Knowing Blue: Early Buddhist Accounts of Non-Conceptual Sense Perception

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Vaibhāṣikas hold that all three elements (object, faculty, cognition) must coexist for perception to occur.

“As mentioned above, the Vaibhās .ikas hold that all three elements must coexist for perception to occur; it makes little sense, they reason, to talk of sense perception (pratyaks .a) with respect to a non-existent sense object.16”

• cites [16]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Buddhist scholiasts sought to produce an account of mind and perceptual experience that does not invoke an enduring self or subject.

“To appreciate the pericope, keep in mind that Buddhist scholiasts sought to produce, using the resources provided in the scriptures, a robust account of mind and perceptual experience that does not invoke an enduring self or subject (ātman).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Sense cognition grasps the inherent characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of the object but not its generic characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa).

“As such, it is sometimes said that sense cognition grasps the”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Visual cognition is said to know 'blue' but not 'this is blue'; only mind-cognition can know 'this is blue'.

“In an oft-repeated example, visual cognition is said to know”

• cites [14]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Mind-cognition has access to mental objects (dharmas) and to sense percepts transduced from the five material senses.

“Mind-cognition, on the other hand, has access to mental objects (dharmas) as well as to sense percepts that are transduced from the five material senses.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Some teachers of new Burmese mindfulness practices interpret sati as bare awareness or bare attention, meaning attending directly to sensations without discursive reflection, emotional response, or ethical judgment.

“Some teachers of the new Burmese practices interpret mindfulness (Pali: sati, Sanskrit: smṛti) as”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Mahāvedalla-sutta consists of questions Mahā Kotthita poses to Sāriputta and Sāriputta's responses.

“The Mahāvedalla-sutta (Majjhima-nikāya 43) consists of a series of questions that Mahā Kot .t .hita poses to Sāriputta, along with Sāriputta's responses.”

May combine two claims.

In the Mahāvedalla-sutta, Sāriputta says the five sense faculties have mind as their resort, and mind experiences their fields and domains.

“To which Sāriputta responds,”

• cites [12]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The pericope touches upon all eighteen elements that comprise the phenomenal world and their causal and temporal interrelations.

“Its appeal lay in the succinct manner in which it touches upon all eighteen elements (dhātu) that collectively comprise the phenomenal world, as well as their causal and temporal interrelations.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The cultivation of non-conceptual states of luminous or mirror consciousness was controversial; detractors argued it contravened orthodox teachings and/or fostered antinomian and ethically pernicious behavior.

“However, the cultivation of non-conceptual states of”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

According to Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas, the objects of the five sense cognitions must coexist with cognition itself.

“but also that these objects must, at least according to the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhās .ikas, coexist with cognition itself.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The arising-of-mind pericope appears repeatedly in the Pali canon and in parallel passages in the Chinese Āgamas, serving as a stock formulation.

“While the passage is found here embedded in a sermon on suffering, the section italicized above appears repeatedly in the Pali canon, as well as in parallel passages in the Chinese Āgamas, serving as a stock formulation or”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Eye-cognition can only register a visual form if that form exists in the present.

“That is to say, eye-cognition can only register a visual form if said form exists in the present.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Nidānavagga-sutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya contains a succinct account of the arising of mind.

“The Nidānavagga-sutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya contains the following succinct account of the arising of mind:”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The preceding moment of cognition functions as the mana-indriya or mind-faculty of the subsequent arising of mind (manas).

“In technical terms, the preceding moment of cognition is said to function as the mana-indriya or”

May combine two claims.

Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti) came to play a pivotal role in later Indo-Tibetan Yogācāra epistemology, comparable to pre-reflective consciousness in some contemporary phenomenology.

“This aspect, known as”

• cites [8]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The five sense cognitions have access only to their proper objects (eye to visual objects, ear to sounds, etc.).

“We learn not only that the five sense cognitions have access only to their proper objects (i.e., the eye to visual objects, the ear to sounds, and so on), but also that these objects must, at least according to the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhās .ikas, coexist with cognition itself.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Non-conceptual discernment was important in certain post-sixth-century Buddhist meditation traditions, notably subitist Tantra, Chan, and Dzogchen.

“Non-conceptual discernment was also important in certain post-sixthcentury traditions of Buddhist meditation, notably the”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Mind can perceive past and future objects as well as present objects.

“Moreover, mind can perceive past and future objects as well as objects in the present.”

May combine two claims.

Sautrāntikas reject simultaneous causation as incoherent and insist that cognition emerges after the arising of the sense object and sense faculty.

“In contrast, Sautrāntikas reject simultaneous causation as incoherent; they insist, on both exegetical and philosophical grounds, that cognition emerges after the arising of the sense object and sense faculty.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The pericope leaves ambiguous how to understand the temporal and causal relationships between perceptual object, sense faculty, and cognition.

