Free Energy and the Self: An Ecological–Enactive Interpretation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to the free energy principle all living systems aim to minimise free energy in their sensory exchanges with the environment. Processes of free energy minimisation are thus ubiquitous in the biological world. Indeed it has been argued that even plants engage in free energy minimisation. Not all living things however feel alive. How then did the feeling of being alive get started? In line with the arguments of the phenomenologists, I will claim that every feeling must be felt by someone. It must have mineness built into it if it is to feel a particular way. The question I take up in this paper asks how mineness might have arisen out of processes of free energy minimisation, given that many systems that keep themselves alive lack mineness. The hypothesis I develop in this paper is that the life of an organism can be seen as an inferential process. Every living system embodies a probability distribution conditioned on a model of the sensory, physiological, and morphological states that are highly probably given the life it leads and the niche it inhabits. I argue for an ecological and enactive interpretation of free energy. I show how once the life of an organism reaches a certain level of complexity mineness emerges as an intrinsic part of the process of life itself.
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Citations
Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 6×
“Instead they regulate their interactions with the environment so as to ensure that they visit and revisit a limited range of sensory and physiological states (Friston 2010).”
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Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 2×
“See also Gallagher (2000, 2005), Legrand (2006, 2012), Thompson (2007).”
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(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-2543 · Cited by 2,696
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Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816 · cited 2×
“They inform the organism that something important is happening 4 Such a hypothesis has been developed in the cognitive neuroscience literature in important papers by Seth (2013), Apps and Tsakiris (2014), Limanowski and Blankenburg (2013).”
BackgroundAttention, uncertainty, and free-energy
Feldman, H., & Friston, K. J. (2010) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00215 · Cited by 1,365
Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
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“Through active inference the organism establishes and sustains a boundary [technically referred to as a Markov blanket13 (Friston 2013; 12 For an extended treatment of the role of attention in free energy minimisation see Feldman and Friston (2010).”
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Cited by
In the body's eye: the computational anatomy of interoceptive inference
Allen, M., Levy, A., Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2022) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010490 · Cited by 185
Learning action-oriented models through active inference
Tschantz, A., Seth, A. K., & Buckley, C. L. (2020) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805 · Cited by 121
Laying down a forking path: tensions between enaction and the free energy principle
Di Paolo, E., Thompson, E., & Beer, R. (2022) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2022.9187 · Cited by 94
Thinking, believing, and hallucinating self in schizophrenia
Humpston, C. S., & Broome, M. R. (2020) · The Lancet Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/s2215-0366(20)30007-9 · Cited by 40
Surprise! Why enactivism and predictive processing are parting ways: The case of improvisation
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Possibility Studies & Society · doi:10.1177/27538699221132691 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Kiverstein, J.
- Venue
- Topoi
- Published
- 2018-04-12
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 559-574
- ISSN
- 0167-7411 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8749
- OpenAlex
- W2797538023
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 2.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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