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From commonsense to science, and back: the use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience

Francken, Jolien C., Slors, Marc·2014·Consciousness and Cognition
DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.019
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Abstract

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as 'mental realism'. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.

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  • Conceptual choices and assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon under study have a significant influence on which experiments are conducted and how their outcomes are interpreted.

    “conceptual choices and assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon under study have a significant influence on which experiments are conducted and how their outcomes are interpreted (Barrett 2009; Irvine 2013; Francken and Slors 2014; Abend 2017).”

    From An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science (2022) · cites this paper as Francken and Slors 2014

  • By starting off with different conceptualizations of consciousness, researchers may not be investigating the same phenomenon even though the same overarching label is used ('consciousness').

    “As a consequence, by starting off with different conceptualizations of consciousness, researchers may not be investigating the same phenomenon even though the same overarching label is used (‘consciousness’) (Figdor 2013; Irvine 2013; Francken and Slors 2014).”

    From An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science (2022) · cites this paper as Francken and Slors 2014

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Cited by

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Authors
Francken, J. C., & Slors, M.
Affiliations
Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
Corresponding author
Francken, Jolien C.
ORCID
Venue
Consciousness and Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2014-10
Volume
29
Pages
248-258
ISSN
1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.019
OpenAlex
W2140473695
Cited by
36
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 5 · 2015: 1
FWCI
0.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
interpretivism, philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, conceptual confusion
MeSH terms
Humans, Neurosciences, Terminology as Topic, Cognitive Science

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