The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 119 of the 119 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 13 of the 140 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Collapsing the Boundaries Between De Jure and De Facto Slavery: The Foundations of Slavery Beyond the Transatlantic Frame
Open accessAbstract
The identification of contemporary forms of slavery is often problematically demarcated by reference to transatlantic enslavement as the definitive archetype. Such an approach overlooks other historic slaveries and neglects the totality of the maangamizi— the African holocaust. This article addresses the problematics of positioning the transatlantic system as the paradigm and unpacks the constituent elements of de jure slavery to construct an understanding of slavery as a condition as well as a status. By identifying the core features of de jure chattel slavery through time, this paper displaces the assumption that legal status is determinative, giving meaning to the concept of slavery in the contemporary world.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper argues that transatlantic enslavement should not be treated as the sole paradigm for understanding slavery, and instead uses de jure chattel slavery to identify core features of slavery across time. It concludes that the boundary between de jure and de facto slavery is less substantial than often assumed, because slavery can exist as a condition even without legal ownership.
## Key findings
- The paper identifies de jure chattel slavery as a widely accepted starting point because it clearly shows slavery as property in law, including “rights of ownership” such as possession, use, management, transfer, and disposal.
- It argues that slavery is defined not only by legal status but by core relational features: control tantamount to possession, permanence/totality, othering/dehumanisation, and the alienation of agency from the person enslaved.
- The authors state that the presumed boundary between de jure and de facto slavery is “illusory, arbitrary, or immaterial” in light of those core features, and that “there is no definitive difference” between them.
- The article also warns that using transatlantic enslavement as the paradigm can distort the history of slavery and “distil[] the experience of a holocaust down to slavery alone.”
## Methods
- Conceptual/theoretical analysis rather than an empirical study.
- The paper draws on a “diversity of historic slaveries” across different regions and periods, plus international legal materials and case law, including the 1926 Slavery Convention, Siliadin v France, Kunarac, and Hacienda Brasil Verde.
- Main analysis is a close unpacking of de jure chattel slavery’s constituent elements and comparison with situations that may amount to de facto slavery.
## Limitations
- The paper does not present original empirical data or a formal dataset; this is evident from the text.
- It does not fully establish the boundaries between de facto slavery and other forms of exploitation; the authors explicitly say it “does not establish the boundaries” there.
- The text suggests a conceptual limitation: even while arguing against the transatlantic paradigm, it does not claim that all severe exploitation is slavery.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Claims the paper makes
9 Valid · 5 Not valid · 97 Not checked · 127 Own results and interpretations
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“Antislavery activists draw direct conceptual, rhetorical, and visual parallels between the experiences of enslaved people within the transatlantic system, and those of people experiencing human trafficking and ' modern slavery ' today (see O ' Connell Davidson 2017, p 1; Kurasawa 2014).”
§ The Author(s) 2020 > Beyond the Transatlantic Paradigm The system of transatlantic chattel enslavement is the dominant image of slavery in contemporary discourse. Contemporary antislavery actors often point to the memory of transatlantic enslavement as the paradigm against which exploitation today can be understood and condemned. Antislavery activists draw direct conceptual, rhetorical, and visual parallels between the experiences of enslaved people within the transatlantic system, and those of people experiencing human trafficking and ' modern slavery ' today (see O ' Connell Davidson 2017, p 1; Kurasawa 2014). The memory of transatlantic enslavement is evoked both to explain the experience of ' modern slavery ' and to agitate for antislavery action (Quirk 2008; Trodd 2013). In many ways, this has proven to be an effective frame and tactic for the contemporary antislavery movement, at least in part by drawing upon the universal consensus decrying the transatlantic system that developed from nineteenth century abolitionism (see D ' Anjou and Van Male 1998; Snow and Benford 1992). The shift in public attitudes on the moral status of transatlantic slavery was largely completed in the twentieth century, to the extent that the prohibition against slavery is now recognised as one of the few jus cogens norms of international law carrying obligations erga omnes. 4 That is to say, that slavery achieved universal legal opposition. Modern antislavery advocates therefore draw on the widespread moral opprobrium attaching to transatlantic enslavement in order to advance their contemporary cause. 2 Another dominant school of thought in this regard delineates various different forms of exploitation, some of which might constitute or rise to the level of slavery, while others do not. This approach is often based on legal argumentation, see for instance Allain (2012), Chuang (2014, 2015).