“Another was how to understand the temporal and causal relationships that pertain between the perceptual object, the sense faculty, and cognition.”

May combine two claims.

Abhidharmakośa kārikā 1.32 says the five cognitions are accompanied by vitarka and vicāra, the latter three have three possibilities, and everything else lacks them.

“kārikā 1.32 of the Abhidharmakośa asserts the same thing: “The five cognitions are [always accompanied] by vitarka and vicāra; of the latter three [elements associated with manas], there are three [possibilities]; everything else lacks it””

• cites [37]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The same Vijñānakāya formula is repeated for nose and odor, tongue and taste, body and touch, and it concludes that mind-cognition discerns all dharmas.

“The Vijñānakāya passage goes on to repeat the same formula for nose and odor, tongue and taste, body and touch, and concludes by saying that “mind-cognition is also able to discern all dharmas””

May combine two claims.

Early Ābhidharmikas did not first use vitarka and vicāra for sense perception itself; their exegetical focus was distinguishing dhyāna states.

“It appears that early Ābhidharmikas did not initially deploy vitarka and vicāra in their analyses of sense perception per se.Their exegetical interests lay, rather, in distinguishing different dhyānic states.”

May combine two claims.

Vaibhāṣika commentators claim that only vitarka is active in sensory perception, despite earlier statements that both vitarka and vicāra are present there.

“Vaibhās .ika commentators will claim that vitarka alone is active (as opposed to simply present) in sensory perception.”

• cites [39]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

The object-field of sense cognition changes continually, but mind-cognition's perceptual object, grasped through a conceptual category, can persist across moments.

“While the object-field grasped by sense cognition is continually changing, the perceptual object [ālambana] of mind-cognition, which is apprehended via a conceptual category, can persist from one moment to the next.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The commentary says resistance contact is named from its basis, designation contact from its cognitive object, and name is the primary object of mental contact.

“Thus the name “resistance contact” is derived from its basis (āśraya), while the name “designation contact” is derived from its cognitive object (ālambana).”

• cites T.1558: 29.52c4-10Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Saṃghabhadra also refers to knowing blue in his Nyāyānusāra discussion of mind-cognition.

“Saṃghabhadra will similarly reference “knowing blue” in his discussion of mind-cognition in his *Nyāyānusāra”

May combine two claims.

Vaibhāṣikas divide the six contacts into resistance contact, tied to a sense faculty meeting a material object, and verbal-designation contact, tied exclusively to mind meeting a name or concept.

“The first is known as “contact of resistance” (pratigha-saṃsparśa, youdui chu 有對觸), as it is associated with the resistance a sense faculty encounters when confronted with a material object (rūpa).The second is “contact of verbal designation” (adhivacanasaṃsparśa, zengyu chu 增語觸) and is associated exclusively with the mind and its encounter with a name or concept.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Five sense cognitions are sometimes said to apprehend svalakṣaṇa, while mind-cognition apprehends sāmānyalakṣaṇa involving concepts and categories.

“five sense cognitions are sometimes said to apprehend the “inherent characteristic” (svalaks .aṇa) of the object-a transient particular-while mind-cognition apprehends the “generic characteristic” (sāmānyalaks .aṇa)”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The Nyāyānusāra says eye-cognition only generally apprehends form and blue, not sound, the designation 'blue', pleasantness, gender, person or tree stump, or gain and loss.

“it will only apprehend blue but not the designation “blue” and so on, and not that it is pleasing or not pleasing, not that it is male or female, not that it is a man or a tree stump, not that it is gained or lost”

• cites T.1562: 29.342a17-22Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Later, vitarka was understood as initial imprecise detection of an object, and vicāra as subsequent mental inspection.

“In time, vitarka came to be understood as the initial and imprecise detection/discernment/recognition of a perceptual object, while vicāra is understood as the subsequent mental inspection of said object.”

May combine two claims.

The Vijñānakāya-śāstra says eye-cognition can discern blue but cannot discern 'this is blue'; mind-cognition can discern blue and, if it can discern the name, can discern both blue and 'this is blue'.

“Eye-cognition is only able to discern blue; it is unable to discern “this is blue.”Mind-cognition is also able to discern blue.As long as [mind-cognition] is unable to discern [the color's] name, it is unable to discern “this is blue.”But should it be able to discern its name, it discerns, at the same time, both “blue” and “this is blue.””

• cites [27]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Inherent discrimination alone is vitarka.

“Inherent discrimination alone is vitarka.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Abhidharmakośa raises the problem: if the five sensory cognitions always have vitarka and vicāra, why are they said to be free from discrimination?

“If the five sensory cognitions are always accompanied by vitarka and vicāra, why are they explained as being free from discrimination?”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Mahāvibhāṣā defines vitarka as cognition seeking out, distinguishing, revealing, determining, representing, and discriminating an object's nature and category.

