Cited by 31Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEconomic Policies and Impacts

Is there a hidden cost of imposing a minimum contribution level for public good contributions?

Open access
Kocher, Martin G., Martinsson, Peter, Persson, Emil, Wang, Xianghong·2016·Journal of Economic Psychology

Abstract

We examine the effects of either exogenously imposing or endogenously letting subjects choose whether to impose minimum contribution levels (MCLs) in a linear public goods experiment using the strategy method. Our results on contribution levels to the public goods are fairly independent of how MCLs are imposed. We find that the main effect of an MCL on unconditional contributions is that it increases low contribution levels to the MCL imposed, while the effect of those contributing more than the MCL before its introduction depends on the size of the MCL. Unexpectedly, there is much more crowding out for a low MCL than for a relatively high MCL. However, the distribution of contribution types is stable across different MCLs.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.007

Cites

21 of 21 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders, observe who is trustworthy, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels.

    “Cooperation tends to increase when players can vote for exclusion of free riders19, observe who is trustworthy20, or enter into contracts that enforce minimum reciprocation levels21,22.”

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Kocher, M. G., Martinsson, P., Persson, E., & Wang, X.
Affiliations
  • Queensland University of Technology (AU)
  • Linköping University (SE)
  • University of Gothenburg (SE)
  • Renmin University of China (CN)
Corresponding author
Wang, Xianghong
Venue
Journal of Economic Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2016-10
Volume
56
Pages
74-84
ISSN
0167-4870 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2341692570
Cited by
31
References
21
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1
FWCI
6.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Economic Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • QUT ePrints (Queensland University of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Gothenburg University Publications Electronic Archive (Gothenburg University) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Swedish Research Council
  • Human Cooperation to Manage Natural Resources
  • Ideenfonds of the University of Munich
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (71373273)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Policies and Impacts
Keywords
public goods, voluntary contributions, crowding out, strategy method

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review