Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 125 of the 127 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Citations
Cites
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
Bornstein, M. H., & Gibson, J. J. (1980) · The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism · doi:10.2307/429816 · Cited by 22,935
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition
Gibson, J. J. (2014) · doi:10.4324/9781315740218 · Cited by 12,132
The Brain's Default Network: Anatomy, Function, and Relevance to Disease
Buckner, R. L., Andrews‐Hanna, J. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1196/annals.1440.011 · Cited by 9,761
Journal of Consciousness Studies
(2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201 · Cited by 6,832
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35784 · Cited by 4,410 · cited 1×
“…imply that what is perceived will be taken as external to self—e.g., experimental subjects can be made to feel that they are experiencing tactile sensations on rubber hands that they observe when these are stroked in synchrony with their biological, occluded hands (Botvinick and Cohen 1998).”
BackgroundAspects of Scientific Explanation.
Resnik, M. D., & Hempel, C. G. (1966) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2106169 · Cited by 3,319
Gusnard, D. A., Akbudak, E., Shulman, G. L., & Raichle, M. E. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.071043098 · Cited by 2,997
Self-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., & Panksepp, J. (2006) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.002 · Cited by 2,792
The Illusion of Conscious Will
Wegner, D. M. (2002) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3650.001.0001 · Cited by 2,017
Noë, A. (2005) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,876
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Damasio, A. (2010). Self comes to mind: constructing the conscious mind. New York: Pantheon.
- Feinberg, T. E. (2009). From axons to identity: neurological explorations of the self. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Hirstein, W. (2009). Confabulations. In J. Bickle (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and the neurosciences (pp. 474–512). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cited by
For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not
Zahavi, D., & Kriegel, U. (2015) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · doi:10.4324/9781315889634-9 · Cited by 66
Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia
Henriksen, M. G., Parnas, J., & Zahavi, D. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.102770 · Cited by 117
“In this article, we focus solely on experiences of thought insertion. it is not stamped with a meish quality; and, for-me-ness does not play a determining role in its constitution” (Lane, 2012, 281).”
BackgroundInfluentialKlein, S. B. (2013) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00003 · Cited by 94
“Taken together, these studies focus attention on ownership as an aspect, or form, of consciousness that can come undone under certain conditions (e.g., Klein and Nichols, 2012; Lane, 2012).”
Klein, S. B. (2016) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1007150 · Cited by 92
Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Selfhood: a Reply to some Critics
Zahavi, D. (2018) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0403-6 · Cited by 86
Interoceptive Ability and Emotion Regulation in Mind–Body Interventions: An Integrative Review
Lazzarelli, A., Scafuto, F., Crescentini, C., Matiz, A., Orrù, G., Ciacchini, R., Alfì, G., Gemignani, A., & Conversano, C. (2024) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs14111107 · Cited by 49
Disorder of Selfhood in Schizophrenia: A Symptom or a Gestalt?
Sandsten, K. E., Zahavi, D., & Parnas, J. (2022) · Psychopathology · doi:10.1159/000524100 · Cited by 53
Timing disownership experiences in the rubber hand illusion
Lane, T., Yeh, S., Tseng, P. H., & Chang, A.-Y. (2017) · Cognitive Research Principles and Implications · doi:10.1186/s41235-016-0041-4 · Cited by 50
“In other words, participants experienced RHI more quickly when the stroking was synchronous than when it was asynchronous (Fig.”
