Extended Life
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“It is in this sense that the water boatman plus its self-orchestrated air bubbles constitute a Markov blanket the boundaries of which reach all the way out to include parts of the environment.”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“Were the system not able to do this it would cease to exist [26,31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“The water boatman is an example of an autonomous system, the internal states of which comprise environmental aspects [31].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [31]
In the citing paper
“A broad constraint on these conditions is epistemic: A definition of agency should be operational, that is, based on what can be explained about a concrete instance without appealing to historical or contextual knowledge beyond the concrete current situation (Di Paolo, 2009; Varela, 1979).”
From Toward an Enactive Conception of Productive Practices: Beyond Material Agency (2023) · cites this paper as Di Paolo, 2009
Citations
Cites
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“1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E. H., & Thompson, E. T. (2017) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 5,910
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Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., Varela, F. J., & Beer, S. (1980) · Cited by 4,699
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“In a recent article, Wheeler (in press) has put a question mark on the relation between enactivism (in its life/mind continuity version, e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialPrinciples of Biological Autonomy
Varela, F. J. (2025) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/14875.001.0001 · Cited by 1,885 · cited 2×
“Such could be the case of sensorimotor loops, conversations and social interactions in general (Varela 1979, 1991, 1997; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007).”
BackgroundParticipatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
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- Di Paolo EA (2003) Organismically-inspired robotics: homeostatic adaptation and natural teleology beyond the closed sensorimotor loop. In: Murase K, Asakura T (eds) Dynamical systems approach to embodiment and sociality. Advanced Knowledge International, Adelaide, pp 19–42
- Di Paolo EA (forthcoming) Overcoming autopoiesis: an enactive detour on the way from life to society. In: Magalhaes R, Sanchez R (eds) Autopoiesis in organizations and information systems. Elsevier, New York
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Cited by
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924
Can social interaction constitute social cognition?
De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.009 · Cited by 911
Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories
Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M. (2009) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2 · Cited by 501
Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343819 · Cited by 497
“In this sense, living systems are subject to a permanent precariousness (Di Paolo, 2009) that is compensated by its active organization.”
BackgroundThe Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle
Kirchhoff, M., Parr, T., Palacios, E., Friston, K., & Kiverstein, J. (2018) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0792 · Cited by 473
Ramstead, M. J. D., Veissière, S. P. L., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01090 · Cited by 422
“…and action, explicitly recognizing the emergence of meaning and salience in the active, embodied engagement of organisms with their environment (Di Paolo, 2005, 2009; Noë, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Froese and Di Paolo, 2011; Hutto and Myin, 2013; Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014; Hutto and Satne, 2015;…”
BackgroundHorizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play
Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M., & De Jaegher, H. (2010) · Enaction · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014601.003.0003 · Cited by 405
“Similar ideas are elaborated by Jonas (1966) ; see also Di Paolo 2009.”
BackgroundInfluentialEmbodiment and sense-making in autism
De Jaegher, H. (2013) · Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnint.2013.00015 · Cited by 388
“It rejects “boxology” as a valid method to address the “how does it work” question (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundMethodIntroduction to the special issue on 4E cognition
Menary, R. (2010) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9187-6 · Cited by 338
Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism
Ward, D., Silverman, D., & Villalobos, M. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9484-6 · Cited by 278
Slaby, J., Mühlhoff, R., & Wüschner, P. (2019) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/1754073917722214 · Cited by 214
“Dynamic processes of organism–environment intra-action take precedence over individual corporeal and mental states (see Colombetti & Thompson, 2008; Di Paolo, 2009; Thompson, 2007).”
BackgroundSocial understanding through direct perception? Yes, by interacting
De Jaegher, H. (2009) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.10.007 · Cited by 206
Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture: Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World
Durt, C., Fuchs, T. A. E., & Tewes, C. (2017) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262035552.001.0001 · Cited by 268
de Haan, S. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108685214 · Cited by 166
An enactive approach to pain: beyond the biopsychosocial model
Stilwell, P., & Harman, K. (2019) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-019-09624-7 · Cited by 162
“As described by Di Paolo (2009), cognition has no location.”
