Cited by 731Philosophical Ethics and TheoryEthics in Business and EducationEthics, Aesthetics, and Art

Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics

Doris, John M.·1998·Noûs

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1111/0029-4624.00136

Cites

88 of 88 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Doris argues that situationist research empirically supports the existence of local traits of character in most of the population.

    “Second, Doris argues that situationist research empirically supports the existence, in most of the population, of local traits of character.”

    From Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate (2009) · cites this paper as Doris 1998

  • Doris concludes that traditional virtue ethics should be abandoned or at least conceptually supplemented with a system of empirically adequate local traits of character.

    “Doris's bottom line is that traditional virtue ethics, since it endorses empirically inadequate global traits of character, should be, if not abandoned altogether, at least conceptually supplemented with a system of empirically adequate local traits of character.”

    From Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate (2009) · cites this paper as Doris 1998

  • Doris argues that empirically adequate traits of character are necessary for moral agents to guide their moral reasoning, choices, and behavior appropriately.

    “Third, Doris argues that empirically adequate traits of character are necessary for moral agents appropriately to guide their moral reasoning, choices, and behavior.”

    From Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate (2009) · cites this paper as Doris 1998

  • Harman and Doris launch the second phase of the situationism debate, arguing that situationist findings vitiate traditional virtue ethics and suggest strategies for moral and social improvement.

    “Both Harman and Doris argue that, properly applied, situationist findings vitiate traditional virtue ethics and also suggest a range of illuminating strategies for moral and social improvement.”

    From Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate (2009) · cites this paper as Doris 1998

  • Doris argues that traditional virtue ethics is empirically inadequate because its virtue attributions do not accurately describe most people across situations.

    “Doris begins by arguing that traditionally-conceived virtue ethics is empirically inadequate.If virtue ethics were empirically adequate, its virtue attributions, such as courageous, just, honest, and compassionate, would accurately describe most of the population.”

    From Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationism Debate (2009) · cites this paper as Doris 1998

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Authors
Doris, J. M.
Affiliations
University of California, Santa Cruz (US)
Corresponding author
Doris, John M.
Venue
Noûs
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1998-12
Volume
32
Issue
4
Pages
504-530
ISSN
  • 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0068
OpenAlex
W2169097523
Cited by
731
References
88
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 70 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 58 · 2019: 88 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 22 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 10
FWCI
10.14
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Noûs (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
Keywords
virtue ethics, people, situation, ethics, personhood

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