What the sources say
- Supportedcites O ' Connell Davidson 2017, p 1 source
The opening passage (indexed under Abstract; cited as p. 1) says antislavery discourse invokes transatlantic slavery through visual and textual references and frequently calls trafficking ‘modern slavery’. A later passage in the same section describes this as powerful rhetoric, supporting the claim that activists draw these parallels, without endorsing their historical accuracy. (LLM, conf=0.93)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Kurasawa 2014 source
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“often existed primarily as a legal status wherein property rights could be exercised over a person and upheld through legal or equivalent customary institutions. 9”
§ The Author(s) 2020 > Conceptualising De Jure Slavery Moving beyond the transatlantic paradigm as a starting point for understanding slavery, another archetype remains at the core of many conceptualisations of slavery through time: slavery as a legal status created when people are held as property in law (de jure chattel slavery). While commentators often dispute the margins of slavery, there is very little argument over the status of de jure chattel slavery as slavery properly called. Rather than being tied to a particular instance of slavery, the paradigm of de jure chattel slavery is carried through many different historical instances of slavery, giving it wider relevance. In order to identify the nature of slavery, the features and experiences of persons held in de jure chattel slavery are therefore a useful starting point for considering the institution as a whole. Unpacking the constituent elements of the experience of de jure chattel slavery exposes core elements of a broadly accepted and uncontested form of slavery (including from the perspectives of commentators with otherwise widely diverging views). These core elements can then be reconceptualised through consideration of the points of mimicry and departure from instances of exploitation that might amount to de facto slavery. This then invites a reconsideration of the presumed boundaries between de jure and de facto slavery, and provides a new foundation for consideration of marginal cases in which the application of the moniker of slavery is contested. The framework of property law -property rights in, and ownership of, persons -delimits the parameters of traditional chattel slavery. In the words of the European Court of Human Rights ( Siliadin v France 2005, para 122), the ' classic ' meaning of slavery entails a ' genuine right of legal ownership ' over a person, reducing them to the status of an ' object ' . Smith (1954) likewise contends that slavery is characterised by the ' legal assimilation of interpersonal rights to the norm of property rights over things ' . Hunt (2017) notes that ' historians define slavery in terms of property ' rather than by the nature of the treatment of persons enslaved, and Nieboer (1971) suggested that slavery ' is the fact that one man is the property or possession of another ' . This was definitively true of transatlantic enslavement, in which the characterisation of Africans and people of African descent as chattel (things) in law, and the tapestry of associated legal protections that gave effect to this property right in persons, were the foundation for the system of institutionalised enslavement. 8 Likewise, in recognised slave societies throughout history, slavery has often existed primarily as a legal status wherein property rights could be exercised over a person and upheld through legal or equivalent customary institutions. 9 This reflects a global orthodoxy in which property frameworks -those legal institutions that regulated slavery for centuries -are the lens through which the practical and theoretical boundaries of the phenomenon of (chattel) slavery are to be viewed (Allain and Hickey 2012). Freamon (2012, p 41) highlights that the basic definition of slavery in Islamic law was ' firmly rooted in property concepts while haltingly recognizing the humanity of the slave ' . Bradley (2011, p 242) describes enslaved persons in the Roman Republic (late sixth century to late first century BC) as ' items of property over which their owners had complete powers of disposal ' . States around the world have demonstrated consensus on the centrality of property law in defining slavery in the negotiation and adoption of the 1926 Slavery Convention (Hickey 2012, p 221), which defines slavery by reference to the ' powers attaching to the right of ownership ' (League of Nations 1926a, art 1). Defining slavery by reference to either legal ownership itself, or the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership, places the property paradigm at the centre of the conceptualisation of slavery.