BackgroundFrom participatory sense-making to language: there and back again
Cuffari, E. C., Di Paolo, E., & De Jaegher, H. (2015) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9 · Cited by 159
“All that is conceptually required for participatory sense-making is the existence of autonomous agents in the enactive sense (Di Paolo 2005, 2009; Thompson 2007) and the possibility of a dynamical coupling between their sensemaking activities in the world such that this coupling acquires, at least…”
BackgroundThe Circularity of the Embodied Mind
Fuchs, T. A. E. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01707 · Cited by 178
Multiscale integration: beyond internalism and externalism
Ramstead, M. J. D., Kirchhoff, M. D., Constant, A., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02115-x · Cited by 168
“In this subsection we formulate the enactive view associated with the work of Varela and colleagues; so-called autopoietic enactivism (Di Paolo 2009; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014; Thompson 2010; Varela et al.”
BackgroundMethodLoving and knowing: reflections for an engaged epistemology
Jaegher, H. D. (2019) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-019-09634-5 · Cited by 185
“Here others, and the interactive experience and skills we honed 13 Cf. Jonas 1966, 1984, 2016; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 1968; Maturana and Varela 1980; Dillon 1997; Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo 2005, 2009, 2018.”
BackgroundEmotions and the extended mind
Slaby, J. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0003 · Cited by 166
On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency
Jaegher, H. D., & Froese, T. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343822 · Cited by 177
“Third, because this identity is an accomplishment of the system, rather than something pre-given or imposed from the outside, it naturally finds itself in a precarious situation that requires continuous overcoming (see Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundMaking enactivism even more embodied
Gallagher, S., & Bower, M. (2014) · AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard · doi:10.26913/50202014.0109.0011 · Cited by 132
Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many?
Kiverstein, J. D., & Clark, A. (2009) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9041-4 · Cited by 160
Gaudenzi, S. (2013) · Goldsmiths, University of London · doi:10.25602/gold.00007997 · Cited by 132
An Enactive Approach to Psychiatry
de Haan, S. (2020) · Philosophy, psychiatry & psychology · doi:10.1353/ppp.2020.0001 · Cited by 151
“Enactivism by contrast does not propose to extend the inner, but rather rejects this very inner mind-outer world division (Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundThe Enactive Approach to Habits: New Concepts for the Cognitive Science of Bad Habits and Addiction
Ramírez–Vizcaya, S., & Froese, T. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00301 · Cited by 141
Enactive Affectivity, Extended
Colombetti, G. (2015) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-015-9335-2 · Cited by 135
“As such, the Umwelt represents what the living system sees as relevant or salient, what matters to it and what it cares about.3 1 Dept.of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology, Univ. of Exeter, EX4 4RJ, UK, G.Colombetti@exeter.ac.uk 2 By “enactive approach” I refer here to the view originally proposed by Varela et al…”
BackgroundWhere There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Froese, T. (2017) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e19040169 · Cited by 114
Enacting musical emotions. sense-making, dynamic systems, and the embodied mind
Schiavio, A., van der Schyff, D., Céspedes-Guevara, J., & Reybrouck, M. (2016) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9477-8 · Cited by 135
The co-creation of meaningful action: bridging enaction and interactional sociology
Jaegher, H. D., Peräkylä, A., & Stevanovic, M. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0378 · Cited by 122
“For enaction, a system—be it a social interaction or a living system—is autonomous when it is composed of processes that actively generate and sustain an identity under precarious conditions [10,11].”
BackgroundAutopoiesis, free energy, and the life–mind continuity thesis
Kirchhoff, M. D. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1100-6 · Cited by 122
McGann, M., Jaegher, H. D., & Paolo, E. A. D. (2013) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0032935 · Cited by 113
“The last decade has seen some significant development of these notions (Thompson, 2004, 2007; Di Paolo, 2005, 2009; Di Paolo, Rohde, & De Jaegher, 2010).”
BackgroundEnactivism and predictive processing: a non-representational view
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Robertson, I. (2018) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2018.1477983 · Cited by 118
“Furthermore, like cognitivist PP, we want to accept that internal dynamics are probabilistic and action-guiding (cf. Di Paolo 2009; Gallagher et al. 2013; Kirchhoff 2016).”
