Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 125 of the 127 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Citations
Cites
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
Bornstein, M. H., & Gibson, J. J. (1980) · The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism · doi:10.2307/429816 · Cited by 22,935
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition
Gibson, J. J. (2014) · doi:10.4324/9781315740218 · Cited by 12,132
The Brain's Default Network: Anatomy, Function, and Relevance to Disease
Buckner, R. L., Andrews‐Hanna, J. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1196/annals.1440.011 · Cited by 9,761
Journal of Consciousness Studies
(2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201 · Cited by 6,832
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35784 · Cited by 4,410 · cited 1×
“…imply that what is perceived will be taken as external to self—e.g., experimental subjects can be made to feel that they are experiencing tactile sensations on rubber hands that they observe when these are stroked in synchrony with their biological, occluded hands (Botvinick and Cohen 1998).”
BackgroundAspects of Scientific Explanation.
Resnik, M. D., & Hempel, C. G. (1966) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2106169 · Cited by 3,319
Gusnard, D. A., Akbudak, E., Shulman, G. L., & Raichle, M. E. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.071043098 · Cited by 2,997
Self-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., & Panksepp, J. (2006) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.002 · Cited by 2,792
The Illusion of Conscious Will
Wegner, D. M. (2002) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3650.001.0001 · Cited by 2,017
Noë, A. (2005) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,876
The Illusion of Conscious Will
Wegner, D. M., Gilbert, D., & Wheatley, T. (2018) · The MIT Press · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262534925.001.0001 · Cited by 1,655
Crick, F., & Koch, C. (2003) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0203-119 · Cited by 1,492 · cited 3×
“But Gallagher (2010) and others, have argued that thought insertions are better understood as instances wherein mineness remains intact, in the sense that the patients do indeed experience the thoughts.”
BackgroundWillful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness
Monti, M. M., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Pickard, J. D., Tshibanda, L., Owen, A. M., & Laureys, S. (2010) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmoa0905370 · Cited by 1,461
Cortical midline structures and the self
Northoff, G., & Bermpohl, F. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.01.004 · Cited by 1,446 · cited 2×
“…194, Goldman 1970: 96; Zahavi 2006: 275).2 The concurrence of scrutiny has contributed to the emergence of a research program focused on mineness (Northoff and Bermpohl 2004), a program wherein experimental work converges on how brains process “self-referential” (SR) stimuli, “stimuli that are…”
BackgroundSchizophrenia, consciousness, and the self
Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007017 · Cited by 1,324 · cited 1×
“Phenomenological approaches to schizophrenia (e.g., Sass and Parnas 2003), even those that focus on the prodromal (the pre-onset) phase (e.g., Nelson et al. 2008), advance congruous claims.”
BackgroundRaichle, M. E. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.01.008 · Cited by 1,111 · cited 3×
“The CMS significantly overlaps with the default-mode network (Raichle 2010), which has also been implicated in self-referential processing (Buckner et al. 2008 and Wicker et al. 2003).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSubjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective
Zahavi, D. (2005) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6541.001.0001 · Cited by 1,104
My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body-ownership.
Tsakiris, M. (2010) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.034 · Cited by 1,069
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 · Cited by 1,060 · cited 4×
“Blanke and Metzinger (2008) have pioneered important conceptual spadework in this vicinity, along with suggesting how these concepts can be fitted to several types of empirical work.”
BackgroundInfluentialRosenthal, D. M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236979.001.0001 · Cited by 993
Craver, C. F. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299317.001.0001 · Cited by 985
Kim, J. (1996) · Cited by 951
The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
Shoemaker, S. (1996) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624674 · Cited by 934
How is our self related to midline regions and the default-mode network?
Qin, P., & Northoff, G. (2011) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.028 · Cited by 909 · cited 1×
“Moreover, meta-analyses (Qin and Northoff 2011) have indicated that the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC)—an important part of the CMS—is engaged by self-specific stimuli, but not by general, evaluative functions.”
BackgroundBeing No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
Metzinger, T. (2003) · MIT Press · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1551.001.0001 · Cited by 789
Flanagan, O. (1992) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2112.001.0001 · Cited by 713
Self-reference and self-awareness
Shoemaker, S. S. (1968) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024121 · Cited by 642 · cited 1×
“Philosophers long assumed that introspective access guaranteed one could not be in error as regards mineness (e.g., Shoemaker 1968).”
BackgroundPhenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610 · cited 1×
“Carruthers (2009) is useful in helping to mark the difference between representing our own thoughts and representing the thoughts of others.”
BackgroundCraig, A. D. (. (2010) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-010-0248-y · Cited by 600 · cited 3×
“They have begun in earnest trying to identify the brain’s “core self” (Damasio 2010: 201–209), its “sentient self” (Craig 2010), its “observing self: (Baars et al. 2003), its “who system” (de Vignemont and Fourneret 2004), indeed just “where in the brain is the self” (Feinberg and Keenan 2005;…”
BackgroundResultAllen, P., Larøi, F., McGuire, P. K., & Aleman, A. (2008) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2007.07.012 · Cited by 579 · cited 1×
“Northoff and Qin (2011), developing an idea first proposed by Allen et al. (2008), have called attention to the possibility that during AVH abnormally strong modulation from the auditory cortex might be accompanied by reduced top-down modulation from cortical regions that are involved in generating…”
BackgroundImpaired Recognition of Social Emotions following Amygdala Damage
Adolphs, R., Baron-Cohen, S., & Tranel, D. (2002) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/089892902760807258 · Cited by 510 · cited 1×
“…independent of the rest of the face, can be sufficient for awareness of the existence of a mental state as well as identification of its type (Adolphs et al. 2002; Dadds et al. 2006; and Morris et al. 2002). from autistic spectrum disorder.25 But DP is socially well-adjusted and adept at…”
BackgroundKriegel, U. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.001.0001 · Cited by 490
Embodiment, ownership and disownership
de Vignemont, F. (2011) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.004 · Cited by 484 · cited 2×
“38 Ramachandran (1995) and de Vignemont (2011) have also developed versions of the discovery hypothesis. multiple components, interacting dynamically, while the explanandum will be a multidimensional phenomenon.”
BackgroundWhat is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results
Legrand, D., & Ruby, P. (2009) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0014172 · Cited by 470 · cited 4×
“…in the CMS (cortical midline structure) that correlates with SR processing was found to be engaged both by self-related and by other-related stimuli, and (b) because it has been alleged to be more accurately regarded as a general mechanism for evaluating and judging (Legrand and Ruby 2009).”
BackgroundInfluentialPhenomenology of anomalous self-experience in early schizophrenia
Parnas, J., & Handest, P. (2003) · Comprehensive Psychiatry · doi:10.1053/comp.2003.50017 · Cited by 458 · cited 1×
“Heightened or exaggerated awareness (sometimes termed, “hyperreflexivity”) of that which is ordinarily tacit or prereflective interferes with absorption necessary for the feeling that self “saturates experience” (Parnas and Handest 2003: 125).”
BackgroundBermúdez, J. L., Marcel, A. J., & Eilan, N. (1995) · Cited by 450
Attention to the eyes and fear-recognition deficits in child psychopathy
Dadds, M. R., Perry, Y., Hawes, D. J., Merz, S., Riddell, A. C., Haines, D. J., Solak, E., & Abeygunawardane, A. I. (2006) · British Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.105.018150 · Cited by 442 · cited 1×
“…the rest of the face, can be sufficient for awareness of the existence of a mental state as well as identification of its type (Adolphs et al. 2002; Dadds et al. 2006; and Morris et al. 2002). from autistic spectrum disorder.25 But DP is socially well-adjusted and adept at managing daily…”
BackgroundDelusions and Other Irrational Beliefs
Bortolotti, L. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780199206162.001.1 · Cited by 438 · cited 1×
“In the former, patients are aware of pains that seem not to belong to them; in the latter (Bortolotti 2010: 68–73), patients are aware of familiar faces that seem oddly alien.”
BackgroundPhenomenal consciousness a naturalistic theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · Cited by 413
Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments.
Madell, G., & Wilkes, K. V. (1989) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2219839 · Cited by 405
Brain, conscious experience and the observing self
Baars, B. J., Ramsøy, T. Z., & Laureys, S. (2003) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2003.09.015 · Cited by 404
Bayne, T. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215386.001.0001 · Cited by 402
Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
(2006) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6155.001.0001 · Cited by 355
The self in action: lessons from delusions of control
Frith, C. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.002 · Cited by 315 · cited 5×
“It is, on the contrary, when we are keenly aware of these that we do not “feel in control in the way we normally do” (Frith 2005: 754).”