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [9] Beutin LP (2017) Black Suffering for/from Anti-trafficking Advocacy. Anti-Trafficking Review 9: 14-30. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The White Accumulation section describes enslaved people being sold and a slaver accumulating wealth through another enslaved person. That supports the claim's point about treating people as property, but our copy does not describe slavery primarily as a legal status or say that property rights were upheld by law or customary institutions. (LLM, conf=0.80)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“The practice of renaming and use of disparaging and demeaning language were employed in many slave societies to denote slave status and undermine individuals ' social and self-held beliefs as to what was ' normal ' (a means of nullifying their personalities and reframing their identities from free men to slaves). 13”
§ The Author(s) 2020 > Conceptualising De Jure Slavery Moving beyond the transatlantic paradigm as a starting point for understanding slavery, another archetype remains at the core of many conceptualisations of slavery through time: slavery as a legal status created when people are held as property in law (de jure chattel slavery). While commentators often dispute the margins of slavery, there is very little argument over the status of de jure chattel slavery as slavery properly called. Rather than being tied to a particular instance of slavery, the paradigm of de jure chattel slavery is carried through many different historical instances of slavery, giving it wider relevance. In order to identify the nature of slavery, the features and experiences of persons held in de jure chattel slavery are therefore a useful starting point for considering the institution as a whole. Unpacking the constituent elements of the experience of de jure chattel slavery exposes core elements of a broadly accepted and uncontested form of slavery (including from the perspectives of commentators with otherwise widely diverging views). These core elements can then be reconceptualised through consideration of the points of mimicry and departure from instances of exploitation that might amount to de facto slavery. This then invites a reconsideration of the presumed boundaries between de jure and de facto slavery, and provides a new foundation for consideration of marginal cases in which the application of the moniker of slavery is contested. The framework of property law -property rights in, and ownership of, persons -delimits the parameters of traditional chattel slavery. In the words of the European Court of Human Rights ( Siliadin v France 2005, para 122), the ' classic ' meaning of slavery entails a ' genuine right of legal ownership ' over a person, reducing them to the status of an ' object ' . Smith (1954) likewise contends that slavery is characterised by the ' legal assimilation of interpersonal rights to the norm of property rights over things ' . Hunt (2017) notes that ' historians define slavery in terms of property ' rather than by the nature of the treatment of persons enslaved, and Nieboer (1971) suggested that slavery ' is the fact that one man is the property or possession of another ' . This was definitively true of transatlantic enslavement, in which the characterisation of Africans and people of African descent as chattel (things) in law, and the tapestry of associated legal protections that gave effect to this property right in persons, were the foundation for the system of institutionalised enslavement. 8 Likewise, in recognised slave societies throughout history, slavery has often existed primarily as a legal status wherein property rights could be exercised over a person and upheld through legal or equivalent customary institutions. 9 This reflects a global orthodoxy in which property frameworks -those legal institutions that regulated slavery for centuries -are the lens through which the practical and theoretical boundaries of the phenomenon of (chattel) slavery are to be viewed (Allain and Hickey 2012). Freamon (2012, p 41) highlights that the basic definition of slavery in Islamic law was ' firmly rooted in property concepts while haltingly recognizing the humanity of the slave ' . Bradley (2011, p 242) describes enslaved persons in the Roman Republic (late sixth century to late first century BC) as ' items of property over which their owners had complete powers of disposal ' . States around the world have demonstrated consensus on the centrality of property law in defining slavery in the negotiation and adoption of the 1926 Slavery Convention (Hickey 2012, p 221), which defines slavery by reference to the ' powers attaching to the right of ownership ' (League of Nations 1926a, art 1). Defining slavery by reference to either legal ownership itself, or the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership, places the property paradigm at the centre of the conceptualisation of slavery.