“What is vitarka?Answer: when any of the [six kinds] of cognition seek out, distinguish, reveal, determine, represent, and discriminate [the object's] nature and category, this is vitarka.”

• cites T.1545: 27.219a2-4Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

The early Mahāvibhāṣā translation has inherent discrimination as vitarka alone, while Xuanzang's later one includes both; this is the inverse of the Abhidharmakośa translations.

“So in the early translation of the Mahāvibhās .ā, which is also our earliest witness to the *trivikalpa doctrine, the inherent discrimination characteristic of sense cognition is said to be vitarka alone, but Xuanzang's later translation includes both vitarka and vicāra.This is the precise inverse of what we found in the two translations of Abhidharmakośa”

May combine two claims.

Inherent discrimination is associated with vitarka but not with smṛti or prajñā.

““Inherent discrimination” is associated with vitarka but not smṛti and prajñā.”

May combine two claims.

Ābhidharmikas held that reality's constituents are in continual flux, that conceptual recognition applies a generic name to a transient particular, and that there is a temporal gap between apprehension and identification.

“the constituent elements of reality are in continual flux; (2) conceptual recognition of a percept involves applying a generic name to a transient particular that emerges from the flux; and (3) there must be a temporal gap between the moment when the transient particular is first apprehended and the subsequent moment when it is identified with a generic name.”

May combine two claims.

In the desire realm, the five cognitions have only inherent discrimination; they have recollection but not its discrimination, and knowledge but not its discrimination, because they cannot recollect or examine.

“In the realm of desire, the five cognitions have only [the first] kind, namely, inherent discrimination.Although they also have recollection, it is not the discrimination of recollection because they are incapable of recollection.Although they also have knowledge, it is not the discrimination of examination, for they are incapable of examination.”

• cites T.1545: 27.219b9-11Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The Mahāvibhāṣā introduces three kinds of vikalpa: inherent discrimination as vitarka-vicāra, recollection discrimination as smṛti, and examination discrimination as prajñā.

“the text goes on, as we have seen, to introduce the three kinds of vikalpa: “There are three kinds of discrimination: (1) inherent discrimination, which is to say vitarka-vicāra; (2) discrimination through recollection, which is the recollection associated with mind-cognition; and (3) discrimination through examination, which is the knowing associated with mind-cognition when not absorbed in medit”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The Mahāvibhāṣā holds that vitarka and vicāra are real entities that can coexist in time, though one dominates at any moment.

“The position of the Mahāvibhās .ā is that vitarka and vicāra are in fact real entities (dharmas) that can coexist in time, but at any particular moment one or the other will come to the fore.”

May combine two claims.

Recollection and knowledge are classified as omnipresent mental factors and therefore must be present in all cognition, including the five material senses.

“recollection and knowledge are both classified as “omnipresent mental factors” (mahābhūmika), and as such must be present in all cognition, including that of the five material senses.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The five sensory cognitions are said to lack discrimination because they have inherent discrimination but not the other two.

“The five sensory cognitions are explained as free from discrimination insofar as they have inherent [discrimination] but not the other two kinds.”

May combine two claims.

Xuanzang's Abhidharmakośa translation says svabhāvavikalpa is vitarka alone, matching the extant Sanskrit.

“Xuanzang's translation, completed in 654, matches the extant Sanskrit text: tatra svabhāvavikalpo vitarkah”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

In the Chinese parallel to the Mahāvedalla-sutta, Mahākauṣṭhila is the one who answers Śāriputra, not the reverse.

“Note that in the Chinese, it is Mahākaus .t .hila (Juchiluo 拘絺羅) who is responding to Śāriputra, rather than the other way around.”

• cites T.26: 1.791b11-17Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Paramārtha's translation of the Abhidharmakośa renders the kārikā as 有覺亦有觀定是五識界.

“In Paramārtha's translation of the Abhidharmakośa, the kārikā is rendered 有覺亦有觀定是五識界 (T.1559: 29.168a12-13).”

• cites T.1559: 29.168a12-13Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The Ming canon reads 有 instead of 唯, a variant that also appears in later works such as the *Nyāyānusāra.

“The Ming canon has 有 for 唯, a variant that appears in later works as well including the *Nyāyānusāra, T.1562: 29.350a5.”

• cites T.1562: 29.350a5Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The traditional meaning of sati/smṛti is to remember, recollect, or bear in mind.

“Yet, as critics note, understanding sati as bare or non-conceptual awareness seems odd on the face of it, given that the traditional meaning of sati/smṛti is to”

• cites [9]Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The Mahāvedalla-sutta likely belongs to a relatively late stratum of the suttapiṭaka and is seen by some scholars as a precursor to systematic Abhidharma exposition.

