Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The concept of “autonomy”, once at the core of the original enactivist proposal in The Embodied Mind (Varela et al. in The embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991), is nowadays ignored or neglected by some of the most prominent contemporary enactivists approaches. Theories of autonomy, however, come to fill a theoretical gap that sensorimotor accounts of cognition cannot ignore: they provide a naturalized account of normativity and the resources to ground the identity of a cognitive subject in its specific mode of organization. There are, however, good reasons for the contemporary neglect of autonomy as a relevant concept for enactivism. On the one hand, the concept of autonomy has too often been assimilated into autopoiesis (or basic autonomy in the molecular or biological realm) and the implications are not always clear for a dynamical sensorimotor approach to cognitive science. On the other hand, the foundational enactivist proposal displays a metaphysical tension between the concept of operational closure (autonomy), deployed as constitutive, and that of structural coupling (sensorimotor dynamics); making it hard to reconcile with the claim that experience is sensorimotorly constituted. This tension is particularly apparent when Varela et al. propose Bittorio (a 1D cellular automata) as a model of the operational closure of the nervous system as it fails to satisfy the required conditions for a sensorimotor constitution of experience. It is, however, possible to solve these problems by re-considering autonomy at the level of sensorimotor neurodynamics. Two recent robotic simulation models are used for this task, illustrating the notion of strong sensorimotor dependency of neurodynamic patterns, and their networked intertwinement. The concept of habit is proposed as an enactivist building block for cognitive theorizing, re-conceptualizing mental life as a habit ecology, tied within an agent’s behaviour generating mechanism in coordination with its environment. Norms can be naturalized in terms of dynamic, interactively self-sustaining, coherentism. This conception of autonomous sensorimotor agency is put in contrast with those enactive approaches that reject autonomy or neglect the theoretical resources it has to offer for the project of naturalizing minds.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980) · Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4 · Cited by 5,815
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
Varela, F. J., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. (1991) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 · Cited by 5,765
A mechanism for cognitive dynamics: neuronal communication through neuronal coherence.
Fries, P. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.08.011 · Cited by 4,284 · cited 2×
“…al. 1996) to the dynamic core hypothesis (de Pasquale et al. 2012; Edelman and Tononi 2000), from global attractors (Freeman 2001) to dissipative dynamic structure (Llinas 2001), from chaotic attractors (Tsuda 2001) to the effective connectivity of distributed neuronal ensembles (Fries 2005), etc.”
BackgroundA sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126 · cited 5×
“And yet, recent emphasis on the sensorimotor nature of the enactive mind has left autonomy out of focus, centring the debate around a definitive victory over the notion of representation (Hutto 2005; Hutto and Myin 2012; Menary 2006), the clarification of the sensorimotor constitution of experience and the nature of s…”
BackgroundInfluentialMind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-2543 · Cited by 2,696
Behavior: The Control of Perception
Kuhn, A., & Powers, W. T. (1975) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2063243 · Cited by 2,398 · cited 1×
“…surfaces is to generate a particular sensory structure (as enactivism would imply) and not to maintain it stable, an idea magnificently developed by Powers (1973). historical record of interactive facts can substitute the actual mechanisms that are producing behaviour within the organism in…”
BackgroundRadical Embodied Cognitive Science
Chemero, A. P. (2009) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8367.001.0001 · Cited by 1,899
Autopoiesis: The organization of living systems, its characterization and a model
Varela, F. G., Maturana, H. R., & Uribe, R. (1974) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/0303-2647(74)90031-8 · Cited by 1,899
Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain
Graybiel, A. M. (2008) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.112851 · Cited by 1,697 · cited 1×
“Neuroscientists acknowledge the need to develop dynamic models of the simultaneous and distributed activity patterns that support habits in cortico-basal ganglia loops (Graybiel 2008, pp. 377–378).”
BackgroundParticipatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
Cited by
Introduction: The Varieties of Enactivism
Ward, D., Silverman, D., & Villalobos, M. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9484-6 · Cited by 278
Reconceiving representation-hungry cognition: an ecological-enactive proposal
Kiverstein, J. D., & Rietveld, E. (2018) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318772778 · Cited by 150
“See Barandiaran and Moreno (2006) for more discussion of this last point.”
BackgroundInfluentialLearning action-oriented models through active inference
Tschantz, A., Seth, A. K., & Buckley, C. L. (2020) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805 · Cited by 121
de la Torre, P. G., Pérez-Verdugo, M., & Barandiaran, X. E. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2405.06478 · Cited by 19
Self-citationGenerative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things
Barandiaran, X. E., & Pérez-Verdugo, M. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-04961-4 · Cited by 19
“However, the sort of intentionality instantiated by technology, in his account, is always directed towards the world, and not back to the agent.”
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Barandiaran, X. E.
- Venue
- Topoi
- Published
- 2016-03-04
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 409-430
- ISSN
- 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8749
- OpenAlex
- W2292958921
- Cited by
- 128
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 4.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11245-016-9365-4
- The paper
- Barandiaran, X. E. (2017). Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency. Topoi. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-016-9365-4
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.