Thinking through enactive agency: sense-making, bio-semiosis and the ontologies of organismic worlds
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: (i) there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence (ii) all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: (i) these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they (ii) end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of (iii) a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds.
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Cites
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“One such approach, enactivism (Colombetti 2014; Di Paolo 2009; Stewart et al. 2010; Thompson 2007)1 has over the last decade developed an account of agency which it argues can serve as the foundation for a non-cognitivist, nonrepresentationalist embodied cognitive science.”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
Systemic Cognition: Sketching a Functional Nexus of Intersecting Ontologies
Gahrn-Andersen, R., Festila, M. S., & Secchi, D. (2024) · Contributions to Management Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-44685-6_8 · Cited by 6
Traces of thinking: a stigmergic approach to 4E cognition
Sims, R. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05074-8 · Cited by 3
“7 This links with the enactivist concept of sensemaking and the autopoietic idea that the Umwelt is ‘brought forth’ by the organism (De Jesus, 2015; see Heras-Escribano and De Jesus, 2018; von Uexkull and O’Neil, 2010).”
Nexuses of performativity: Systemic generalities, infrastructures and practical ontologies
Gahrn-Andersen, R. (2025) · Thesis Eleven · doi:10.1177/07255136241308882 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- De Jesus, P.
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2018-03-02
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 861-887
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2791111388
- Cited by
- 37
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 1.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- De Jesus, P. (2018). Thinking through enactive agency: sense-making, bio-semiosis and the ontologies of organismic worlds. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9562-2
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