The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Impartial Institutions, Pathogen Stress and the Expanding Social Network
Abstract
Anthropologists have documented substantial cross-society variation in people's willingness to treat strangers with impartial, universal norms versus favoring members of their local community. Researchers have proposed several adaptive accounts for these differences. One variant of the pathogen stress hypothesis predicts that people will be more likely to favor local in-group members when they are under greater infectious disease threat. The material security hypothesis instead proposes that institutions that permit people to meet their basic needs through impartial interactions with strangers reinforce a tendency toward impartiality, whereas people lacking such institutions must rely on local community members to meet their basic needs. Some studies have examined these hypotheses using self-reported preferences, but not with behavioral measures. We conducted behavioral experiments in eight diverse societies that measure individuals' willingness to favor in-group members by ignoring an impartial rule. Consistent with the material security hypothesis, members of societies enjoying better-quality government services and food security show a stronger preference for following an impartial rule over investing in their local in-group. Our data show no support for the pathogen stress hypothesis as applied to favoring in-groups and instead suggest that favoring in-group members more closely reflects a general adaptive fit with social institutions that have arisen in each society.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“The cues of belief and belonging from adoption of these religious belief systems ride on the signalling systems utilised in ritual displays to convey information about a potential interaction partner without the benefit of direct connection through kinship or interpersonal contact and reputation (McNamara and Henrich 2017a; Hruschka et al. 2014).”
From Cultural Evolution of Religion, Spirituality and Ritual: Impacts On Human Cooperation (2024) · cites this paper as Hruschka et al. 2014
Citations
Cites
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
Schneider, P. A., & Fukuyama, F. (1996) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.2307/1251846 · Cited by 10,493
Individualism and Collectivism
Hayek, F. A. (1976) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203991718-8 · Cited by 6,060
Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness.
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596 · Cited by 5,157
(2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.5.i · Cited by 4,608
Journal of Economic Literature
(2017) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel · Cited by 4,186
The causes of corruption: a cross-national study
Treisman, D. S. (2000) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00092-4 · Cited by 3,967
(2005) · Cited by 3,670
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1024471506938 · Cited by 3,432
Differences Between Tight and Loose Cultures: A 33-Nation Study
Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., Duan, L., Almaliach, A., Ang, S., Arnadottir, J., et al. (2011) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1197754 · Cited by 3,252
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.
Banfield, E. C. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550413 · Cited by 3,232
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy
Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790881 · Cited by 2,737
Toward a General Theory of Action
(1951) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674863507 · Cited by 2,640
Greif, A. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261959 · Cited by 2,374
Individualism and Collectivism
Triandis, H. C. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429499845 · Cited by 1,844
Toward a General Theory of Action.
Schrag, C. C., Parsons, T., Shils, E. A., Tolman, E. C., Allport, G. W., Kluckhohn, C., Murray, H. A., Sears, R. R., Sheldon, R. C., & Stouffer, S. A. (1952) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2087672 · Cited by 1,693
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
Fukuyama, F. (1995) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 1,613
Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions
Bowles, S. (2016) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,547
The Meaning Maintenance Model: On the Coherence of Social Motivations
Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1002_1 · Cited by 1,437 · cited 2×
“These results also potentially clarify a puzzle raised by prior studies of sharing in diverse small-scale societies.”
ResultMarkets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment
Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R. L., Barr, A. M., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cárdenas, J.-C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E. L. M., Henrich, N. S., et al. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1182238 · Cited by 1,424
Self-citationCues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting
Bateson, M., Nettle, D., & Roberts, G. (2006) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2006.0509 · Cited by 1,304
Pathogen prevalence predicts human cross-cultural variability in individualism/collectivism
Fincher, C. L., Thornhill, R., Murray, D. R., & Schaller, M. (2008) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0094 · Cited by 1,014
Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2010) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/s10887-010-9052-z · Cited by 635
Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System
Kranton, R. E. (1996) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 632
Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2001) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.97 · Cited by 628
Fincher, C. L., & Thornhill, R. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11000021 · Cited by 530
The behavioural immune system and the psychology of human sociality
Schaller, M. (2011) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0029 · Cited by 441
Patterns of neural activity associated with honest and dishonest moral decisions
Greene, J. D., & Paxton, J. M. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0900152106 · Cited by 430
Punishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate warfare
Mathew, S., & Boyd, R. T. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1105604108 · Cited by 373
Globalization and human cooperation
Buchan, N. R., Grimalda, G. F., Wilson, R. K., Brewer, M. B., Fatás, E., & Foddy, M. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0809522106 · Cited by 287
FriendshipDevelopment, Ecology, and Evolution of a Relationship
Hruschka, D. (2010) · doi:10.1525/california/9780520265462.001.0001 · Cited by 273
Self-citationPersistent parochialism: trust and exclusion in ethnic networks
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. M. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.005 · Cited by 264
Kaplan, H. S., & Gurven, M. (2005) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4771.003.0007 · Cited by 259
Sugiyama, L. S. (2003) · American Journal of Physical Anthropology · doi:10.1002/ajpa.10325 · Cited by 211
Cognitive constraints on the structure and dynamics of social networks.
