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Cited by 33Taxation and Compliance StudiesCorruption and Economic DevelopmentExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion

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Buckenmaier, Johannes, Dimant, Eugen, Mittone, Luigi·2020·Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.004
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References 62 · Cited by 33

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Metadata

Authors
Buckenmaier, J., Dimant, E., & Mittone, L.
Affiliations
  • University of Zurich (CH)
  • University of Nottingham (GB)
  • University of Trento (IT)
Corresponding author
Dimant, Eugen
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2020-07
Volume
175
Pages
296-313
ISSN
0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.004
OpenAlex
W2782799748
Cited by
33
References
62
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 7
FWCI
6.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
  • Institutional Research Information System (Università degli Studi di Trento) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
Funders
  • Universität zu Köln
  • California Department of Fish and Game (AL-1169/3-2, AL-1169/5-1)
  • University of Pennsylvania
  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
leniency programs, whistleblowing, collusion, tax evasion, corruption, bribery, tax compliance, institutional history, tax yield

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