BackgroundInfluentialMcGilchrist, I. (2017) · Yale University Press eBooks · doi:10.12987/9780300170177 · Cited by 314
The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry
(2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511543708 · Cited by 311
Anosognosia in Parietal Lobe Syndrome
Ramachandran, V. S. (1995) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1006/ccog.1995.1002 · Cited by 306 · cited 1×
“38 Ramachandran (1995) and de Vignemont (2011) have also developed versions of the discovery hypothesis. multiple components, interacting dynamically, while the explanandum will be a multidimensional phenomenon.”
BackgroundFeeling Pain and Being in Pain
Grahek, N. (2007) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2978.001.0001 · Cited by 299 · cited 1×
“Lesions to the parietal operculum and the posterior insula can cause pain asymbolia, a syndrome in which patients fail to experience the emotions typically associated with pain, despite being able recognize its modality, qualities, intensity, and location (Grahek 2007: 51–71).”
BackgroundThe tell-tale brain: a neuroscientist's quest for what makes us human
(2011) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.48-6945 · Cited by 294
Where am I? The neurological correlates of self and other
Platek, S. M., Keenan, J. P., Gallup, G. G., & Mohamed, F. B. (2004) · Cognitive Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2003.11.014 · Cited by 290 · cited 1×
“One set of studies, for example, concerns how we recognize some faces as our own and others as those of a famous person (Platek et al. 2004).”
BackgroundSpecifying the self for cognitive neuroscience
Christoff, K., Cosmelli, D., Legrand, D., & Thompson, E. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.01.001 · Cited by 286 · cited 1×
“6 See also Legrand (2007) and Christoff et al. (2011). 7 Northoff et al.”
BackgroundHandbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
(2010) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0 · Cited by 271
Depersonalization: a selective impairment of self-awareness
Sierra, M., & David, A. S. (2011) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.018 · Cited by 254 · cited 1×
“As with the cases already discussed, here too there is no involvement of autobiographical memory or self-narrative (Sierra and David 2011: 99).”
BackgroundSelf-reference and self-awareness
Sharpless Shoemaker, S. (2001) · Advances in Consciousness Research · doi:10.1075/aicr.30.08sha · Cited by 244
The Neurology of Consciousness
(2009) · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-374168-4.x0001-9 · Cited by 241
The trans-species concept of self and the subcortical cortical midline system.
Northoff, G., & Panksepp, J. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.04.007 · Cited by 240 · cited 1×
“4 Northoff’s view of CMS has been expanded so as to include subcortical regions; hence, he now tends to refer to the SCMS (e.g., Northoff and Panksepp 2008 and Northoff 2011: 216).”
BackgroundStrawson, G. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250067.001.0001 · Cited by 234
Mapping causal interregional influences with concurrent TMS–fMRI
Bestmann, S., Ruff, C. C., Blankenburg, F., Weiskopf, N., Driver, J., & Rothwell, J. C. (2008) · Experimental Brain Research · doi:10.1007/s00221-008-1601-8 · Cited by 213
Northoff, G., & Qin, P. (2011) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2010.11.009 · Cited by 209 · cited 2×
“Northoff and Qin (2011), developing an idea first proposed by Allen et al. (2008), have called attention to the possibility that during AVH abnormally strong modulation from the auditory cortex might be accompanied by reduced top-down modulation from cortical regions that are involved in generating…”
BackgroundThe Blackwell Companion to Consciousness
(2007) · The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness · doi:10.1111/b.9781405120197.2007.00019.x · Cited by 197
Human Amygdala Responses to Fearful Eyes
Morris, J. S., deBonis, M., & Dolan, R. J. (2002) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1006/nimg.2002.1220 · Cited by 195 · cited 1×
“…rest of the face, can be sufficient for awareness of the existence of a mental state as well as identification of its type (Adolphs et al. 2002; Dadds et al. 2006; and Morris et al. 2002). from autistic spectrum disorder.25 But DP is socially well-adjusted and adept at managing daily activities.”