BackgroundSelf-citationKlein, S. B. (2015) · Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/cns0000052 · Cited by 34
“At present, such cases constitute a very small database (I suspect more will begin to be reported once “personal ownership” becomes recognized as a necessary constituent of mind; see also Lane, 2012).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe ‘We’ in ‘Me’: An Account of Minimal Relational Selfhood
Higgins, J. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9564-2 · Cited by 27
“If one is tempted to argue that the pre-reflective awareness of bodily schema, or any other dimension of consciousness, amounts to some form of subjectivity, but not bona fide selfhood (e.g. Dreyfus 2007; Lane 2009; Lyrra 2009), then Zahavi’s response is that acceptance of subjective experience simply must simultaneou…”
BackgroundDisturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness
Gennaro, R. J. (2015) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.001.0001 · Cited by 39
Lane, T. J. (2020) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2020.103029 · Cited by 33
“If this were the case, it would still be consistent with the view that the two are dissociable, albeit in the sense that conscious experience can occur independently of MS (Lane, 2012, 2015).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationKlein, S. B. (2015) · Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/cns0000036 · Cited by 32
“…presented in Klein (2014) suggests that a unitive understanding may be afforded by the largely overlooked (in contemporary psychological research) but critically important mental construct of “personal ownership of one’s mental states” (see also, Klein, 2012 and Klein & Nichols, 2012; Lane, 2012).”
BackgroundBeing for no-one: Psychedelic experience and minimal subjectivity
Letheby, C. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.47 · Cited by 20
“As a counterexample to SP, Lane (2012) presents the case of patient DP, who experienced visual perceptions allegedly lacking any sense of subjectivity, and could only establish that the visual perceptions were his own via a subsequent process of explicit inference.”
BackgroundInfluentialO’Conaill, D. (2017) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9960-9 · Cited by 18
“8 Other possible examples have been drawn from pathological cases (Lane 2012; Guillot 2017, 41–43; for discussion see Zahavi 2014, 37–40).”
BackgroundKlein, S. B. (2016) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2015.1126815 · Cited by 20
Yeh, S., Lane, T. J., Chang, A.-Y., & Chien, S.-E. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02172 · Cited by 15
“Accordingly, we concerned ourselves with ownership, the respect in which the rubber hand is experienced as belonging to self (Lane, 2012, 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citationReflexivity, Subjectivity, and the Constructed Self: A Buddhist Model
MacKenzie, M. (2015) · Asian Philosophy · doi:10.1080/09552367.2015.1078140 · Cited by 19
“[6] See Lane (2012) for a thorough discussion of this case.”
BackgroundThe Pre-reflective Situational Self
Clowes, R. W., & Gärtner, K. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9598-5 · Cited by 19
“We believe moreover that our view is immune to the objections that Zahavi stages against Metzinger and Lane, because we need not claim that consciousness is not constituted by a form of pre-reflective self-awareness.”
BackgroundInfluentialZahavi, D., & Kriegel, U. (2015) · Cited by 10
When Actions Feel Alien—an Explanatory Model
Lane, T. J. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-4585-84-2_4 · Cited by 10
“”15 The considerations adduced here and elsewhere (Lane 2012) suggest that there is no “feeling that ‘I am’,” at least that is if this is literally taken to be a condition for experiencing “the existence and salience of anything else in the environment.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationIs Depressive Rumination Rational?
Lane, T. J., & Northoff, G. (2017) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-804600-5.00007-6 · Cited by 8
“…AND THE RESTING STATE HYPOTHESIS OF MDD 129 concerns (Northoff, 2012; Lane, 2012), is not on self as conventionally understood by philosophers (Lane, 2012, Lane & Liang, 2010, 2011).19 Instead, it is on what Northoff (2013a, p. 253) refers to as “organization in relation to the organism…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationKlein, S. B. (2018) · Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/cns0000174 · Cited by 6
“…of inference” imbues this acquired (i.e., nonautomatic) ownership with a upsetting feeling of experiential detachment (that is, “While I can infer X must be mine, it does not feel personally owned; e.g., Albahari, 2006; Klein, 2015a; Lane, 2012; Zahavi, 2005, 2011; Zahn, Talazko, & Ebert, 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialPhenomenology, Psychopathology, and Pre-Reflective Experience
Fernandez, A. V. (2022) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003014584-29 · Cited by 8
Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons
Bianchin, M. (2015) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393115580267 · Cited by 5
How can consciousness be false? Alienation, simulation, and mental ownership
Bianchin, M. (2022) · Philosophy & Social Criticism · doi:10.1177/01914537221131578 · Cited by 3
“…common ground that mental ownership is an element of phenomenal consciousness that conveys pre-reflective self-awareness and allows de se ascriptions of mental predicates to express their subject (Guillot 2017; Lane 2012; Zahavi 2014, 18 ff.; Kriegel, Za havi 2016; see also Damasio 1999, 168 ff .).”
