Cited by 570Embodied and Extended CognitionPhenomenology and Existential PhilosophyPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation

Dreyfus, Hubert L.·2002·Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1023/a:1021351606209

Cites

6 of 6 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • In this feedback loop, the agent aims toward a more coherent understanding of the situation, the maximal grip, continually adjusting posture, attention, and movements to bring the situation into sharper focus.

    “In this feedback loop, the agent aims toward a more coherent understanding of the situation, the maximal grip (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). In this process, the agent continually adjusts its posture, attention, and movements to bring the situation into sharper focus, both perceptually and motorically.”

    From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Dreyfus, 2002

  • The agent's goals and needs filter which similarities are relevant, constraining the vast space of possible generalizations.

    “In other words, it serves to constrain the vast space of possible generalizations: in a world where everything could resemble everything else in countless ways, the agent's goals and needs filter which similarities are relevant (Dreyfus, 2002).”

    From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Dreyfus, 2002

  • The body does not simply constrain what can be perceived, but provides a structure for understanding the world in terms of action-relevant similarities.

    “In this way, the body does not simply constrain what can be perceived, but provides a structure for understanding the world in terms of action-relevant similarities (Dreyfus, 2002).”

    From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Dreyfus, 2002

  • These refinements are not guided by explicit reasoning but by a bodily sense of tension and relief.

    “These refinements are not guided by explicit reasoning but by a bodily sense of tension when the current state deviates from an optimal relation, and by the felt relief that comes with moving closer to that optimal state.”

    From Toward Enactive Artificial Intelligence (2026) · cites this paper as Dreyfus, 2002

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Dreyfus, H. L.
Affiliations
University of California, Berkeley (US)
Corresponding author
Dreyfus, Hubert L.
Venue
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Published
2002-12
Volume
1
Issue
4
Pages
367-383
ISSN
  • 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8676
OpenAlex
W324585127
Cited by
569
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 40 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 58 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 39 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 24
FWCI
2.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology of perception, mental representation, embodied cognition, skill acquisition, learning, scientific explanation, artificial neural networks, Walter Freeman, brain dynamics, perception and action, body and world

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review