Cited by 172Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorAnimal Behavior and Reproduction

The evolution of magnanimity: When is it better to give than to receive?

Boone, James L.·1998·Human Nature

Abstract

Conspicuous consumption associated with status reinforcement behavior can be explained in terms of costly signaling, or strategic handicap theory, first articulated by Zahavi and later formalized by Grafen. A theory is introduced which suggests that the evolutionary raison d'être of status reinforcement behavior lies not only in its effects on lifetime reproductive success, but in its positive effects on the probability of survival through infrequent, unpredictable demographic bottlenecks. Under some circumstances, such "wasteful" displays may take the form of displays of altruistic behavior and generosity on the part of high status individuals, in that is signals the ability to bear the short-term costs of being generous or "cooperative," while at the same time reinforcing the long-term benefits of higher status.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s12110-998-1009-y

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45 of 45 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The statement that altruism may serve as a costly signal has received theoretical support in anthropology, biology, and economics.

    “The statement that altruism may serve as a costly signal has received theoretical support in anthropology, biology, and economics (e.g., Boone, 1998; Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Gurven, 2004; Lotem, Fishman, & Stone, 2003; Roberts, 1998).”

    From Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007) · cites this paper as Boone, 1998

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Authors
Boone, J. L.
Affiliations
University of New Mexico (US)
Corresponding author
Boone, James L.
Venue
Human Nature
Published
1998-03
Volume
9
Issue
1
Pages
1-21
ISSN
  • 1045-6767 (ISSN-L)
  • 1936-4776
OpenAlex
W1559167293
Cited by
172
References
45
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 8
FWCI
20.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Human Nature (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
Keywords
magnanimity, conspicuous consumption, costly signaling, altruism, generosity, cooperative behavior, population bottleneck, survival probability, reproductive success

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