BackgroundAI Extenders: The Ethical and Societal Implications of Humans Cognitively Extended by AI
Hernández-Orallo, J., & Vold, K. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society · doi:10.1145/3306618.3314238 · Cited by 99
Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis
Froese, T., & Paolo, E. A. D. (2009) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9140-8 · Cited by 98
“What is additionally needed is a more detailed non-species-specific operational mechanism to account for the transformative potential of such cognitive extension as it relates to agency (Di Paolo 2009).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Past, Present, and Future of Artificial Life
Aguilar, W., Santamaría-Bonfil, G., Froese, T., & Gershenson, C. (2014) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2014.00008 · Cited by 122
“…science is in the process of continuing its theoretical development from an embodied to a so-called “enactive” approach, which pays particular attention to the properties of the living such as autopoiesis, autonomy, and sense-making (Weber and Varela, 2002; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundThe Enactive Torch: A New Tool for the Science of Perception
Froese, T., McGann, M., Bigge, W., Spiers, A. J., & Seth, A. K. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Haptics · doi:10.1109/toh.2011.57 · Cited by 107
“Sense-making is the activity by which an autonomous and adaptive agent maintains a meaningful relationship with its environment [54], [17].”
BackgroundLaying down a forking path: tensions between enaction and the free energy principle
Di Paolo, E., Thompson, E., & Beer, R. (2022) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2022.9187 · Cited by 94
“Moreover, because operational closure is an organizational concept, its relation to biological or cognitive structural “boundaries” is not obvious nor are there obvious relations between the boundaries of biological and cognitive systems, as discussed in Di Paolo (2009).”
BackgroundSelf-citationKirchhoff, M. D. (2015) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12039 · Cited by 86
Self across time: the diachronic unity of bodily existence
Fuchs, T. A. E. (2016) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-015-9449-4 · Cited by 103
“Such a conception is proposed here, drawing on concepts of the embodied mind and a continuity of life and mind which have been developed mainly in the last two decades (Jonas 1966; Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo 2009).”
BackgroundKiverstein, J. D. (2012) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01219.x · Cited by 109
Dimensions of Musical Creativity
Schiavio, A., & Benedek, M. (2020) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2020.578932 · Cited by 104
“Living beings are autonomous because they are organized to survive under precarious conditions by means of self-organization—the ability to separate themselves from the environment (Di Paolo, 2005, 2009).”
BackgroundPaolo, E. A. D., & Thompson, E. T. (2014) · doi:10.4324/9781315775845-16 · Cited by 98
Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception
McGann, M., & Jaegher, H. D. (2009) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9141-7 · Cited by 98
“The body provides a basis for the agent's perspective, but that perspective cannot be reduced to biology (Di Paolo 2009, see also Thompson and Stapleton 2009).”
BackgroundSensorimotor Theory and Enactivism
Degenaar, J., & O'Regan, J. K. (2015) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-015-9338-z · Cited by 98
“More particularly, an organism lives under precarious conditions – without its activity, its organization breaks down – and the organism must adapt to the environment in order to continue its autopoietic organization (Di Paolo 2005; 2009).”
Backgroundvan der Schyff, D., & Schiavio, A. (2017) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2017.00519 · Cited by 88
“…of sense-making that involve the enactment of emotional-affective and empathic modes of communication between agents and social groups (mimesis), and that coincide with the development of shared repertoires of coordinated action (entrainment; see De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundPhilosophie, technologie et cognition. Etats des lieux et perspectives
Steiner, P. (2010) · Intellectica Revue de l Association pour la Recherche Cognitive · doi:10.3406/intel.2010.1176 · Cited by 79
Bio-psycho-social interaction: an enactive perspective
de Haan, S. (2020) · International Review of Psychiatry · doi:10.1080/09540261.2020.1830753 · Cited by 86
Extended cognition and fixed properties: steps to a third-wave version of extended cognition
Kirchhoff, M. D. (2011) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-011-9237-8 · Cited by 78
“So, despite employed to overcome any sharp separation between “inner” and “outer”—between “fluid biology and stable culture” (Sutton 2006, p. 242)—the PP ends up privileging the “internal” on matters of cognitive inclusion for the “external” (Di Paolo 2009, p. 10).”
BackgroundNaturalizing relevance realization: why agency and cognition are fundamentally not computational
Jaeger, J., Riedl, A., Djedovic, A., Vervaeke, J., & Walsh, D. M. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1362658 · Cited by 91
On the role of social interaction in social cognition: a mechanistic alternative to enactivism
Herschbach, M. (2011) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-011-9209-z · Cited by 77
“2010; De Jaegher & Froese 2009; Di Paolo 2005, 2009a,b; Di Paolo et al. 2011; Di Paolo et al. 2008; Froese & Di Paolo 2009, 2010; Fuchs & De Jaegher 2009; McGann & De Jaegher 2009; Torrance & Froese 2011).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPaolo, E. A. D., Barandiaran, X. E., Beaton, M., & Bührmann, T. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00551 · Cited by 82
Autopoietic enactivism, phenomenology and the deep continuity between life and mind
Jesus, P. D. (2015) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-015-9414-2 · Cited by 88
The existential dimension in psychiatry: an enactive framework
de Haan, S. (2017) · Mental Health Religion & Culture · doi:10.1080/13674676.2017.1378326 · Cited by 73
Mcphie, J., & Clarke, D. A. G. (2015) · The Journal of Environmental Education · doi:10.1080/00958964.2015.1069250 · Cited by 68
“, 2010; Noë, 2009; & di Paolo, 2009) (list taken from Malafouris, 2013, pp. 57-58).”