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [13] Bravo K (2011) The Role of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in Contemporary Anti-Human Trafficking Discourse. Seattle Journal for Social Justice 9(1): 555-597.Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Five queries of our copy (renaming/new names, disparaging and demeaning language, nullifying personalities, dehumanizing terms, degradation ceremonies/ritual of enslavement) returned only the two Abstract passages (Abstract, pp. not paginated), which discuss how anti-trafficking activists invoke the trans-Atlantic slave trade and whether the analogy illuminates similarities and differences. No passage in our indexed copy addresses renaming practices or demeaning language in slave societies as a means of reframing free persons' identities, so nothing here supports or contradicts the attributed claim. (LLM, conf=0.70)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“This is evidenced through the use of language to describe enslaved populations, from dehumanising labels characterising enslaved persons as ' nameless ' and ' not human ' in early modern China (Crossley 2011, p 190) and the denial of family names to those enslaved in ancient Near East (Mendelson 1949, p 31), to derogatory and racist epithets of ' negro ' , ' nigger ' , ' colored ' , and ' black '”
§ The Author(s) 2020 > Conceptualising De Jure Slavery Moving beyond the transatlantic paradigm as a starting point for understanding slavery, another archetype remains at the core of many conceptualisations of slavery through time: slavery as a legal status created when people are held as property in law (de jure chattel slavery). While commentators often dispute the margins of slavery, there is very little argument over the status of de jure chattel slavery as slavery properly called. Rather than being tied to a particular instance of slavery, the paradigm of de jure chattel slavery is carried through many different historical instances of slavery, giving it wider relevance. In order to identify the nature of slavery, the features and experiences of persons held in de jure chattel slavery are therefore a useful starting point for considering the institution as a whole. Unpacking the constituent elements of the experience of de jure chattel slavery exposes core elements of a broadly accepted and uncontested form of slavery (including from the perspectives of commentators with otherwise widely diverging views). These core elements can then be reconceptualised through consideration of the points of mimicry and departure from instances of exploitation that might amount to de facto slavery. This then invites a reconsideration of the presumed boundaries between de jure and de facto slavery, and provides a new foundation for consideration of marginal cases in which the application of the moniker of slavery is contested. The framework of property law -property rights in, and ownership of, persons -delimits the parameters of traditional chattel slavery. In the words of the European Court of Human Rights ( Siliadin v France 2005, para 122), the ' classic ' meaning of slavery entails a ' genuine right of legal ownership ' over a person, reducing them to the status of an ' object ' . Smith (1954) likewise contends that slavery is characterised by the ' legal assimilation of interpersonal rights to the norm of property rights over things ' . Hunt (2017) notes that ' historians define slavery in terms of property ' rather than by the nature of the treatment of persons enslaved, and Nieboer (1971) suggested that slavery ' is the fact that one man is the property or possession of another ' . This was definitively true of transatlantic enslavement, in which the characterisation of Africans and people of African descent as chattel (things) in law, and the tapestry of associated legal protections that gave effect to this property right in persons, were the foundation for the system of institutionalised enslavement. 8 Likewise, in recognised slave societies throughout history, slavery has often existed primarily as a legal status wherein property rights could be exercised over a person and upheld through legal or equivalent customary institutions. 9 This reflects a global orthodoxy in which property frameworks -those legal institutions that regulated slavery for centuries -are the lens through which the practical and theoretical boundaries of the phenomenon of (chattel) slavery are to be viewed (Allain and Hickey 2012). Freamon (2012, p 41) highlights that the basic definition of slavery in Islamic law was ' firmly rooted in property concepts while haltingly recognizing the humanity of the slave ' . Bradley (2011, p 242) describes enslaved persons in the Roman Republic (late sixth century to late first century BC) as ' items of property over which their owners had complete powers of disposal ' . States around the world have demonstrated consensus on the centrality of property law in defining slavery in the negotiation and adoption of the 1926 Slavery Convention (Hickey 2012, p 221), which defines slavery by reference to the ' powers attaching to the right of ownership ' (League of Nations 1926a, art 1). Defining slavery by reference to either legal ownership itself, or the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership, places the property paradigm at the centre of the conceptualisation of slavery.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Crossley 2011, p 190 source
- Not matchedcites Mendelson 1949, p 31
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Supportedcites Brown 2019, p 163 source
The ‘Speech Act Theory’ section names all four terms—‘negro,’ ‘nigger,’ ‘colored,’ and ‘black’—and argues that some uses can subordinate or enslave people in particular contexts. The ‘Nigger’ Slave section gives an example from South Carolina slavery law. The China and ancient Near East examples are attributed to other citations, not to Brown. (LLM, conf=0.87)
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This reflects historical legal justifications for enslavement as an alternative to death (Schwarz 2019; Allain 2012).”