BackgroundSelf, Me, or I? Unravelling the Triumvirate of Selfhood in Pathological Consciousness
Fingelkurts, A. A., & Fingelkurts, A. A. (2025) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci15060640 · Cited by 2
Are there Counterexamples to the Immunity Principle? Some Restrictions and Clarifications
Haug, O., & Jung, M. F. (2015) · doi:10.15502/9783958570467 · Cited by 1
“Lane (2012), for instance, denies that there are any unique constituents that could explain mineness or mental ownership.”
BackgroundFunctional blindsight and its diagnosis
Lane, T. J., Liou, T., Kung, Y., Tseng, P. H., & Wu, C. W. (2024) · Frontiers in Neurology · doi:10.3389/fneur.2024.1207115 · Cited by 2
“An alternative possibility is that conscious percepts are formed before they are experienced as belonging to self, as has been associated with hypometabolism in the parieto-occipital regions (73, 74).”
BackgroundSelf-citationKlein, S. B., & Loftus, J. (2025) · Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/cns0000402 · Cited by 2
“What individuates a mental state as distinctly and exclusively taking place in one ’ s head (i.e., the inner space of the mind) is that I sense — without need for intuition or inference — that the content of that state is uniquely and infallibly authored from within (for comprehensive treatment, see Albahari, 2006; Kl…”
BackgroundInfluentialHaanila, H. (2022) · UTUPub (University of Turku) · Cited by 2
O PARA-MIM [FOR-ME-NESS] COMO CARACTERÍSTICA UNIVERSAL DA EXPERIÊNCIA CONSCIENTE
Meurer, C. F. (2018) · Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia · doi:10.36311/1984-8900.2017.v9n21.12.p147
My Body is the Subject’s Body. In Defence of Experientialism about the Sense of Bodily Ownership
Serrahima, C. (2019) · Dipòsit Digital de la Universitat de Barcelona (Universitat de Barcelona)
Self and First-Person Perspective
Gallagher, S. (2022) · Palgrave philosophy today · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-11586-8_7
Haug, O., & Jung, M. F. (2015) · Gutenberg Open Science · doi:10.25358/openscience-656
Serrahima, C. (2026) · THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science · doi:10.1387/theoria.26190 · Cited by 3
“…of a first-personal “mode of givenness” of all conscious experiences (Zahavi, 2005; Fasching, 2009; Zahavi & Kriegel, 2015; Gallagher, 2015), in agentive terms (Duncan, 2019), in affective terms (Dub, 2023), or as a phenomenal mark jointly constituted by various phenomenal dimensions (Lane, 2012).”
Trayectorias y desafíos en el Modelo de la Esquizofrenia como Trastorno de la Ipseidad
López‐Silva, P., & Álvarez-Fernández, P. (2026) · Análisis Filosófico · doi:10.36446/af.e1283
Metadata
- Authors
- Lane, T.
- Affiliations
- National Chengchi University (TW)
- Corresponding author
- Lane, Timothy
- ORCID
- Lane, Timothy
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2012-02-19
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 251-286
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W1967470647
- Semantic Scholar
- 9fe50a4cd7a916823461a4b5e9fab170e0ccdd30
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 127
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 4.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Taipei Medical University Repository (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- mineness, subjective perspective, selfhood, narrative self, minimal self
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.