BackgroundA relation between rest and the self in the brain?
Wicker, B., Ruby, P., Royet, J.-P., & Fonlupt, P. (2003) · Brain Research Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.brainresrev.2003.08.003 · Cited by 195
The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system
de Vignemont, F., & Fourneret, P. (2004) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/s1053-8100(03)00022-9 · Cited by 192 · cited 1×
“…trying to identify the brain’s “core self” (Damasio 2010: 201–209), its “sentient self” (Craig 2010), its “observing self: (Baars et al. 2003), its “who system” (de Vignemont and Fourneret 2004), indeed just “where in the brain is the self” (Feinberg and Keenan 2005; Feinberg 2009: 132–158).”
Anosognosia: The Neurology of Beliefs and Uncertainties
VUILLEUMIER, P. (2004) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/s0010-9452(08)70918-3 · Cited by 189 · cited 1×
“I favor the view that anosognosia is better understood as a “multi-dimensional construct” (Vuilleumier 2004: 15) and that its explanation will require “a multi-componential model…in which no single deficit is either sufficient or necessary” (Vocat et al. 2010: 3592).”
BackgroundSelf-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Advances in Consciousness Research · doi:10.1075/aicr.23.14gal · Cited by 181 · cited 1×
“But Gallagher (2010) and others, have argued that thought insertions are better understood as instances wherein mineness remains intact, in the sense that the patients do indeed experience the thoughts.”
BackgroundAnosognosia for hemiplegia: a clinical-anatomical prospective study
Vocat, R., Staub, F., Stroppini, T., & Vuilleumier, P. (2010) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awq297 · Cited by 171 · cited 1×
“I favor the view that anosognosia is better understood as a “multi-dimensional construct” (Vuilleumier 2004: 15) and that its explanation will require “a multi-componential model…in which no single deficit is either sufficient or necessary” (Vocat et al. 2010: 3592).”
BackgroundWhere in the brain is the self?
Feinberg, T. E., & Keenan, J. P. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.01.002 · Cited by 170 · cited 1×
“…trying to identify the brain’s “core self” (Damasio 2010: 201–209), its “sentient self” (Craig 2010), its “observing self: (Baars et al. 2003), its “who system” (de Vignemont and Fourneret 2004), indeed just “where in the brain is the self” (Feinberg and Keenan 2005; Feinberg 2009: 132–158).”
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory
Sebastian, M. Á. (2012) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2012-0007 · Cited by 167
Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives
Legrand, D. (2007) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.002 · Cited by 163 · cited 3×
“Motivated by their minimalist perspective, they do not presuppose constitution of a self prior to the entertaining of a perspective 6 See also Legrand (2007) and Christoff et al. (2011).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-Representation in Nervous Systems.
Churchland, P. S. (2002) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1070564 · Cited by 160 · cited 1×
“…brain activity, but a shared concern with self’s proprietary aspects links their work, and their work to that of several philosophers who are traversing the same terrain (e.g., Bayne 2010: 269–271; Bogdan 2010: 86; Churchland 2002; Dainton 2008: 354–359; Lane and Liang 2010; Metzinger 2003: 283).”
BackgroundROSENTHAL, D. M. (2016) · ORBi (University of Liège) · Cited by 159
Selves: an essay in revisionary metaphysics
(2010) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-4343 · Cited by 153
Neuropsychoanalysis in practice: Brain, Self and Objects
Northoff, G. (2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780199599691.001.0001 · Cited by 151
Self and schizophrenia: a phenomenological perspective
Parnas, J. (2003) · The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511543708.012 · Cited by 150 · cited 1×
“Phenomenological approaches to schizophrenia (e.g., Sass and Parnas 2003), even those that focus on the prodromal (the pre-onset) phase (e.g., Nelson et al. 2008), advance congruous claims.”
BackgroundDepersonalization: A New Look at a Neglected Syndrome
Sierra, M. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511730023 · Cited by 149 · cited 1×
“In some cases, the effect of cortico-limbic disconnection can be so profound that patients report awareness of pains, “but they seem to belong to someone else, not to me” (Sierra 2009: 150).”