“Accordingly, some scholars see this text, which likely belongs to a relatively late strata of the suttapit .aka, as precursor to the kind of systematic exposition found in Abhidharma literature.”

May combine two claims.

The arising-of-mind pericope gives no hint of a structural difference between sense cognition and mind-cognition; the asymmetry was introduced in later texts such as the Mahāvedalla and early commentarial works to make the distributed cognition model intelligible.

“Note that the arising-of-mind pericope gives no hint of any structural difference between sense cognition and mind-cognition; the asymmetry seems to have been introduced in later texts such as the Mahāvedalla and early commentarial works so as to render the Buddhist model of distributed cognition intelligible.”

May combine two claims.

Mind is unique among the six faculties in having access to and serving as foundation for the other five.

“In short, mind is unique among the six faculties in having access to, and serving as foundation or”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The Mahāvedalla-sutta may be the earliest extant Buddhist text to posit a structural asymmetry between the five sense cognitions and mind-cognition.

“In any case, it may be the earliest extant Buddhist text to posit a structural asymmetry between (1) the five cognitions associated with the material senses (hereafter: the five sense cognitions), and (2) mind-cognition.”

May combine two claims.

This asymmetry is crucial for the Buddhist analysis of mind and cognition, and the Ābhidharmikas develop it at length.

“This asymmetry turns out to be crucial for the Buddhist analysis of mind and cognition, and the Ābhidharmikas develop it at length.”

May combine two claims.

This creates a total of eighteen elements that account for the entirety of conscious experience, with no need for an independent observer.

“This creates a total of eighteen elements that collectively account for the entirety of conscious experience; there is no need for an independent observer that sits astride the process.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

These developments date to the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries and were likely influenced by non-Buddhist Indian religious traditions, including Tantra.

“These developments, which date to the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries, were likely influenced by non-Buddhist Indian religious traditions, including Tantra.”

The quote only partly states this claim.

Eliminating those cognitive factors does not yield a luminous pure consciousness but instead progressively attenuates consciousness.

“But the elimination of these factors does not result in a more luminous or transparent state of”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Eye-cognition can differentiate blue from yellow, red, and white before concepts like 'blue' and 'yellow' are applied.

“the claim, it would appear, is that eye-cognition can differentiate blue from yellow or red or white, and that this occurs in the perceptual stream prior to the application of concepts such as “blue” and “yellow” and “red” and “white.””

May combine two claims.

Vaibhāṣikas hold that immediate sense perception of a svalakṣaṇa is non-conceptual yet still involves minimal discrimination.

“although the immediate sense perception of a svalaks .aṇa does not involve the use of concepts and language, it still entails some minimal discriminative capacity”

May combine two claims.

The resistance/designation contact distinction rests on different ontologies of perceptual objects and is captured epistemically by knowing blue versus knowing 'this is blue'.

“The distinction between resistance contact and designation contact is thus predicated on the different ontologies of their perceptual objects, and this is captured epistemically in the distinction between knowing blue and knowing “this is blue.””

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Vitarka is the rudimentary coarse recognition that knows blue, while vicāra is the refined discriminatory capacity involved in knowing 'this is blue'.

“Vitarka is that rudimentary or “coarse” mode of recognition that knows blue, while vicāra is a more refined discriminatory capacity involved in knowing “this is blue.””

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Saṃghabhadra says that although the five sense faculties are associated with knowledge and memory, their capacity to discern and register is minuscule, so knowledge and memory are only grasped by mind.

“although the five sense faculties are associated with knowledge and memory, their capacity to discern and register [therein] is minuscule, and thus [knowledge and memory] are only grasped by mind”

• cites T.1562Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Different Chinese translations give conflicting answers about vicāra; this may reflect time needed to work out trivikalpa theory and real inconsistencies among early recensions.

“That different Chinese translations provide conflicting responses to this question may reflect the fact that it took time to sort out the details of the new *trivikalpa theory.In other words, rather than being simple errors on the part of the Chinese translators or later copyists, the variant renderings may reflect real inconsistencies among early recensions of the source texts.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The claim that omnipresent factors are present but operate only weakly is difficult to accept for knowing (prajñā) and ideation (saṃjñā), since it is unclear what functionality they retain once stripped of access to names and concepts.

“This is difficult to swallow when it comes to factors like knowing (prajñā) and ideation (saṃjñā), since it is unclear what functionality they retain, however minimal, once they are stripped of access to names and concepts.”

May combine two claims.

The Ābhidharmikas proposed three kinds of discrimination to explain that there is coarse discriminatory activity in a previously non-discriminative state and that certain normally conceptual mental factors are present but not fully active in nonconceptual sense cognition.

