The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Anti-luck epistemology
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“To say that a belief is safe is to say that the belief couldn't easily have been false .”
From The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts (2025) · cites this paper as Pritchard, 2007
Citations
Cites
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Williamson, T. L. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
American Philosophical Quarterly
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Wittgenstein, L. (1969) · Cited by 2,146
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Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
Self-citation(2000) · doi:10.5040/9798216977261.0007 · Cited by 863
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Metaepistemology and Skepticism
Fumerton, R. A. (1990) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-1942-6_5 · Cited by 524
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Williams, B. A. O., & Nagel, T. (1976) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/50.1.115 · Cited by 296
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An Analysis of Factual Knowledge
Unger, P. (1968) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024203 · Cited by 253
Cohen, S. (2000) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00013.x · Cited by 242
Greco, J. (1999) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.13 · Cited by 233
Sainsbury, R. M. (1997) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2953809 · Cited by 224
Pritchard, D. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0013 · Cited by 207
Self-citationSosa, E. (2000) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00002.x · Cited by 199
THE STRUCTURE OF SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS
Pritchard, D. (2004) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00383.x · Cited by 164
Self-citationWhy epistemologists are so down on their luck
Riggs, W. D. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9043-y · Cited by 154
Sosa, E. (2000) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.34.s1.1 · Cited by 152
Lackey, J. A. (2008) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400801886207 · Cited by 140
The psychology and philosophy of luck
Pritchard, D., & Smith, M. D. (2004) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2004.03.001 · Cited by 139
Self-citation(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-0212 · Cited by 133
Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology
(2007) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199275755.001.0001 · Cited by 130
Schaffer, J. (2005) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.003.0009 · Cited by 126
Recent work on radical skepticism
Pritchard, D. (2002) · Cited by 125
Self-citationResurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic
Pritchard, D. (2002) · International Journal of Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1080/09672550210152122 · Cited by 118
Self-citationAn introduction to contemporary epistemology
(2017) · Bloomsbury Academic eBooks · doi:10.5040/9781474295017.ch-004 · Cited by 107
Coffman, E. J. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9046-8 · Cited by 104
Code, L. B. (2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315212043-9 · Cited by 96
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
Creighton, J. E. (1919) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2178091 · Cited by 92
Worries about Pritchard’s safety
Greco, J. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9040-1 · Cited by 90
Pritchard, D. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00033.x · Cited by 82
Self-citationHiller, A., & Neta, R. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9041-0 · Cited by 72
McDowell and the New Evil Genius
Neta, R., & Pritchard, D. (2007) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00023.x · Cited by 69
Self-citationVirtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck
Pritchard, D. (2003) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00263 · Cited by 59
Self-citationMcDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism
Pritchard, D. (2003) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00187 · Cited by 46
Self-citationIntellectual virtue in perspective
Sosa, E. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625299.017 · Cited by 42
Becker, K. (2006) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00452.x · Cited by 36
Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemicangst
Pritchard, D. (2005) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400500110867 · Cited by 33
Self-citationPritchard, D. (2007) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199275755.003.0005 · Cited by 31
Self-citationVirtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise
Greco, J. (2003) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00278 · Cited by 29
Pritchard, D. (2007) · Cited by 23
Self-citationGoldberg, S. C. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9042-z · Cited by 14
Felix Culpa: Luck In Ethics And Epistemology
Axtell, G. S. (2003) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00277 · Cited by 9
Two for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance
Axtell, G. S. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9045-9 · Cited by 8
Flagged first, then by citations
5 of the 62 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Harman G. (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value
Pritchard, D. (2009) · Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement · doi:10.1017/s1358246109000046 · Cited by 253
Self-citationRecent Work on Epistemic Value
Pritchard, D. (2007) · Cited by 163
Self-citationWittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing
Pritchard, D. (2011) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-011-0057-8 · Cited by 136
Self-citationPritchard, D. (2015) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/meta.12142 · Cited by 130
Self-citationBogardus, T. (2012) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00564.x · Cited by 128
Metadata
- Authors
- Pritchard, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Stirling (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Pritchard, Duncan
- ORCID
- Pritchard, Duncan
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2006-10-10
- Volume
- 158
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 277-297
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2092707543
- Cited by
- 408
- References
- 62
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 47.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/D500494/1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic luck
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