Froese, T., & Gallagher, S. (2012) · Interaction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems · doi:10.1075/is.13.3.06fro · Cited by 99
Understanding Sophia? On human interaction with artificial agents
Fuchs, T. A. E. (2022) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-022-09848-0 · Cited by 84
“Deviations from homeostasis must be registered and responded to by appropriate adaptive behavior toward the environment if the living being is not to perish (Di Paolo, 2009; Di Paolo, 2018).”
Steps to a “Properly Embodied” cognitive science
Stapleton, M. (2012) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2012.05.001 · Cited by 76
Large models of what? Mistaking engineering achievements for human linguistic agency
Birhane, A., & McGann, M. (2024) · Language Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2024.101672 · Cited by 97
Locked-in syndrome: a challenge for embodied cognitive science
Kyselo, M., & Paolo, E. A. D. (2013) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9344-9 · Cited by 70
“For that reason the enactivist would not presume that the boundaries of the body fall together with the boundaries of the organism (Di Paolo 2009).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Enactive Conception of Life
Paolo, E. A. D. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.4 · Cited by 106
“Instead of rehearsing this story, which has been told on other occasions (Di Paolo 2005; 2009; Thompson 2007), I would like here to present the enactive concept of life in a different form.”
BackgroundThe enactive approach and disorders of the self - the case of schizophrenia
Kyselo, M. (2015) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-015-9441-z · Cited by 63
“Precarious refers to the fact that these processes of that network are organized such that they enable and are enabled by each other, and thus together they ensure the network identity maintains its structure and does not dissolve (Di Paolo 2009).”
BackgroundMaking imagination even more embodied: imagination, constraint and epistemic relevance
Rucińska, Z., & Gallagher, S. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03156-x · Cited by 67
“10 See Kyselo and Di Paolo (2009) for a discussion of the role of body-schema and sensorimotor activation in patients with Locked-In Syndrome (LIS).”
BackgroundInfluentialHow to determine the boundaries of the mind: a Markov blanket proposal
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Kiverstein, J. D. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02370-y · Cited by 63
“…such processes enforce a separation of the agent from it environment we have argued they do not preclude an agent from integrating into the organisation that is produced and maintained over time, resources that are located in the external world (c.f. Di Paolo 2009; Colombetti and Krueger 2015).”
Exploring Music-Based Rehabilitation for Parkinsonism through Embodied Cognitive Science
Schiavio, A., & ALTENMÜLLER, E. O. (2015) · Frontiers in Neurology · doi:10.3389/fneur.2015.00217 · Cited by 63
Impact of auditory sense on trust and brand affect through auditory social interaction and control
Poushneh, A. (2020) · Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services · doi:10.1016/j.jretconser.2020.102281 · Cited by 57
“This study demonstrated that situated voice assistants that are kept in consumers ’ houses or installed on smartphones are not fully autonomous to self-regulate (e.g., Di Paolo, 2005; 2009); however yet, such voice assistants are [semi] autonomous to act upon the environment.”
Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Participation in Maternal–Fetal Interactions
Quintero, A. M., & Jaegher, H. D. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01977 · Cited by 56
“To have an intuitive understanding of self-individuation, imagine that the system ‘encapsulates’ its constitutive parts into a functional or physical boundary.3 In organizational terms, this is defined as operational closure (Varela, 1979; Di Paolo, 2009; Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014).”
BackgroundCritical Neuroscience and Socially Extended Minds
Slaby, J., & Gallagher, S. (2014) · Theory Culture & Society · doi:10.1177/0263276414551996 · Cited by 71
Enactive autonomy in computational systems
Villalobos, M., & Dewhurst, J. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1386-z · Cited by 60
“According to CE, only precarious systems can be recognized as autonomous systems (Di Paolo 2009; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014).”
