Is there a hidden cost of imposing a minimum contribution level for public good contributions?
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We examine the effects of either exogenously imposing or endogenously letting subjects choose whether to impose minimum contribution levels (MCLs) in a linear public goods experiment using the strategy method. Our results on contribution levels to the public goods are fairly independent of how MCLs are imposed. We find that the main effect of an MCL on unconditional contributions is that it increases low contribution levels to the MCL imposed, while the effect of those contributing more than the MCL before its introduction depends on the size of the MCL. Unexpectedly, there is much more crowding out for a low MCL than for a relatively high MCL. However, the distribution of contribution types is stable across different MCLs.
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Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders, observe who is trustworthy, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels.
“Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders19, observe who is trustworthy20, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels21,22.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [21]
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- Authors
- Kocher, M. G., Martinsson, P., Persson, E., & Wang, X.
- Affiliations
- Queensland University of Technology (AU)
- Linköping University (SE)
- University of Gothenburg (SE)
- Renmin University of China (CN)
- Corresponding author
- Wang, Xianghong
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-10
- Volume
- 56
- Pages
- 74-84
- ISSN
- 0167-4870 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2341692570
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 21
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 6.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- eprints.qut.edu.au
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Psychology (publishedVersion)
- QUT ePrints (Queensland University of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Gothenburg University Publications Electronic Archive (Gothenburg University) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Swedish Research Council
- Human Cooperation to Manage Natural Resources
- Ideenfonds of the University of Munich
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71373273)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Policies and Impacts
- Keywords
- public goods, voluntary contributions, crowding out, strategy method
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