BackgroundNelson, B., Yung, A. R., Bechdolf, A., & McGorry, P. D. (2007) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbm094 · Cited by 148
A disturbed sense of self in the psychosis prodrome: Linking phenomenology and neurobiology
Nelson, B., Fornito, A., Harrison, B. J., Yücel, M., Sass, L. A., Yung, A. R., Thompson, A., Wood, S. J., Pantelis, C., & McGorry, P. D. (2009) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.01.002 · Cited by 144 · cited 1×
“…of the loss of “saturation” is that thoughts or sensations which had previously been mine can become objectified, “as if they were external objects” (Nelson et al. 2009: 809).32 Toward an explanatory framework33 for mineness: the principle of confounded expectations (PCE) Gleanings from the…”
BackgroundFeeling touches in someone else’s hand
Bottini, G., Bisiach, E., Sterzi, R., & Vallarc, G. (2002) · Neuroreport · doi:10.1097/00001756-200202110-00015 · Cited by 144 · cited 1×
“26 Bottini et al. (2002) describe a case which is arguably (Lane and Liang 2011) of this type.”
BackgroundOchsner, K. N., Zaki, J., Hanelin, J., Ludlow, D. H., Knierim, K., Ramachandran, T., Glover, G. H., & Mackey, S. C. (2008) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsn006 · Cited by 142 · cited 1×
“…to the framework sketched here, it has been found that one of the critical differences between perception of pain in self and others is that when we perceive self to be in pain a large region of the mid-insula is much more active than when we perceive others to be in pain (Ochsner 2008: 153).”
BackgroundUnawareness of visual and sensorimotor defects: A hypothesis
Levine, D. N. (1990) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/0278-2626(90)90052-p · Cited by 139
Ismael, J. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195174366.001.0001 · Cited by 139 · cited 1×
“This suggests the empirical possibility of selves—perhaps even selves that exhibit “an inner hub of information and locus of control” (Ismael 2007: 211)—persisting even when the capacity to experience is greatly diminished. behalf of the CMS (or SCMS) model to suggest that self is independent of…”
BackgroundControl: conscious and otherwise
Suhler, C. L., & Churchland, P. S. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.010 · Cited by 138 · cited 1×
“…reject the view that we possess a faculty of free will and seek, instead, to understand the many ways in which a person can be in or out of control (Suhler and Churchland 2009), so too should we reject the search for a unique mineness constituent, and seek to understand how multiple components…”
BackgroundDainton, B. (2008) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288847.001.0001 · Cited by 138 · cited 1×
“…brain activity, but a shared concern with self’s proprietary aspects links their work, and their work to that of several philosophers who are traversing the same terrain (e.g., Bayne 2010: 269–271; Bogdan 2010: 86; Churchland 2002; Dainton 2008: 354–359; Lane and Liang 2010; Metzinger 2003: 283).”
BackgroundBrain imaging of the self-conceptual, anatomical and methodological issues
Northoff, G., Qin, P., & Feinberg, T. E. (2011) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.011 · Cited by 135 · cited 5×
“…exhibit “an inner hub of information and locus of control” (Ismael 2007: 211)—persisting even when the capacity to experience is greatly diminished. behalf of the CMS (or SCMS) model to suggest that self is independent of the different sensory modalities or distinct domains (Northoff 2011: 218).”
BackgroundInfluentialEmpirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples
Metzinger, T. (2007) · Progress in Brain Research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(07)68018-2 · Cited by 123 · cited 3×
“Blanke and Metzinger (2008) have pioneered important conceptual spadework in this vicinity, along with suggesting how these concepts can be fitted to several types of empirical work.”
BackgroundDepersonalization – A New Look at a Neglected Syndrome
(2010) · International Journal of Health Care Quality Assurance · doi:10.1108/ijhcqa.2010.06223aae.002 · Cited by 123
Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception
PRINZ, J. J. (2006) · PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness · Cited by 122
Clark, A. (2007) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil2007104426 · Cited by 119 · cited 1×
“If this line of thinking is correct it suggests that one presupposition motivating the “no-agency” account might be an inversion of that which motivates some criticisms of the Extended Mind Hypothesis (Clark 2007).”