BackgroundInfluentialCharacterizing Autopoiesis in the Game of Life
Beer, R. D. (2014) · Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/artl_a_00143 · Cited by 53
“There is a long history of computational modeling of autopoiesis (Varela, Maturana & Uribe, 1974; Zeleny, 1977; McMullin, 2004; Bourgine & Stewart, 2004; Egbert & Di Paolo, 2009; Barandiaran & Egbert, 2014).”
BackgroundThompson, E. T. (2011) · Philosophy Today · doi:10.5840/philtoday201155supplement14 · Cited by 52
Life After Ashby: Ultrastability and the Autopoietic Foundations of Biological Autonomy.
Froese, T., & Stewart, J. R. (2010) · Cybernetics & human knowing · Cited by 87
Froese, T., Gershenson, C., & Rosenblueth, D. A. (2013) · IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC) · doi:10.1109/cec.2013.6557730 · Cited by 53
“Nevertheless, reformulating the EMH in systemic terms is beginning to be considered as a promising response [8, 14, 15].”
Backgroundvan der Schyff, D. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00345 · Cited by 61
“Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 345 that exhibit ‘operational closure’ (Varela, 1979; Di Paolo, 2005, 2009; Thompson, 2007; Colombetti, 2014).”
Motility at the Origin of Life: Its Characterization and a Model
Froese, T., Virgo, N., & Ikegami, T. (2013) · Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/artl_a_00096 · Cited by 59
Neo-Pragmatism and Enactive Intentionality
Gallagher, S., & Miyahara, K. (2012) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230360792_6 · Cited by 60
Enacting memories through and with things: Remembering as material engagement
Prezioso, E., & Alessandroni, N. (2022) · Memory Studies · doi:10.1177/17506980221108475 · Cited by 57
The extended cognition thesis: Its significance for the philosophy of (cognitive) science
Arnau, E., Estany, A., del Solar, R. G., & Sturm, T. (2013) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.836081 · Cited by 53
“As such, cognition is neither internal nor external, as the idea that it can be individuated and located in space, it is claimed, is the very first mistake when thinking about cognition (DiPaolo, 2009; Thompson & Stapleton, 2010).”
BackgroundWolfe, C. T. (2014) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.06.006 · Cited by 55
“…step is taken when, despite the presence and even usefulness of the (or ‘an’) organism concept in disciplines such as embryology, ethology or evolutionary biology (Pepper and Heron, 2008), some researchers in fundamental biology (Di Paolo, 2009) end up stating that life itself does not exist.”
BackgroundThinking through enactive agency: sense-making, bio-semiosis and the ontologies of organismic worlds
Jesus, P. D. (2018) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-018-9562-2 · Cited by 49
“One such approach, enactivism (Colombetti 2014; Di Paolo 2009; Stewart et al. 2010; Thompson 2007)1 has over the last decade developed an account of agency which it argues can serve as the foundation for a non-cognitivist, nonrepresentationalist embodied cognitive science.”
BackgroundInfluentialDream to Predict? REM Dreaming as Prospective Coding
Llewellyn, S. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01961 · Cited by 45
“This perspective on memory as inherent to sense-making extends to an enactivist ontology, where the world, as experienced, is sculpted by expectations which project meaning and propel willed actions (Varela et al., 1991; Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundRigid and fluid interactions with institutions
Jaegher, H. D. (2013) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.002 · Cited by 50
Situated Cognition: A Field Guide to Some Open Conceptual and Ontological Issues
Walter, S. (2013) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-013-0167-y · Cited by 47
The theoretical foundations of enaction: Precariousness
Beer, R. D., & Paolo, E. A. D. (2022) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2022.104823 · Cited by 56
“As proposed by Di Paolo (2009), a processually precar-ious individual is not only fragile as a system, but the very processes whose interactions constitute that system are themselves fragile.”
InfluentialFingerhut, J. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.635993 · Cited by 47
“It lacks reference to meaning-making—namely, to the body as a self-individuating system interacting with the environment (Di Paolo, 2009; Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014).”
BackgroundIs Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations from the Enactive Theory of Agency
Stapleton, M., & Froese, T. (2015) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_12 · Cited by 49
The Normative Turn in Enactive Theory: An Examination of Its Roots and Implications
Barrett, N. F. (2015) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-015-9355-y · Cited by 49
“autopoiesis in a seminal 2002 paper [2] that has since initiated a normative turn within enactive theory, led principally by Ezequiel Di Paolo [3] and his colleagues at the University of Sussex and the University of the Basque Country [4, 5, 6, 7, 8].”
