase their contribution to a public good if others also increase their contributions, although, in material terms, each individual has a strict incentive to contribute nothing.
“It is shown by Croson (2000), Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001), and Falk and Fischbacher (2001) that many people increase their contribution to a public good if others also increase their contributions, although, in material terms, each individual has a strict incentive to contribute nothing.”
From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001)
Reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation also plays an important role in the context of the provision of public goods.
“Reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation also plays an important role in the context of the provision of public goods.”
From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001)
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- Authors
- Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fischbacher, Urs
- Venue
- Economics Letters
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-06
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 397-404
- ISSN
- 0165-1765 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125314754
- Cited by
- 2,780
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 89 · 2025: 135 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 109 · 2022: 146 · 2021: 171 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 118 · 2018: 143 · 2017: 131 · 2016: 138 · 2015: 159 · 2014: 134 · 2013: 159 · 2012: 119
- FWCI
- 136.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.zora.uzh.ch
- Licence
- Locations
- Economics Letters (publishedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- conditional cooperation, public goods game, free-riding, one-shot games, strategy method, cooperation
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