“So the Ābhidharmikas punted: they proffered the theory of three kinds of discrimination (*trivikalpa) that would explain, at one and the same time, (1) that there is indeed a modicum of coarse discriminatory activity in what was previously supposed to be a non-discriminative (avikalpaka) state, and (2) that certain mental factors (smṛti, prajñā, saṃjñā), normally deemed conceptual, are present but”

May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

The mature Vaibhāṣika position is that eye-cognition's capacity to register blue but not know 'this is blue' involves a minimal kind of discrimination (svabhāvavikalpa), associated with a rudimentary or coarse form of recognition (vitarka) and a weak or minuscule form of memory and recognition.

“Accordingly, the mature Vaibhās .ika position is that the capacity of eyecognition to register blue but not know”

May combine two claims.

They treat vicāra similarly: it may be present with vitarka in sense cognition, but only vitarka is operative.

“they can concede that while vicāra may be present along with vitarka in sense cognition (as scripturally mandated), only vitarka is operative.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Knowing blue must at least involve knowing that it is not yellow, red, or white.

“After all, knowing blue must be to know, at the very least, that it is something other than yellow or red or white.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

On a charitable reading, svabhāvavikalpa is simply registering difference.

“svabhāvavikalpa-a term intended to denote the very “essence” or “intrinsic nature” (svabhāva) of discrimination itself-is simply to register difference.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The Vaibhāṣika authors have trouble making the charitable account stick.

“But while I believe this charitable account may well capture the intent of our Vaibhās .ika authors, they have trouble making it stick.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The author's charitable interpretation disaggregates rudimentary forms of discrimination from conceptuality per se.

“In my”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Conceptuality is normally associated with language.

May combine two claims.

Both the Mahāvibhāṣā and Abhidharmakośa confirm vitarka, vicāra, smṛti, and prajñā are present in sense cognition, then use trivikalpa to show their conceptualizing capacities are not operative.

“both texts, following Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy, confirm that vitarka and vicāra are present in sense cognition, as are smṛti and prajñā, but they then aver to the *trivikalpa doctrine to show how such conceptualizing capacities are not operative.”

May combine two claims.

Vaibhāṣikas claim recollection and knowledge are present in sense cognition, but their discriminatory capacities are not.

“The Vaibhās .ikas can then claim that recollection and knowledge, which are counted among the omnipresent (mahābhūmika) mental factors, are indeed present in sense cognition, but not so their discriminatory capacities.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

These texts stumble in their attempts to define non-conceptualizing yet discriminative vitarka.

“Yet they stumble over themselves in their attempts to define non-conceptualizing yet discriminative vitarka.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted). May combine two claims.

If understood correctly, Dhammajoti is saying that for Sautrāntikas the subject and object of cognition do not coexist-there is no intentionality, no relationship between grasper and grasped-and thus cognition can only be known if it is self-illuminating or self-intimating.

“If I understand him correctly, Dhammajoti is saying that for Sautrāntikas the”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

To make his case against the Sautrāntikas, Saṃghabhadra distinguishes three kinds of perception: perception based on the sense faculties, perception of inner feelings, and perception of awareness or comprehension.

“To make his case against the Sautrāntikas, Saṃghabhadra distinguishes between three different kinds of perception (xiangliang 現量, pratyaks .a), namely, (1) perception based on the sense faculties (yigen xianliang 依根現 量, *indriyāśrita-pratyaks .a), (2) perception of [inner] feelings (lingna xianliang 領納現量, *anubhāva-pratyaks .a), and (3) perception of awareness or comprehension (jueliao xianliang 覺”

• cites T.1562Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The contemporary debates over the existence and nature of non-conceptual experience parallel the disputes that took place some two millennia ago among the Ābhidharmikas.

“It should now be clear that the contemporary debates over the existence and nature of non-conceptual experience parallel the disputes that took place some two millennia ago among the Ābhidharmikas.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Mind and world-knower and known-do not denote autonomous domains or frames of reference, or even interdependent perspectives.

“Mind and world-knower and known-do not denote autonomous domains or frames of reference, or even interdependent perspectives.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Dhammajoti suggests that Sautrāntikas must hold to something akin to the self-awareness or self-illumination position later associated with svasaṃvedana; without it, they would be unable to explain the 'sense of vividness' associated with sense perception prior to the arising of mind-cognition.

“Dhammajoti, drawing on Saṃghabhadra's presentation of the Sautrāntika position in the *Nyāyānusāra, suggests that Sautrāntikas must hold to something akin to the”

• cites Dhammajoti 2009Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

In Saṃghabhadra's innovative three-part division of perception, the pure sensory percept is not, in itself, consciously experienced; sense perception is experienced only via the feeling that arises in tandem with it.

