The evolution of magnanimity: When is it better to give than to receive?
Abstract
Conspicuous consumption associated with status reinforcement behavior can be explained in terms of costly signaling, or strategic handicap theory, first articulated by Zahavi and later formalized by Grafen. A theory is introduced which suggests that the evolutionary raison d'être of status reinforcement behavior lies not only in its effects on lifetime reproductive success, but in its positive effects on the probability of survival through infrequent, unpredictable demographic bottlenecks. Under some circumstances, such "wasteful" displays may take the form of displays of altruistic behavior and generosity on the part of high status individuals, in that is signals the ability to bear the short-term costs of being generous or "cooperative," while at the same time reinforcing the long-term benefits of higher status.
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The statement that altruism may serve as a costly signal has received theoretical support in anthropology, biology, and economics.
“The statement that altruism may serve as a costly signal has received theoretical support in anthropology, biology, and economics (e.g., Boone, 1998; Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Gurven, 2004; Lotem, Fishman, & Stone, 2003; Roberts, 1998).”
From Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007) · cites this paper as Boone, 1998
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- Authors
- Boone, J. L.
- Affiliations
- University of New Mexico (US)
- Corresponding author
- Boone, James L.
- Venue
- Human Nature
- Published
- 1998-03
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 1045-6767 (ISSN-L)
- 1936-4776
- OpenAlex
- W1559167293
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 20.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Human Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- magnanimity, conspicuous consumption, costly signaling, altruism, generosity, cooperative behavior, population bottleneck, survival probability, reproductive success
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