Minds: extended or scaffolded?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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In the citing paper
“Sterelny [2010] also focuses on the ideas of individualization and entrenchment, as opposed to interchangeability.”
From Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things (2025) · cites this paper as Sterelny, 2010
In the citing paper
“These concepts highlight the intuition that an important aspect of integration is the tailoring of the artifact to our specific cognitive needs so that our cognitive processes become more efficient.”
From Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things (2025) · cites this paper as Sterelny, 2010
In the citing paper
“In this regard, by starting from the deliverances of our bare and unassisted mind, including folk logic and basic perceptual capacities, we may gradually increase the reliability of our beliefs, by accumulating evidence and thus bootstrapping or 'scaffolding' (Sterelny 2010) our way to more justified beliefs.”
From Natural Selection Does Care about Truth (2014) · cites this paper as Sterelny 2010
In the citing paper
“The theory of evolution by natural selection is by no means the product of our bare, unassisted mind. It is in every respect the result of a long process of critical thinking and of 'scaffolding' our naked mind, as Kim Sterelny (2010, 480) puts it.”
From Natural Selection Does Care about Truth (2014) · cites this paper as Sterelny 2010
In the citing paper
“Indeed, as Sterelny (2010, 480) points out, scientific theories about the world are primarily the product of our ability to extend our mind's capacity.”
From Natural Selection Does Care about Truth (2014) · cites this paper as Sterelny 2010
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The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering
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“…as never extended but always at most merely embedded in (causally triggered by) the social and natural environment, Sterelny argues that " the Extended Mind picture is not false " : its " most compelling and plausible cases... are limiting special cases of scaffolded minds " (Sterelny 2010).”
BackgroundInfluentialScaffoldings of the affective mind
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“The third dimension refers to the degree to which the resource at stake is employed by an individual or is, rather, collective (Sterelny, 2010, pp. 477–479).”
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“The papers in this issue show us that there are strong phylogenetic reasons why cognitive capacities have turned out to be highly embodied and embedded (Sterelny 2010, Stotz 2010, Jeffares 2010) and that, therefore, we need explanatory resources that go beyond the dynamics of neural networks.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Sterelny, K.
- Affiliations
- Australian National University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Sterelny, Kim
- ORCID
- Sterelny, Kim
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2010-10-05
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 465-481
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2079944053
- Cited by
- 619
- References
- 56
- Citations by year
- 2026: 65 · 2025: 58 · 2024: 55 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 61 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 77 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 6.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- extended mind, niche construction, active agency, cognitive tools, human action, environmental resources, cognitive ability
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