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Is Yogācāra Phenomenology? Some Evidence from the Cheng weishi lun

Sharf, Robert H. · 2016 · Journal of Indian Philosophy

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 51 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Sharf argues that the *Cheng weishi lun*’s accounts of the five omnipresent mental factors and the four aspects of cognition do not support reading early Yogācāra as Husserlian phenomenology. He concludes that the later Dignāga–Dharmakīrti pramāṇa tradition did take a “phenomenological turn,” but that both it and phenomenology falter in relating conceptual content to non-conceptual experience.

Key findings

  • In the *Cheng weishi lun*’s fascicle 3 commentary on *Triṃśikā* verse 3, the five omnipresent factors—contact, attention, sensation, conception, and volition—are not treated as first-person phenomenal features; contact and attention are instead analyzed as subliminal cognitive machinery, with attention distinguished from meditative concentration (*samādhi*) and detached from the mental continuum.
  • The *Cheng weishi lun*’s fascicle 2 account of the “four aspects” (*sifen*) counterposes two-, three-, and four-aspect theories; Dharmapāla/Xuanzang posits a fourth aspect to cognize self-awareness, avoiding infinite regress and aligning with the Abhidharma requirement that knowing entails a distinct known object.
  • Dignāga’s self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*, *svasaṃvitti*) arises in pramāṇa theory, not phenomenological investigation; Sharf argues it bridges pure perception and inference only by an equivocation or “cheat,” since it must be both contentless and contentful.
  • Sharf concludes that the *Cheng weishi lun* is closer to “classical” Yogācāra and Abhidharma/Madhyamaka, while the later pramāṇa tradition influenced Tibetan exegesis took a phenomenological turn—yet both Dignāga and Husserl stumble when deriving conceptual content from non-conceptual experience.

Methods

  • Philosophical and historical textual analysis of the *Cheng weishi lun*, focusing on the five omnipresent mental factors and the four aspects of cognition, with comparison to Indian Abhidharma, Sthiramati, Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and Western phenomenology.
  • Uses Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan sources in translation, Taishō citations, and secondary scholarship; no empirical sample, quantitative data, or experimental analysis is reported.

Limitations

  • The author states the paper is a “provisional foray” into both subjects and that he lacks the time or expertise to survey the large secondary literature on Buddhist epistemology (*pramāṇavāda*).
  • The author limits the argument to the *Cheng weishi lun* and early Yogācāra “writ large,” while distinguishing later pramāṇa and Tibetan developments.
  • Evident from the text: the study is interpretive and comparative rather than exhaustive, relying on selected passages and translations, and its critique of phenomenology is programmatic rather than a full historical survey.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s10781-015-9282-7

Cites

72 of 72 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 11 Not valid · 41 Not checked · 83 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 72 references

Research works printed but not linked: 13

  1. Arnold, D. A. (2005). Buddhists, brahmins, and belief: Epistemology in Indian and Buddhist philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.
  2. de La Vallée Poussin, L. (1988–1990). Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam (L. M. Pruden, Trans.) (4 Vols.). Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press.
  3. Deleanu, F. (2013). Meditative practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and liberation through the thing-in-itself. In U. T. Kragh (Ed.), The foundation for yoga practitioners: The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi treatise and its adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet (pp. 884–919). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  4. Dhammajoti, K. L. (2009). Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (4th revised ed.). Hong Kong: Center for Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong (1st ed. published in Colombo, 2002).
  5. Dreyfus, G. (2007). Is perception intentional? A preliminary exploration of intentionality in Dharmakīrti. In B. Kellner, H. Krasser, M. T. Much, & H. Tauscher (Eds.), Pramāṇakīrti: Papers dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the occasion of his 70th birthday (pp. 95–113). Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien.
  6. Garfield, J. L. (2011). Ask not what Buddhism can do for cognitive science; ask what cognitive science can do for Buddhism. Bulletin of Tibetology, 47, 15–30.
  7. Hammerstrom, E. J. (2010). Buddhists discuss science in Modern China (1895–1949). Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University.
  8. Husserl, E. (1965). Philosophy and the crisis of European man. In Q. Lauer (Trans.), Phenomenology and the crisis of philosophy (pp. 149–192). New York: Harper & Row. (A translation of “Die Philosophie in der Krisis europäischen Menschheit,” delivered in Vienna in 1935.)
  9. Kawamura, L. S. (1964). A study of the Triṃśikā–Vijñapti-Bhāṣya. M.A. Thesis, Kyoto University.
  10. Kern, I. (1992). Object, objective phenomenon and objectivating act according to the ‘Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi’ of Xuanzang (600–644). In D. P. Chattopadhyaya, L. Embree, & J. Mohanty (Eds.), Phenomenology and Indian philosophy (pp. 262–269). Albany: SUNY Press.
  11. Krasser, H. (2004). Are Buddhist Pramāṇavādins non-Buddhistic? Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the impact of logic and epistemology on emancipation. Hōrin, 11, 129–146.
  12. Schmithausen, L. (1976). On the problem of the relation of spiritual practice and philosophical theory in Buddhism. In German scholars on India (Vol. 2, pp. 235–250). Bombay: Nachiketa Publications.
  13. Watson, A. (2006). The self’s awareness of itself: Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s arguments against the Buddhist doctrine of no-self. Vienna: Sammlung de Nobili, Institut für Südasien-, Tibet-und Buddhismuskunde der Universität Wien.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Sharf, R. H.
Affiliations
University of California, Berkeley (US)
Corresponding author
Sharf, Robert H.
Venue
Journal of Indian Philosophy
Published
2015-09-04
Volume
44
Issue
4
Pages
777-807
ISSN
  • 0022-1791 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0395
OpenAlex
W2285824080
Cited by
18
References
72
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2017: 3
FWCI
20.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of Indian Philosophy (publishedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Religious studies › Indian and Buddhist Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
Yogācāra, Vasubandhu, self-awareness, Edmund Husserl, Dignāga, Dharmakirti

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Is Yogācāra Phenomenology? Some Evidence from the Cheng weishi lun. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10781-015-9282-7
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Sharf, R. H. (2016). Is Yogācāra Phenomenology? Some Evidence from the Cheng weishi lun. Journal of Indian Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-015-9282-7

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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