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Cited by 23Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceNeuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical InnovationsCybernetics and Technology in Society

Uploading and Branching Identity

Open access
Cerullo, Michael A.·2015·Minds and Machines
DOI 10.1007/s11023-014-9352-8
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Abstract

If a brain is uploaded into a computer, will consciousness continue in digital form or will it end forever when the brain is destroyed? Philosophers have long debated such dilemmas and classify them as questions about personal identity. There are currently three main theories of personal identity: biological, psychological, and closest continuer theories. None of these theories can successfully address the questions posed by the possibility of uploading. I will argue that uploading requires us to adopt a new theory of identity, psychological branching identity. Psychological branching identity states that consciousness will continue as long as there is continuity in psychological structure. What differentiates this from psychological identity is that it allows identity to continue in multiple selves. According to branching identity, continuity of consciousness will continue in both the original brain and the upload after nondestructive uploading. Branching identity can also resolve long standing questions about split-brain syndrome and can provide clear predictions about identity in even the most difficult cases imagined by philosophers.

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  • Fading and dancing qualia thought experiments show that identity and non-computational functionalist theories allow the unity of consciousness to be interrupted at any arbitrary point.

    “Fading and dancing qualia thought experiments show that identity and non-computational functionalist theories allow the unity of consciousness to be interrupted at any arbitrary point [22].”

    From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [22]

    In “Machine Consciousness” (page unavailable), the paper says these qualia thought experiments could interrupt the unity of conscious experience at any point under identity theory. It does not extend that conclusion to non-computational functionalist theories; instead, it says the experiments support functionalism and present no obstacles to it. (LLM, conf=0.89)

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  2. Ruhnau, E. (1995). Time gestalt and the observer. In Metzinger (Ed.), Conscious experience. Paderborn: Scho ¨ningh; Exeter: Imprint Academic.
  3. Sandberg, A. (2013). Feasibility of whole brain emulation. In Mu ¨ller, V. C. (Ed.), Theory and philosophy of artificial intelligence (SAPERE) (pp. 251-64). Berlin: Springer.
  4. Shoemaker, S. (1984). Personal identity: A materialist's account. Shoemaker and swinburne, personal identity (pp. 69-132). Oxford: Blackwell.
  5. Stanley, R. (1999). Qualia space. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(1), 49-60.
  6. Swinburne, R. (1984). Personal identity: A dualist theory. Shoemaker and swinburne, personal identity (pp. 1-66). Oxford: Blackwell.

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Authors
Cerullo, M. A.
Affiliations
University of Cincinnati (US)
Corresponding author
Cerullo, Michael A.
Venue
Minds and Machines
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2014-12-02
Volume
25
Issue
1
Pages
17-36
ISSN
  • 0924-6495 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8641
DOI
10.1007/s11023-014-9352-8
OpenAlex
W2082639656
Cited by
23
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 2
FWCI
2.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
Minds and Machines (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
Keywords
personal identity, consciousness, psychological identity, biological identity, split-brain syndrome, digital immortality, multiple selves

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