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Who Speaks for Science?

Allchin, Douglas·2022·Science & Education
DOI 10.1007/s11191-021-00257-4PMC PMC8520088
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Abstract

Ironically, flat-Earthers, anti-vaxxers, and climate change naysayers trust in science. Unfortunately, they trust the wrong science. That conundrum lies at the heart of scientific literacy in an age of well-funded commercial and ideological interests and overwhelming digital information. The core question for the citizen-consumer is not philosophically “why trust science?” (Oreskes 2019) but sociologically “who speaks for science?” Teachers can help students learn how to navigate the treacherous territory of inevitably mediated communication and the vulnerabilities of epistemic dependence. Students need to understand the role of science communication practices (media literacy) and the roles of credibility, expertise and honesty and the deceptive strategies used by imitators of science to seem like credible voices for science.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s11191-021-00257-4

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Figures

Fig. 1 Two models of science communication. a Barrier model, b consumer-centered model
Fig. 1 Two models of science communication. a Barrier model, b consumer-centered modelCC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 2 The challenge of deciding “who speaks for science?”
Fig. 2 The challenge of deciding “who speaks for science?”CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 3 Comparison of ways to assess the trustworthiness of scientific claims in the news media. Conventional methods focus on documents and their epistemic attributes. The “who speaks for science?” approach focuses on the author and the sociology of their credibility
Fig. 3 Comparison of ways to assess the trustworthiness of scientific claims in the news media. Conventional methods focus on documents and their epistemic attributes. The “who speaks for science?” approach focuses on the author and the sociology of their credibilityCC BY · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Allchin, D.
ORCID
Allchin, Douglas
Venue
Science & Education
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2021-10-16
Volume
31
Issue
6
Pages
1475-1492
ISSN
  • 0926-7220
  • 1573-1901
DOI
10.1007/s11191-021-00257-4
PMC
PMC8520088
Cited by
52
References
6
Language
en
Licence
Funders
Not applicable

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