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Cited by 582Evolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationLanguage and cultural evolution

To give and to give not: the behavioral ecology of human food transfers

Gurven, Michael·2004·Behavioral and Brain Sciences
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x04000123
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Abstract

The transfer of food among group members is a ubiquitous feature of small-scale forager and forager-agricultural populations. The uniqueness of pervasive sharing among humans, especially among unrelated individuals, has led researchers to evaluate numerous hypotheses about the adaptive functions and patterns of sharing in different ecologies. This article attempts to organize available cross-cultural evidence pertaining to several contentious evolutionary models: kin selection, reciprocal altruism, tolerated scrounging, and costly signaling. Debates about the relevance of these models focus primarily on the extent to which individuals exert control over the distribution of foods they acquire, and the extent to which donors receive food or other fitness-enhancing benefits in return for shares given away. Each model can explain some of the variance in sharing patterns within groups, and so generalizations that ignore or deny the importance of any one model may be misleading. Careful multivariate analyses and cross-cultural comparisons of food transfer patterns are therefore necessary tools for assessing aspects of the sexual division of labor, human life history evolution, and the evolution of the family. This article also introduces a framework for better understanding variation in sharing behavior across small-scale traditional societies. I discuss the importance of resource ecology and the degree of coordination in acquisition activities as a key feature that influences sharing behavior.

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Crossref · 10.1017/s0140525x04000123

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  • Food sharing between unrelated individuals outside the mating context is rare but has been reported for humans, vampire bats, chimpanzees and bonobos.

    “Food sharing between unrelated individuals outside the mating context is rare but has been reported for humans, vampire bats, chimpanzees and bonobos [13,46,48,49,52].”

    From Food sharing is linked to urinary oxytocin levels and bonding in related and unrelated wild chimpanzees (2014) · cites this paper as [46]

  • The link between food sharing and oxytocin found in chimpanzees may also be relevant for humans.

    “This link between food sharing and oxytocin found in chimpanzees may also be relevant for humans [70], where pro-social behaviour has often been linked to food sharing and provisioning [46,81,82].”

    From Food sharing is linked to urinary oxytocin levels and bonding in related and unrelated wild chimpanzees (2014) · cites this paper as [46]

  • Many theories explaining various types of cooperation have been proposed in biology and economics, but a theoretical explanation of unconditional altruism has remained elusive to date.

    “Many theories explaining various types of cooperation have been proposed in biology and economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gurven, 2004) but a theoretical explanation of unconditional altruism (de W ned as bene W ting others at a cost to oneself, Wilson, 1976) has remained elusive to date.”

    From Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007) · cites this paper as Gurven, 2004

  • The statement that altruism may serve as a costly signal has received theoretical support in anthropology, biology, and economics.

    “The statement that altruism may serve as a costly signal has received theoretical support in anthropology, biology, and economics (e.g., Boone, 1998; Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Gurven, 2004; Lotem, Fishman, & Stone, 2003; Roberts, 1998).”

    From Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007) · cites this paper as Gurven, 2004

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Authors
Gurven, M.
Affiliations
University of California, Santa Barbara (US)
Corresponding author
Gurven, Michael
ORCID
Gurven, Michael
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2004-08
Volume
27
Issue
4
Pages
543-559
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
DOI
10.1017/s0140525x04000123
OpenAlex
W2122226023
Cited by
582
References
209
Citations by year
2026: 39 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 36 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 41 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 39 · 2014: 26 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 30
FWCI
15.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 197 d)
Locations
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
Keywords
food sharing, food transfers, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling, cross-cultural comparison, resource ecology, gender division of labor, life history evolution, evolution of the family, unrelated individuals, traditional society

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