ResultPutnam, M. C., Steven, M. S., Doron, K. W., Riggall, A. C., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21290 · Cited by 118
Seeing red: a study in consciousness
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-1813 · Cited by 104
Seeing Red: A Study in Consciousness
HUMPHREY, N. (2006) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/9780674038905 · Cited by 100
Kourtzi, Z., & Huberle, E. (2005) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.06.017 · Cited by 91
The tell-tale brain a neuroscientist's quest for what makes us human
Ramachandran, V. S. (2011) · Cited by 69
Brain, Mind, and the Structure of Reality
Nunez, P. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195340716.001.0001 · Cited by 59
Review of Ramachandran (2011): The tell-tale brain: A neuroscientist’s quest for what makes us human
van Peer, W. (2013) · Scientific Study of Literature · doi:10.1075/ssol.3.1.14pee · Cited by 59
Phantom limbs: The body in mind
Halligan, P. W. (2002) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800244000111 · Cited by 58 · cited 1×
“One reason for this neglect is that the very idea of sensations felt where there is no limb just strikes us as too counter intuitive (Halligan 2002).”
BackgroundAutomatic Brains—Interpretive Minds
Roser, M., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (2004) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00274.x · Cited by 58 · cited 1×
“…from left-hemisphere dominance (“me”) to right hemisphere dominance (“it”), as indicated by split-brain research that suggests distinct cognitive styles (Roser and Gazzaniga 2004; Schiffer et al. 1998).27 But knowledge of hemispheric lateralization could not have influenced the development of…”
BackgroundIntentional binding and higher order agency experience
Moore, J. W., & Haggard, P. (2010) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.11.007 · Cited by 57 · cited 1×
“In 31 Various factors contribute to this feeling: one among them is “intentional binding,” wherein perceived time of initiating an act and perceived time of effect are closely bound (Moore and Haggard 2010).”
BackgroundIsmael, J. (2007) · Cited by 56
(2003) · Cited by 55
Brewer, B. (1995) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1640.003.0015 · Cited by 55
Self-knowledge and “inner sense.” Lecture II: The broad perceptual model
Shoemaker, S. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624674.012 · Cited by 52
Asymmetry of interhemispheric communication
Marzi, C. A. (2010) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.53 · Cited by 52 · cited 1×
“One among the well-established research findings concerning inter-hemispheric transmission of information (Barnett and Corballis 2005, Marzi 2010, and Putnam et al. 2010), is that left to right is slower than is right to left, and this is true regardless of whether the task tends to engage more…”
BackgroundActive Perception and Perceiving Action: The Shared Circuits Model
Hurley, S. L. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0007 · Cited by 51 · cited 1×
“Taking their lead from the views of Gibson (1979) on perception, as well as from recent developments of those views (e.g., Hurley 2006 and Noe 2004), they propose that the link between perceiving subject and perceived object is forged by the subject’s actions and their perceptual consequences in…”
BackgroundGott, P. S., Hughes, E. C., & Whipple, K. Z. W. (1984) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/0028-3932(84)90008-3 · Cited by 44
Barnett, K. J., & Corballis, M. C. (2005) · Neuroscience Letters · doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2005.01.025 · Cited by 42 · cited 1×
“One among the well-established research findings concerning inter-hemispheric transmission of information (Barnett and Corballis 2005, Marzi 2010, and Putnam et al. 2010), is that left to right is slower than is right to left, and this is true regardless of whether the task tends to engage more…”
BackgroundSelf-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model
Shoemaker, S. (1994) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108489 · Cited by 38
Our own minds: sociocultural grounds for self-consciousness
(2011) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.48-3781 · Cited by 36
Knowing Other People’s Mental States as if They Were One’s Own
de Vignemont, F. (2009) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_16 · Cited by 34 · cited 1×
“24 The issues here admittedly are complex: de Vignemont (2010), for example, has cautioned that for cases of this type, what we might call “mirror empathy,” the degree to which we can know another’s mental state is greatly “mediated by context.””
BackgroundHardcastle, V. G. (2008) · Advances in consciousness research · doi:10.1075/aicr.73 · Cited by 33
Wilkes, K. V. (1993) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240808.001.0001 · Cited by 32
Zahn, R., Talazko, J., & Ebert, D. (2008) · Psychopathology · doi:10.1159/000158228 · Cited by 31
Bogdan, R. J. (2010) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026376.001.0001 · Cited by 31
Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture
Ismael, J. (2006) · Psyche · Cited by 30
Manos Tsakiris, A. (2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.003.0008 · Cited by 30
Different psychological status in the two hemispheres of two split-brain patients.