Dunbar, R. (2008) · Group Dynamics Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/1089-2699.12.1.7 · Cited by 200
Anxiety and Intergroup Bias: Terror Management or Coalitional Psychology?
Navarrete, C. D., Kurzban, R., Fessler, D. M. T., & Kirkpatrick, L. A. (2004) · Group Processes & Intergroup Relations · doi:10.1177/1368430204046144 · Cited by 179
Cheating in mind games: The subtlety of rules matters
Jiang, T. X. (2013) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.003 · Cited by 172
Self-citationPathogen Prevalence, Group Bias, and Collectivism in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample
Cashdan, E., & Steele, M. (2013) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-012-9159-3 · Cited by 141
Climato-Economic Origins of Variation in Ingroup Favoritism
de Vliert, E. V. (2010) · Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology · doi:10.1177/0022022110381120 · Cited by 138
Why Do People Become Modern? A Darwinian Explanation
Newson, L., & Richerson, P. J. (2009) · Population and Development Review · doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2009.00263.x · Cited by 130
Navarrete, C. D., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2005) · Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1177/147470490500300121 · Cited by 120
Institutions, Parasites and the Persistence of In-group Preferences
Hruschka, D. J., & Henrich, J. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0063642 · Cited by 109
Self-citationDiscrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule
Toegepaste, D., Wetenschappen, E., Fershtman, C., Uri Gneezy, B., Verboven, F., Fershtman, C., Uri Gneezy, B., Verboven, F., Backere, P. K. D., Borger, B. D., et al. (2002) · Cited by 104
Institutional Evolution in the Holocene: The Rise of Complex Societies
Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. T. (2001) · Cited by 53
Is Liberal Society a Parasite on Tradition?
Bowles, S. (2011) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2011.01201.x · Cited by 46
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The cultural evolution of prosocial religions
Norenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., McNamara, R. A., Slingerland, E., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x14001356 · Cited by 934
Self-citationAbeler, J., Nosenzo, D., & Raymond, C. (2016) · Econometrica · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2840132 · Cited by 865
Muthukrishna, M., & Henrich, J. (2019) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0522-1 · Cited by 745
Self-citationIntrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies
Gächter, S., & Schulz, J. F. (2016) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature17160 · Cited by 551
Moralistic gods, supernatural punishment and the expansion of human sociality
Purzycki, B. G., Apicella, C., Atkinson, Q. D., Cohen, E., McNamara, R. A., Willard, A. K., Xygalatas, D., Norenzayan, A., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature16980 · Cited by 494
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Hruschka, D., Efferson, C., Jiang, T., Falletta-Cowden, A., Sigurdsson, S., McNamara, R., Sands, M., Munira, S., Slingerland, E., & Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Arizona State University (US)
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Field Museum of Natural History (US)
- Yale New Haven Hospital (US)
- University of British Columbia (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Hruschka, Daniel
- ORCID
- Venue
- Human Nature
- Published
- 2014-10-07
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 567-579
- ISSN
- 1045-6767 (ISSN-L)
- 1936-4776
- OpenAlex
- W1967450864
- Cited by
- 123
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 32.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Human Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- IRIS (submittedVersion)
- SERVAL (Université de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Cultural Differences and Values
- Keywords
- impartiality, in-group favoritism, social institutions, government quality, food security, social networks, cross-cultural variation
- MeSH terms
- Cross-Cultural Comparison, Government, Humans, Residence Characteristics, Social Support, Stress, Physiological, Social Networking
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review