§ The Author(s) 2020 > Is there a Fundamental Difference Between De Jure and De Facto Slavery? The paradigm of de jure chattel slavery prima facie admits the construction of a slave/ non-slave binary on the basis of legal status -either a person is held as property according to the law, or they are not. However, this binary holds only for the question of legal status, and consideration of the condition and experience of enslavement (even in the context of de jure chattel slavery) necessitates a more complex formulation. From an abolitionist perspective, such an approach is required to prevent the continuation of the behaviours constituting de jure chattel slavery under new legal classifications. In the most extreme cases, the manifestations of ' slavery by other names ' might engage the machinery of the State in upholding a discriminatory system of exploitation in a functionally analogous manner as in a system of de jure chattel slavery. For instance, drawing lessons from colonial practices in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Mazower 2008), and founded on extreme othering of particular groups of people in order to justify abuse and exploitation (Stone 2017, p 12), Nazi-forced labour camps in WWII embedded a condition of total domination in exploitation within legal frameworks. 29 Yet, despite the totality of control, arbitrariness and discriminatory premise of detention, extreme levels of abuse, and permanence of the condition, dominant narratives continued to frame exploitation in these contexts as ' forced labour ' rather than slavery (Schwarz 2020). Recognition of these practices as slave labour (as constructed in the crime against humanity of enslavement in the Nuremberg Trials) requires acceptance of the possibility for slavery to exist as a condition or experience rather than a legal status. Conversely, defining the boundaries of slavery without a frame of reference beyond legal status creates an absurdity in the definition: that States might create discriminatory systems of exploitation involving total and permanent control over people as if they were things, upheld by the legal machinery of the State, 30 which could be constructed as non-slavery simply by labelling them as such. 27 O ' Connell Davidson argues that this is the necessary conclusion of recognising slavery -that slavery is classed as ' inappropriate exploitation ' and all other forms of exploitation are thereby categorised as ' appropriate '-(O ' Connell Davidson 2010, p 249; 2006, 2015).
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Schwarz 2019
Section 2.4 (p. of 'The expansion of enslavement in customary international law') states that Justinian's Institutes permitted enslavement 'as an alternative to death' and that this justification 'predominated legal reasoning for over a millennium', framed as an exception to a general prohibition (permitted as jus gentium though contrary to jus naturale). The same section ties this directly to chattel status: at the point a person may lawfully be killed, or otherwise would have died, they lose legal personality 'in favour of chattel status' ('Slavery is all but death', Gentili). Section 2.6 confirms the racialised chattel system was built on and modified these permissibility conditions, so the attributing paraphrase is faithful to this source. (LLM, conf=0.90)
- Not matchedcites Allain 2012
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
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Citations
Cites
Slavery and Social Death. A Comparative Study
Hellie, R., & Patterson, O. (1983) · Russian Review · doi:10.2307/129496 · Cited by 3,006
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Sunstein, C. R. (1996) · University of Pennsylvania Law Review · doi:10.2307/3312647 · Cited by 795 · cited 1×
“Law both reflects and reshapes society, acting as a moral and cultural signifier to shape and change social norms (see Sunstein 1996, 1999).”
BackgroundSlavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study
Hellie, R., & Patterson, O. (1984) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1862573 · Cited by 772
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Bowersock, G. W., & Finley, M. I. (1981) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1860387 · Cited by 509
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Mooney, C. C., & Stampp, K. M. (1957) · The Journal of Southern History · doi:10.2307/2954870 · Cited by 502
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Degler, C. N., & Davis, D. B. (1975) · The Journal of Southern History · doi:10.2307/2206413 · Cited by 480
Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World
Davis, D. B. (2006) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195140736.001.0001 · Cited by 460
Research works printed but not linked: 12
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- Dennis A, Foot P, Perkins R (trans) (1980) Laws of Early Iceland, Grágás. The Codus regius of Grágás, with Material From Other Manuscripts. University of Manitoba Press, Winnipeg
- Dockès P (1982) Medieval Slavery and Liberation, translated by A Goldhammer. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Khalaf F, Hoffmann AC (2016) The Girl Who Beat Isis: My Story. Vintage Digital, New York.
- Nicholson A (2018) Bearing Witness: Contemporary Slave Narratives and the Global Antislavery Movement. PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham.
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- Reid A (1983) Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia. University of Queensland Press, Brisbane.
- Schwarz K (2020) Definitions and Ideologies of Slavery and Trafficking. In: Altnick H (ed) Cultural History of Slavery and Human Trafficking: Global Conflict, Colonialism, and Decolonisation 1900-1945. Bloomsbury Academic, London.
- Sunstein CR (1999) Law’s Expressive Function. The Good Society 9(2): 55-61.
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Cited by
“I bought you. You are my wife”: “Modern Slavery” and Forced Marriage
McCabe, H., & Eglen, L. (2022) · Journal of Human Trafficking · doi:10.1080/23322705.2022.2096366 · Cited by 42
“Thus, Schwarz and Nicholson (2020) are right to argue that it is not only the exercise of any or all of the specific powers associated with ownership, but also the necessary underlying relationship of control tantamount to possession in which these are exercised that demarcates the presence of…”
Schwarz, K., & Williams-Woods, A. (2022) · Journal of Poverty and Social Justice · doi:10.1332/175982721x16418164636200 · Cited by 17
Self-citationStructural racism and health in the age of COVID‐19: A selective review with policy implications
Brondolo, E. N., Kaur, A., & Flores, M. A. (2023) · Social Issues and Policy Review · doi:10.1111/sipr.12095 · Cited by 15
Palacios-Arapiles, S. (2021) · Laws · doi:10.3390/laws10020028
(2021) · Revue des droits de l’homme · doi:10.4000/revdh.11278
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwarz, K., & Nicholson, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Nottingham (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Schwarz, Katarina
- Venue
- Human Rights Review
- Published
- 2020-09-03
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 391-414
- ISSN
- 1524-8879 (ISSN-L)
- 1874-6306
- OpenAlex
- W3083583106
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 113
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 4.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Human Rights Review (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- Repository@Nottingham (University of Nottingham) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- University of Nottingham
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History › Colonialism, slavery, and trade
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Law and Human Rights
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Labor and Employment Law
- Keywords
- slavery, transatlantic slave trade, chattel slavery, modern slavery
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- The paper
- Schwarz, K., & Nicholson, A. (2020). Collapsing the Boundaries Between De Jure and De Facto Slavery: The Foundations of Slavery Beyond the Transatlantic Frame. Human Rights Review. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-020-00604-y
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