“So in his innovative three-part division of perception, the pure sensory percept is not, in itself, consciously experienced.The sense perception is experienced only via the feeling that arises in tandem with it.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

According to the Sautrāntika account, as there is nothing that sees or grasps an object, there is also nothing that is seen or grasped; the whole notion of direct sense perception is wrongheaded because it conjures a cogito or subject of experience; for the Sautrāntikas, such a cogito can only be the ersatz self (ātman) that Buddhists disavow as a fiction.

“According to this account, as there is nothing that sees or grasps an object, there is also nothing that is seen or grasped.Thus the whole notion of direct sense perception is wrongheaded from the get-go, as it conjures a cogito or subject of experience that apprehends an object.For the Sautrāntikas, such a cogito-something that sees or knows-can only be the ersatz self (ātman) that the Buddhists”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

This may simply reflect Saṃghabhadra's mischaracterization of the Sautrāntika reductionist, if not eliminativist, position.

“But this may simply reflect Saṃghabhadra's mischaracterization of the Sautrāntika reductionist (if not eliminativist) position.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The auto-commentary elaborates that each consciousness discerns its own object domain; it grasps in general the object's characteristic, and thus is called cognition.

“The auto-commentary elaborates,”

• cites T.1558Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The definition of cognition seems too circular to be of much help, and it leaves unclear whether vijñāna is something that does the discerning or is the discerning itself.

“But the definition, which is typical of the literature, seems too circular to be of much help, and it leaves unclear whether vijñāna is a something that does the discerning, or if it is the discerning itself.”

May combine two claims.

In the Abhidharmakośa, ideation is related to 'view' (dṛṣṭi), and ideation can be in error: the force of mistaken ideation leads to attachment to various views.

“Moreover, in the Abhidharmakośa, ideation is related to”

• cites T.1558Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Vasubandhu presents the Sautrāntika position that the entire debate is misguided since there is nothing that sees in the first place.

“At the end of his discussion of”

• cites T.1558Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

According to the Sautrāntika analysis, the object of perception is gone before cognition of any kind occurs; hence there is no direct sense perception and no grasper-grasped relationship.

“(Recall that, according to the Sautrāntika analysis, the object of perception is gone before cognition of any kind occurs; hence there is no direct sense perception and no grasper-grasped relationship.)”

May combine two claims.

The Sautrāntikas do not treat vitarka and vicāra as independently existing dharmas; they regard the distinction between them as relative rather than absolute, and therefore hold that the two cannot occur together.

“The Sautrāntikas have a rather different analysis, as they don't reify vitarka and vicāra into independently existing dharmas to begin with, and while they agree that the difference is between coarse and fine discriminative activities of mind, they see these in relative, rather than absolute terms, and hence they believe that they cannot coexist.”

• cites T.1545: 27.219aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Saṃghabhadra explains that sensory perception is based on the five sense faculties and apprehends the five outer sense fields; perceptual experience is the immediate manifestation of the dharmas of mind and associated mental factors such as feeling and ideation; perceptual awareness is the appropriate recognition of both the nature and characteristics of dharmas.

“Sensory perception is based on the five [sense] faculties, and apprehends the five outer sense fields of form etc. Perceptual experience is the immediate manifestation of the dharmas of mind and associated mental factors such as feeling, ideation, etc. Perceptual awareness is the appropriate recognition of both the nature and characteristics of dharmas.”

• cites T.1562Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

On the Vaibhāṣika account, a single sense cognition apprehends only the intrinsic mark of its own sensory domain, so it does not apprehend the entity as it is in itself.

“The argument seems to be that any single sense cognition grasps only the inherent characteristic pertaining to its own sense field-the eye sees only colors and forms, the ears sound, etc.-and hence it does not grasp the entity as it exists in itself.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Commentators explain that the capacity to grasp a characteristic is tied to the application of names, associating a transient particular with a generic category or class.

“Commentators explain that the capacity to grasp the characteristic is tied to the application of names-associating a transient particular with a generic category or class.”

May combine two claims.

In this schema, cognition still consists of two steps, but the first step is divided into two components: the immediate or bare impression of a sense object, and the feeling or sensation or experience that arises in conjunction with this sense impression; these perceptions are functionally distinct but occur in the same instant.

“So in this schema, cognition still consists of two steps, but the first step is now divided into two components: (1) the immediate or bare impression of a sense object, and (2) the feeling or sensation or experience (lingna 領 納, anubhāva) that arises in conjunction with this sense impression.These perceptions are functionally distinct but occur in the same instant.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Yao believes that, in positing his doctrine of three perceptions, even Saṃghabhadra-arch-critic of Sautrāntika-comes to embrace something along the lines of self-awareness.

“But curiously, Yao believes that, in positing his doctrine of three perceptions, even Saṃghabhadra-arch-critic of Sautrāntika-comes to embrace something along the lines of self-awareness.”

• cites YaoNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Once the rupture is made between knower and known, subject and object, first-person and third-person, nurture and nature, mind and world, it is impossible to bring them together again.