BackgroundExternalized memory in slime mould and the extended (non-neuronal) mind
Sims, M., & Kiverstein, J. (2022) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2021.12.001 · Cited by 40
“This would seem to threaten to make the cognitive status of some environmental resource depend on whether it plays a role in guiding behaviour in the same sort of way that brains do (Cf. Di Paolo, 2009).”
BackgroundFrom mutual manipulation to cognitive extension: challenges and implications
Kirchhoff, M. D. (2016) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9483-x · Cited by 43
“Di Paolo (2009) has critized the framework of extended cognition for subscribing to precisely this form of location fetishism.”
BackgroundWiese, W., & Friston, K. J. (2021) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies6010018 · Cited by 44
From enactive phenomenology to biosemiotic enactivism
Jesus, P. D. (2016) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712316636437 · Cited by 53
“…(e.g. Clark, 2008; Wheeler, 2005), others take a more distinctive ‘revolutionary’ line and insist that enactivism can provide the necessary theoretical and methodological tools for a clean break with the cognitivist hegemony (e.g. Di Paolo, 2009; Froese, 2007; Hutto, 2011; Thompson, 2007).”
BackgroundInfluentialEnactivism, action and normativity: a Wittgensteinian analysis
Heras-Escribano, M., Noble, J., & de Pinedo, M. (2015) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712314557364 · Cited by 38
“Thus, the notion of ‘adaptivity’, developed by Di Paolo (2005, 2009), offers a new way for understanding sense-making in a much finer way, and also introduces a new notion of normativity within the enactive framework.”
BackgroundEnactment and construction of the cognitive niche: toward an ontology of the mind-world connection
Werner, K. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1756-1 · Cited by 41
“This situation may make one inclined to follow the claim made by Di Paolo (2009) as well as Thompson and Stapleton (2009), that capturing cognition, thought of as enactment or sense-making, in terms of location and boundaries is in principlemisguided and should be abandoned.”
BackgroundThe Role of the Spatial Boundary in Autopoiesis
Virgo, N., Egbert, M. D., & Froese, T. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-21283-3_30 · Cited by 45
“The possibility of incompatibility between the two was first raised by Wheeler in a talk at last year’s Artificial Life conference [10, 11], which has subsequently been the target of a critical analysis by Di Paolo [5].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialInteractionism and Mindreading
Michael, J. (2011) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-011-0066-z · Cited by 42
Hidden Concepts in the History and Philosophy of Origins-of-Life Studies: A Workshop Report
Mariscal, C., Barahona, A., Aubert-Kato, N., Aydinoglu, A. U., Bartlett, S., Cárdenas, M. L., Chandru, K., Cleland, C., Cocanougher, B. T., Comfort, N., et al. (2019) · Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres · doi:10.1007/s11084-019-09580-x · Cited by 36
“…within a surrounding membrane-like enclosure (Luisi 2006), while others allow processes that occur outside the physical boundary of the organism (Di Paolo 2009; Virgo et al. 2011; Froese et al. 2012), opening up the possibility that interactions with the environment might have played key roles…”
BackgroundProcess and Individuation: The Development of Sensorimotor Agency
Paolo, E. A. D. (2019) · Human Development · doi:10.1159/000503827 · Cited by 45
“An autonomous system is an operationally closed system under precarious conditions (e.g., Di Paolo, 2009; Di Paolo & Thompson, 2014, pp. 69–72; Di Paolo et al., 2017, pp. 111–116).”
BackgroundEmbodying Bounded Rationality: From Embodied Bounded Rationality to Embodied Rationality
Petracca, E. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.710607 · Cited by 37
“Following this line of argument, Clark’s environmental interventionism has been explicitly related to niche constructionism by Sterelny (2004) and to autopoiesis by Di Paolo (2009).”
BackgroundEnacting the self: Buddhist and Enactivist approaches to the emergence of the self
MacKenzie, M. (2009) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9132-8 · Cited by 42
Attuning to the World: The Diachronic Constitution of the Extended Conscious Mind
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Kiverstein, J. D. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01966 · Cited by 36
Metadata
- Authors
- Di Paolo, E.
- Venue
- Topoi
- Published
- 2008-12-18
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 9-21
- ISSN
- 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8749
- OpenAlex
- W3188690837
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 7.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Topoi (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- extended mind, enactivism, autopoiesis, internalism, relational cognition, autonomy, individuality, mediation, agency, definition of cognition
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