Extended Life
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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In the citing paper
“It is in this sense that the water boatman plus its self-orchestrated air bubbles constitute a Markov blanket the boundaries of which reach all the way out to include parts of the environment.”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“Were the system not able to do this it would cease to exist [26,31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“The water boatman is an example of an autonomous system, the internal states of which comprise environmental aspects [31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“A broad constraint on these conditions is epistemic: A definition of agency should be operational, that is, based on what can be explained about a concrete instance without appealing to historical or contextual knowledge beyond the concrete current situation (Di Paolo, 2009; Varela, 1979).”
From Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency (2023) · cites this paper as Di Paolo, 2009
Citations
Cites
Bourdieu, P. (1990) · doi:10.1515/9781503621749 · Cited by 17,271
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 4×
“1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E. H., & Thompson, E. T. (2017) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 5,910
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980) · Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4 · Cited by 5,815
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., Varela, F. J., & Beer, S. (1980) · Cited by 4,699
Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-2543 · Cited by 2,696 · cited 5×
“In a recent article, Wheeler (in press) has put a question mark on the relation between enactivism (in its life/mind continuity version, e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialPrinciples of Biological Autonomy
Varela, F. J. (2025) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/14875.001.0001 · Cited by 1,885 · cited 2×
“Such could be the case of sensorimotor loops, conversations and social interactions in general (Varela 1979, 1991, 1997; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007).”
BackgroundParticipatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology.
Merlan, P., & Jonas, H. (1967) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2105293 · Cited by 916
Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency
Di Paolo, E. A. (2005) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-005-9002-y · Cited by 806 · cited 8×
“…enactive perspective has started to advance on the intimate connection between the concept of autonomy and sense-making, the normative engagement of a system with its world (Varela 1991, 1997; Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo et al. 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialClark, A., & Chalmers, D. J. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00096 · Cited by 672
Rethinking materiality : the engagement of mind with the material world
DeMarrais, E., Gosden, C., & Renfrew, C. (2004) · Cited by 617
Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition
Rupert, R. D., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2004) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil2004101826 · Cited by 584 · cited 1×
“Notice that this is not the same line of argument against EM as that presented, for instance, by Rupert (2004).”
BackgroundLife after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality
Weber, A., & Varela, F. J. (2002) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1023/a:1020368120174 · Cited by 566 · cited 6×
“It narrows down the multidimensionality of a physical coupling into the distinction of whether the encounter is good or bad for autopoiesis (Weber and Varela 2002).”
BackgroundInfluential(2014) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 518
Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories
Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M. (2009) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2 · Cited by 501 · cited 4×
“…enactive perspective has started to advance on the intimate connection between the concept of autonomy and sense-making, the normative engagement of a system with its world (Varela 1991, 1997; Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo et al. 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialPatterns of Life: Intertwining Identity and Cognition
Varela, F. J. (1997) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1006/brcg.1997.0907 · Cited by 414 · cited 4×
“…enactive perspective has started to advance on the intimate connection between the concept of autonomy and sense-making, the normative engagement of a system with its world (Varela 1991, 1997; Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo et al. 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialHorizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play
Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M., & De Jaegher, H. (2010) · Enaction · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014601.003.0003 · Cited by 405 · cited 1×
“…enactive perspective has started to advance on the intimate connection between the concept of autonomy and sense-making, the normative engagement of a system with its world (Varela 1991, 1997; Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo et al. 2008).”
BackgroundThompson, E. T. (2001) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 386
Design for a brain: The origin of adaptive behaviour (2nd ed. rev.).
Ashby, W. R. (1960) · Chapman & Hall eBooks · doi:10.1037/11592-000 · Cited by 358 · cited 1×
“This second-order loop is rarely made explicit (though it already appears as a central idea of Ashby's theory of adaptive behaviour, Ashby 1960).”
BackgroundThe Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology
Yolton, J. W., & The Journal of Philosophy, I. (1967) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024495 · Cited by 349 · cited 2×
“Hans Jonas has explored precisely this logic (Jonas 1966).”
BackgroundMaturana, H. R. (2002) · Cybernetics & human knowing · Cited by 315
Organism: A Meshwork of Selfless Selves
Varela, F. J. (1991) · Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/978-94-011-3406-4_5 · Cited by 269 · cited 7×
“In order for it to work, Varela must resort to notions such as ‘‘breakdowns’’ in autopoiesis, which may be major or minor (Varela 1991).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate
Malafouris, L. (2004) · CogPrints (University of Southampton) · Cited by 236
Bourgine, P., & Stewart, J. (2004) · Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/1064546041255557 · Cited by 221 · cited 1×
“''Life = cognition'' has been a famous motto that comes out of this literature (Stewart 1995; Boden 1999; Bourgine and Stewart 2004).”
