Pragmatic markers: the missing link between language and Theory of Mind
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Language and Theory of Mind come together in communication, but their relationship has been intensely contested. I hypothesize that pragmatic markers connect language and Theory of Mind and enable their co-development and co-evolution through a positive feedback loop, whereby the development of one skill boosts the development of the other. I propose to test this hypothesis by investigating two types of pragmatic markers: demonstratives (e.g., ‘this’ vs. ‘that’ in English) and articles (e.g., ‘a’ vs. ‘the’). Pragmatic markers are closed-class words that encode non-representational information that is unavailable to consciousness, but accessed automatically in processing. These markers have been associated with implicit Theory of Mind because they are used to establish joint attention (e.g., ‘I prefer that one’) and mark shared knowledge (e.g., ‘We bought the house’ vs. ‘We bought a house’). Here I develop a theoretical account of how joint attention (as driven by the use of demonstratives) is the basis for children’s later tracking of common ground (as marked by definite articles). The developmental path from joint attention to common ground parallels language change, with demonstrative forms giving rise to definite articles. This parallel opens the possibility of modelling the emergence of Theory of Mind in human development in tandem with its routinization across language communities and generations of speakers. I therefore propose that, in order to understand the relationship between language and Theory of Mind, we should study pragmatics at three parallel timescales: during language acquisition, language use, and language change.
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Citations
Cites
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition
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Social cognition, joint attention, and communicative competence from 9 to 15 months of age.
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Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?
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Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking
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The interface of language and theory of mind
de Villiers, J. (2007) · Lingua · doi:10.1016/j.lingua.2006.11.006 · Cited by 457 · cited 1×
“From a theoretical perspective, it has been proposed that false-belief understanding (as measured by standard tasks) emerges from children’s mastery of sentential complement syntax (de Villiers 1999, 2007; cf. Hacquard and Lidz 2019).”
BackgroundIterated learning and the evolution of language
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Cited by
Over-reliance on English hinders cognitive science
Blasi, D. E., Henrich, J., Adamou, E., Kemmerer, D., & Majid, A. (2022) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2022.09.015 · Cited by 396
“All in all, this calls for finding common linguistic ground from which to understand andmeasure the potential linguistic roots of ToM, ideally tapping into linguistic resources with broad crosslinguistic attestation [102,103].”
Neural Theory-of-Mind? On the Limits of Social Intelligence in Large LMs
Sap, M., Le Bras, R., Fried, D., & Choi, Y. (2022) · Proceedings of the 2022 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing · doi:10.18653/v1/2022.emnlp-main.248 · Cited by 118
Neural Theory-of-Mind? On the Limits of Social Intelligence in Large LMs
Sap, M., LeBras, R., Fried, D., & Choi, Y. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2210.13312 · Cited by 118
“and communication can frame our understanding of this link (Rubio-Fernandez, 2021), positing that one needs to reason about an interlocutor’s mental state (TOM) to effectively communicate and understand language (Grice, 1975; Fernández, 2013; Goodman and Frank, 2016; Enrici et al.”
BackgroundInfluentialA fine-grained comparison of pragmatic language understanding in humans and language models
Hu, J., Floyd, S., Jouravlev, O., Fedorenko, E., & Gibson, E. (2023) · Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers) · doi:10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.230 · Cited by 78
Metadata
- Authors
- Rubio-Fernandez, P.
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2020-07-08
- Volume
- 199
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 1125-1158
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W3041623293
- Cited by
- 55
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 7.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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