“If there is a lesson here, it may be that once the rupture is made between knower and known, subject and object, first-person and third-person, nurture and nature, mind and world, it is impossible to bring them together again.”

May combine two claims.

From the standpoint of the entity, however, the object is taken as a whole by the senses, which involves apprehending both intrinsic and generic marks.

“But from the point of view of the entity, it is perceived as a whole (by all the senses?), and this entails grasping both inherent and generic characteristics.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Among the issues on the table is the Sautrāntika claim that there is no direct perception, since the sense object has passed prior to the arising of sense cognition.

“Among the issues on the table is the Sautrāntika claim that there is no direct perception, since the sense object has passed prior to the arising of sense cognition.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Otherwise there would be no difference in kind between the access we have to our own inner experience and the access we have to the experiences of others; they would both be after-the-fact conceptual construals.

“Otherwise there would be no difference in kind between the access we have to our own inner experience, and the access we have to the experiences of others; they would both be after-the-fact conceptual construals.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Human social life, not to mention philosophical reflection, is possible only within the space opened up by this rupture.

“Of course, human social life, not to mention philosophical reflection, is possible only within the space opened up by this rupture.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Thus conceptually mediated perceptual awareness must be grounded in an individual's sensory contact with the world.

“Thus conceptually mediated perceptual awareness must be grounded in an individual's sensory contact with the world.”

May combine two claims.

Saṃghabhadra is insistent that there must be a direct perceptual encounter with an object for there to be conceptual awareness of that object, even though those two moments are not simultaneous.

“Saṃghabhadra is here insistent that there must be a direct perceptual encounter with an object for there to be conceptual awareness of that object, even though those two moments are not simultaneous.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Yao Zhihua, like Dhammajoti, traces the svasaṃvedana idea back to earlier Mahāsāṃghika and Sautrāntika materials.

“In his study of Buddhist theories of self-cognition, Yao Zhihua, like Dhammajoti, traces the svasaṃvedana idea back to earlier Mahāsāṃghika and Sautrāntika materials.”

• cites YaoNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

Saṃghabhadra's innovation lies in proffering the second kind of perception, 'perceptual experience' or 'inner experience,' which is closely associated with the feeling (vedanā) that arises in response to contact with an external perceptual object; it can be thought of as the visceral sensation that registers the advantageous or deleterious valence, or more simply the pain or pleasure, of the sense

“Saṃghabhadra's innovation lies in proffering the second kind of perception,”

• cites T.1562Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The Abhidharmakośa defines cognition (vijñāna) as discerning each sense sphere and as what is called the sphere of the mental.

“The Abhidharmakośa (kārikā 1.16ab) defines cognition (vijñāna) as”

• cites T.1558Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The Abhidharmāvatāra defines vitarka as having the characteristic of causing mind to be coarse with regard to an object; it is also named 'discriminative reflection'; struck by the wind of ideation, it operates in a coarse manner; it serves as the cause of the transformations of the five cognitions.

“Vitarka has the characteristic of causing mind to be coarse with regard to an object.It is also named”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Saṃghabhadra composed his *Nyāyānusāra to clarify the Vaibhāṣika position and respond to Sautrāntika critiques, notably those presented by Vasubandhu.

“Saṃghabhadra would go on to compose his *Nyāyānusāra to clarify the Vaibhās .ika position and respond to Sautrāntika critiques, notably those presented by Vasubandhu.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

It is not clear to the author that Saṃghabhadra is interested in the nature of awareness per se any more than Vasubandhu is.

“But it is not clear to me that Saṃghabhadra is interested in the nature of awareness per se any more than is Vasubandhu.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Saṃghabhadra argues that only when a feeling has vanished into the past can it function as an object that appears in memory; this stage of recollection is called the moment of awareness; from this it follows that perceptual awareness only exists with respect to the perception of things experienced in the past; therefore perceptual awareness emerges with respect to what has been personally

“Only when [a feeling] has vanished into the past can it function as an object that appears in memory.This stage of recollection is called the moment of awareness.From this it follows that perceptual awareness only exists with respect to the perception of things that have been experienced in the past.Therefore it is established that perceptual awareness emerges with respect to what has been”

• cites T.1562Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Saṃghabhadra's concern is to render intelligible the orthodox Vaibhāṣika understanding of cognition, in which the full sensorial awareness associated with mind-cognition necessarily involves memory and conceptual construction, and this awareness is nevertheless predicated on a prior moment in which there is a direct, unmediated perceptual encounter with an external object.

“His concern, rather, is to render intelligible the orthodox Vaibhās .ika understanding of cognition, in which (1) the full sensorial awareness associated with mindcognition necessarily involves memory and conceptual construction, and (2) this awareness is nevertheless predicated on a prior moment in which there is a direct, unmediated perceptual encounter with an”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Given such definitions, it is difficult to imagine what a minimal non-conceptual form of ideation might look like.

