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Anti-luck epistemology
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“To say that a belief is safe is to say that the belief couldn't easily have been false .”
From The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts (2025) · cites this paper as Pritchard, 2007
Citations
Cites
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Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Harman G. (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Pritchard, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Stirling (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Pritchard, Duncan
- ORCID
- Pritchard, Duncan
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2006-10-10
- Volume
- 158
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 277-297
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2092707543
- Cited by
- 408
- References
- 62
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 47.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/D500494/1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic luck
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