The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An experimental study on bribes, detection probability and principal witness policy
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“In some cases, leniency policies reduce collusive bribery (Bigoni et al., 2015; Buckenmaier et al., 2018) but at the cost of making bribery more profitable for bidders (Christofl et al. 2017).”
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Christofl et al. 2017
Citations
Cites
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
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International handbook on the economics of corruption
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Imitation—theory and experimental evidence
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Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment
Abbink, K., & Hennig‐Schmidt, H. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z · Cited by 270
The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
Barr, A. M., & Serra, D. (2009) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9 · Cited by 212
Combining Top-Down and Bottom-Up Accountability: Evidence from a Bribery Experiment
Serra, D. (2011) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewr010 · Cited by 138
Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments
Frank, B., Lambsdorff, J. G., & Boehm, F. (2010) · European Journal of Development Research · doi:10.1057/ejdr.2010.47 · Cited by 138
Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes
Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T. (2014) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 · Cited by 132
The Long War against Corruption
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Laboratory Experiments on Corruption
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Bribing versus gift-giving – An experiment
Lambsdorff, J. G., & Frank, B. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.004 · Cited by 100
Bribery and public procurement: an experimental study
Büchner, S., Freytag, A., González, L. G., & Güth, W. (2008) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9315-9 · Cited by 60
Fraud characteristics and their effects on shareholder wealth
Ewelt‐Knauer, C., Knauer, T., & Lachmann, M. (2015) · Journal of Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11573-015-0773-5 · Cited by 17
Baule, R., & Fandel, G. (2016) · Journal of Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11573-016-0833-5 · Cited by 6
Honesty in intra-organizational reporting
Rasmußen, A., & Leopold‐Wildburger, U. (2014) · Journal of Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11573-014-0740-6 · Cited by 4
Self-citationSimulation of Bribes and Consequences of Leniency Policy. Results from an Experimental Study
Christöfl, A., Leopold‐Wildburger, U., & Rasmußen, A. (2013) · Operations research proceedings · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-00795-3_31 · Cited by 1
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Engel C, Georg SJ, Yu G (2012) Symmetric vs. asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57476 . Accessed 03 Apr 2014
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review
Mugellini, G., Della Bella, S., Colagrossi, M., Isenring, G. L., & Killias, M. (2021) · Campbell Systematic Reviews: Better Evidence for a Better World · doi:10.1002/cl2.1173 · Cited by 60
“For example, concerning organizational and cultural interventions, the findings of Di Falco et al. (2016) show that, on average, in Tanzania making information more transparent and reducing the number of intermediaries in transfer chains can reduce embezzlement, and that this negative impact is statistically significa…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialEffects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion
Buckenmaier, J., Dimant, E., & Mittone, L. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.004 · Cited by 33
An inspection game of internal audit and the influence of whistle-blowing
Siggelkow, B. F., Trockel, J., & Dieterle, O. (2018) · Journal of Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11573-018-0893-9 · Cited by 2
The dynamics of anti-corruption: a multi-level framework for intervention design
Rotinwa-Oseni, B., Chmura, T., Orlandi, L., & Dixon, L. (2026) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137426100642
Metadata
- Authors
- Christöfl, A., Leopold-Wildburger, U., & Rasmußen, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Graz (AT)
- Venue
- Journal of Business Economics
- Published
- 2017-01-16
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1067-1081
- ISSN
- 0044-2372 (ISSN-L)
- 1861-8928
- OpenAlex
- W2573856233
- Cited by
- 4
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2018: 2
- FWCI
- 1.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Business Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- bribery, leniency programs, corruption, detection probability, contract award, bid rigging, cooperation with authorities, fine reduction, laboratory experiments
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