BackgroundPLASTRON RESPIRATION IN AQUATIC INSECTS
THORPE, W. H. (1950) · Biological Reviews · doi:10.1111/j.1469-185x.1950.tb01590.x · Cited by 191 · cited 1×
“The bubbles even refill with oxygen due to the differences in partial pressure provoked by respiration and potentially can work indefinitely (see e.g., Thorpe 1950).”
BackgroundCognition = life: Implications for higher-level cognition
Stewart, J. R. (1995) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/0376-6357(95)00046-1 · Cited by 189 · cited 1×
“''Life = cognition'' has been a famous motto that comes out of this literature (Stewart 1995; Boden 1999; Bourgine and Stewart 2004).”
BackgroundClark, A. (2007) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil2007104426 · Cited by 119 · cited 1×
“Clark states: ''The parity principle was meant to engage our rough sense of what we might intuitively judge to belong to the domain of cognition—rather than, say, that of digestion—but to do so without the pervasive distractions of skin and skull'' (Clark 2007, p. 166).”
BackgroundBlood Chimerism in a Pair of Twins
Booth, P. B., Plaut, G., James, J. D., Ikin, E. W., Moores, P. P., Sanger, R. A., & Race, R. R. (1957) · BMJ · doi:10.1136/bmj.1.5033.1456 · Cited by 98 · cited 1×
“During gestation blood cells from the opposite twin can be acquired in utero and they can initiate a successful, but genetically different lineage that can persist throughout a lifetime (Booth et al. 1957).”
BackgroundAutopoiesis: the status of its system logic
Fleischaker, G. R. (1988) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/0303-2647(88)90048-2 · Cited by 85 · cited 1×
“An observer should in principle be able to ascertain whether a system is autopoietic or not (for this, explicit operational criteria have been offered, e.g., by Fleischaker 1988).”
BackgroundBoden, M. A. (1999) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/50.2.231 · Cited by 80 · cited 1×
“''Life = cognition'' has been a famous motto that comes out of this literature (Stewart 1995; Boden 1999; Bourgine and Stewart 2004).”
BackgroundMetabolism and the problem of its universalization
Bergareche, A. M., & Ruiz-Mirazo, K. (1999) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/s0303-2647(98)00034-3 · Cited by 78 · cited 1×
“Several researchers have recently come to the realization that, as a theory of life and as theory of cognition, autopoiesis leaves many important questions unanswered (e.g., Moreno and Ruiz-Mirazo 1999; Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007).”
BackgroundMental life. A naturalized approach to the autonomy of cognitive agents
Barandiaran, X. E., & Eugenio, X. (2008) · Euskomedia Digital Bilduma · Cited by 31
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Barandiaran X, Di Paolo EA (2008) Artificial mental life (Abstract). In: Bullock S, Noble J, Watson RA, Bedau MA (eds) Proceedings of the 11th international conference on artificial life, Alife XI, Winchester, UK, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
- Di Paolo EA (2003) Organismically-inspired robotics: homeostatic adaptation and natural teleology beyond the closed sensorimotor loop. In: Murase K, Asakura T (eds) Dynamical systems approach to embodiment and sociality. Advanced Knowledge International, Adelaide, pp 19–42
- Di Paolo EA (forthcoming) Overcoming autopoiesis: an enactive detour on the way from life to society. In: Magalhaes R, Sanchez R (eds) Autopoiesis in organizations and information systems. Elsevier, New York
- Heidegger M (2001) The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: world, finitude, solitude (translated by McNeill W, Walker N). Indiana University Press, Bloomington
- Wheeler M (in press) Mind, things and materiality. In: Renfrew C, Malafouris L (eds) The cognitive life of things: recasting the boundaries of the mind. McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research Publications, Cambridge
Cited by
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Can social interaction constitute social cognition?
De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.009 · Cited by 911
Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories
Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M. (2009) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2 · Cited by 501
Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343819 · Cited by 497
“In this sense, living systems are subject to a permanent precariousness (Di Paolo, 2009) that is compensated by its active organization.”
BackgroundThe Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle
Kirchhoff, M., Parr, T., Palacios, E., Friston, K., & Kiverstein, J. (2018) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0792 · Cited by 473
Metadata
- Authors
- Di Paolo, E.
- Venue
- Topoi
- Published
- 2008-12-18
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 9-21
- ISSN
- 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8749
- OpenAlex
- W3188690837
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 7.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Topoi (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- extended mind, enactivism, autopoiesis, internalism, relational cognition, autonomy, individuality, mediation, agency, definition of cognition
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.