“Given such definitions, it is difficult to imagine what a minimal”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The logical relationship among these antinomies is bound in paradox, and this is key to understanding why the problem of non-conceptual experience seems so intractable.

“Which is to say that the logical relationship among these antinomies is bound in paradox, and this, I believe, is key to understanding why the problem of non-conceptual experience seems so intractable.”

May combine two claims.

With this model, Saṃghabhadra can acknowledge that the perceptual awareness associated with mind-cognition does not know the object directly, but nevertheless this awareness would not be possible without a prior direct perceptual encounter with an object.

“With this model in hand, Saṃghabhadra can acknowledge that the perceptual awareness associated with mind-cognition does not know the object directly, but nevertheless this awareness would not be possible without a prior direct perceptual encounter with an object.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The Abhidharmakośa defines ideation as apprehending appearances, grasping characteristics such as blue, yellow, long, short, man, woman, enemy, friend, pain, and pleasure, and divides it into six kinds associated with each cognition.

“The essence of the aggregate of ideation is that it apprehends appearances, which is to say it grasps characteristics such as blue, yellow, long, short, man, woman, enemy, friend, pain, pleasure, and so on.This is further divided into six kinds of ideation [associated with each of the cognitions] as was explained above in reference to feeling (vedanā).”

• cites T.1558Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The orthodox Vaibhāṣika position is that the eye faculty in conjunction with eye-cognition sees.

“The orthodox Vaibhās .ika position is that it is the eye faculty in conjunction with eye-cognition that sees, but at least two Vaibhās .ika masters disagreed: Dharmatrātra argued that it is eyecognition, while Ghos .aka said it is knowledge (prajñā) in conjunction with eye-cognition.”

• cites MahāvibhāṣāNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Yao notes that the new category of 'perceptual awareness' is essentially reflective in nature.

“Among other things, Yao notes that the new category of”

• cites YaoNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Saṃghabhadra argues that the feelings of another person are not felt as one's own perceptual experience, so there is no perceptual awareness that knows 'I have previously felt that very pain or pleasure'; hence knowledge of another's feelings is not acquired through perceptual awareness; the same applies to forms and other objects.

“The feelings of another person are not felt as one's own perceptual experience, and thus there is no perceptual awareness that knows”

• cites T.1562Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

In the Vaibhāṣika two-step analysis, there is direct perception in sensory cognition, but not in mind-cognition-mind only knows an object via conceptual reflection on the throughput of a sense cognition.

“Recall that in the Vaibhās .ika two-step analysis, there is direct perception in sensory cognition, but not in mindcognition-mind only knows an object via conceptual reflection on the throughput of a sense cognition.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Mind and world logically enfold one other; mind is only possible within the world, and the world only possible within the mind.

“Rather, mind and world logically enfold one other; mind is only possible within the world, and the world only possible within the mind.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The Sautrāntika masters say that eye-cognition arises in dependence on the eye, forms, etc.; that only the cause and effect of individual dharmas are involved, which do not actually do anything; that in accord with worldly attitudes we provisionally speak of the eye as seeing and cognition as knowing; and that the wise are not attached to such talk.

“The Sautrāntika masters have this to say: You are all just chewing (khādyate) away at empty space![According to the sūtras,]”

• cites T.1558Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The Abhidharmāvatāra expands that ideation comprehends by provisionally linking a characteristic to a name and meaning, and that it is the causal basis for vitarka and vicāra.

“The meaning of the word”

May combine two claims.

In the Sautrāntika analysis, at least as presented by Vasubandhu, just as there is no actual flame that moves, there is no knower that knows, and hence no knowing either.

“In the Sautrāntika analysis, at least as presented by Vasubandhu, just as there is no actual”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The third kind of perception is associated with the awareness or comprehension that attends the subsequent arising of mind-cognition, a perceptual awareness predicated on the representational and reflective capacities afforded by names and language.

“The third kind of perception is associated with the awareness or comprehension that attends the subsequent arising of mind-cognition, a perceptual awareness that is predicated on the representational and reflective capacities afforded by names and language.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The text attributed to *Dharmaśreṣṭhin was translated by Saṃghadeva and Lushan Huiyuan in 391, and it seems to have been composed just before or at the same time as the Mahāvibhāṣā.

“This text, attributed to *Dharmaśres .t .hin 法勝 (also rendered *Dharmaśrī), was translated by Saṃghadeva (Jutan Sengqietipo 瞿曇僧 伽提婆) and Lushan Huiyuan 廬山慧遠 in 391.It appears to have been composed either immediately before, or contemporaneous with, the Mahāvibhās .ā”

• cites Frauwallner 1995, pp.128-130Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998, pp.174-175 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source