Reconstructing the minimal self, or how to make sense of agency and ownership
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership (SO) and the sense of agency (SA) as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual reading of the two that allows for various blends of SO and SA. Such an approach not only provides us with a richer phenomenology but also with a more parsimonious view of the minimal self.
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Cites
Gallagher, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199271941.001.0001 · Cited by 3,311
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 4×
“For example, he defines it as “the sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience” ( Gallagher 2000a, b), as “the sense that it is I who am experiencing the movement or thought” (Gallagher 2005, p. 173), and as “the pre-reflective experience or sense that I am the subject of the movement (e.g.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0601 · Cited by 1,901
What is embodiment? A psychometric approach
Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.004 · Cited by 956
Farrer, C., & Frith, C. D. (2002) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.1009 · Cited by 949
Modulating the experience of agency: a positron emission tomography study
Farrer, C., Franck, N., Georgieff, N., Frith, C. D., Decety, J., & Jeannerod, M. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(02)00041-1 · Cited by 755
Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique
Gallagher, S. (2004) · Psychopathology · doi:10.1159/000077014 · Cited by 243 · cited 4×
“…his convincing objections to Frith’s (Frith 1992) claim that “thinking, like all our actions, is normally accompanied by a sense of effort and deliberate choice as we move from one thought to the next” (p. 81) and his arguments against the motor model of cognition in general (Gallagher 2004, 2005).”
BackgroundInfluentialTight Link Between Our Sense of Limb Ownership and Self-Awareness of Actions.
Baier, B., & Karnath, H.-O. (2008) · Stroke · doi:10.1161/strokeaha.107.495606 · Cited by 235
The Natural Philosophy of Agency
Gallagher, S. (2007) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00067.x · Cited by 171
Gallagher, S. (2007) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470910601183549 · Cited by 158
Cited by
How does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator
Ataria, Y., Dor-Ziderman, Y., & Berkovich-Ohana, A. (2015) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.09.002 · Cited by 154
Examining Agency, Expertise, and Roles of AI Systems in AI-Mediated Communication
Mieczkowski, H., & Hancock, J. (2022) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/asnv4 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- de Haan, S., & de Bruin, L.
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2009-11-13
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 373-396
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2060250751
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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