Schiffer, F., Eran Zaidel, B., Bogen, J. E., & Chasan-Taber, S. (1998) · PubMed · Cited by 29
Consciousness, the self and bodily location
ROSENTHAL, D. M. (2009) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anp167 · Cited by 27 · cited 1×
“…2005: 343–344), developing a distinct theory of conscious mental states, also emphasizes that they feel “direct,” “unmediated,” or “noninferential,” that “one’s awareness of the state tacitly represents that state as belonging to the very individual that has that awareness” (Rosenthal 2010: 271).”
BackgroundSelf-Consciousness and Immunity
Lane, T. J., & Liang, C. (2011) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil201110824 · Cited by 24 · cited 2×
“Elsewhere, for example, I have argued that in order to experience certain introspectively accessible sensations, those sensations must be represented as belonging to someone other than self (Lane and Liang 2011).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Left Hemisphere Does Not Miss the Right Hemisphere
Gazzaniga, M. S., & Miller, M. B. (2009) · The Neurology of Consciousness · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-374168-4.00020-4 · Cited by 13 · cited 1×
“As is well-known, Gazzaniga hypothesizes (e.g., Gazzaniga and Miller 2009: 266) that the left hemisphere is an “interpreter,” that “it creates a running narrative of our actions, emotions, thoughts, and dreams,” that it is “the glue that keeps our story unified.””
BackgroundMental ownership and higher-order thought: Response to Rosenthal
Lane, T. J., & Liang, C. (2010) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anq022 · Cited by 12 · cited 1×
“…brain activity, but a shared concern with self’s proprietary aspects links their work, and their work to that of several philosophers who are traversing the same terrain (e.g., Bayne 2010: 269–271; Bogdan 2010: 86; Churchland 2002; Dainton 2008: 354–359; Lane and Liang 2010; Metzinger 2003: 283).”
BackgroundSelf-citationSchlechty, P. C. (2009) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781118269497.ch12 · Cited by 9
Bermúdez, J. L. (2007) · Blackwell Publishing Ltd eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470751466.ch37 · Cited by 9
HSP90 inhibitors alter capsaicin- and ATP-induced currents in rat dorsal root ganglion neurons
McDowell, T. S., & Yukhananov, R. Y. (2002) · Neuroreport · doi:10.1097/00001756-200203250-00015 · Cited by 6
Mental Ownership and Higher Order Thought
Lane, T. J., & Liang, C. (2010) · Taipei Medical University Repository · Cited by 4
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Damasio, A. (2010). Self comes to mind: constructing the conscious mind. New York: Pantheon.
- Feinberg, T. E. (2009). From axons to identity: neurological explorations of the self. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Hirstein, W. (2009). Confabulations. In J. Bickle (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and the neurosciences (pp. 474–512). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cited by
For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not
Zahavi, D., & Kriegel, U. (2015) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · doi:10.4324/9781315889634-9 · Cited by 66
Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia
Henriksen, M. G., Parnas, J., & Zahavi, D. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.102770 · Cited by 117
“In this article, we focus solely on experiences of thought insertion. it is not stamped with a meish quality; and, for-me-ness does not play a determining role in its constitution” (Lane, 2012, 281).”
BackgroundInfluentialKlein, S. B. (2013) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00003 · Cited by 94
“Taken together, these studies focus attention on ownership as an aspect, or form, of consciousness that can come undone under certain conditions (e.g., Klein and Nichols, 2012; Lane, 2012).”
Klein, S. B. (2016) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1007150 · Cited by 92
Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Selfhood: a Reply to some Critics
Zahavi, D. (2018) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0403-6 · Cited by 86
Metadata
- Authors
- Lane, T.
- Affiliations
- National Chengchi University (TW)
- Corresponding author
- Lane, Timothy
- ORCID
- Lane, Timothy
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2012-02-19
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 251-286
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W1967470647
- Semantic Scholar
- 9fe50a4cd7a916823461a4b5e9fab170e0ccdd30
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 127
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 4.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Taipei Medical University Repository (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- mineness, subjective perspective, selfhood, narrative self, minimal self
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.