The Epistemic Status of Processing Fluency as Source for Judgments of Truth
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article combines findings from cognitive psychology on the role of processing fluency in truth judgments with epistemological theory on justification of belief. We first review evidence that repeated exposure to a statement increases the subjective ease with which that statement is processed. This increased processing fluency, in turn, increases the probability that the statement is judged to be true. The basic question discussed here is whether the use of processing fluency as a cue to truth is epistemically justified. In the present analysis, based on Bayes' Theorem, we adopt the reliable-process account of justification presented by Goldman (1986) and show that fluency is a reliable cue to truth, under the assumption that the majority of statements one has been exposed to are true. In the final section, we broaden the scope of this analysis and discuss how processing fluency as a potentially universal cue to judged truth may contribute to cultural differences in commonsense beliefs.
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Citations
Cites
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“Dêchene and colleagues (2009a) as well as Unkelbach and Stahl (2009) found some evidence that new statements are not as easily believed; however, the effects were small in comparison to the advantages that familiar and fluent information enjoys.”
BackgroundInfluentialFrequency and the conference of referential validity
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Cited by
Bullot, N. J., & Reber, R. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000489 · Cited by 381
Self-citationSchmader, T., & Sedikides, C. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317734080 · Cited by 330
Reber, R., & Greifeneder, R. (2017) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520.2016.1258173 · Cited by 87
“First, a strong body of research shows that fluency informs judgments of truth (for an overview, see Reber & Unkelbach, 2010).”
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Arango-Muñoz, S. (2013) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-012-0124-1 · Cited by 69
Repetition increases both the perceived truth and fakeness of information: An ecological account
Corneille, O., Mierop, A., & Unkelbach, C. (2020) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104470 · Cited by 57
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Reber, R., & Unkelbach, C.
- Venue
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Published
- 2010-09-07
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 563-581
- ISSN
- 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
- 1878-5166
- OpenAlex
- W2049134002
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 41.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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