The DOI matches its Crossref record; 96 of the 99 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 3 are not checked yet.
Active Inference as a Computational Framework for Consciousness
Open accessAbstract
Recently, the mechanistic framework of active inference has been put forward as a principled foundation to develop an overarching theory of consciousness which would help address conceptual disparities in the field (Wiese 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020). For that promise to bear out, we argue that current proposals resting on the active inference scheme need refinement to become a process theory of consciousness. One way of improving a theory in mechanistic terms is to use formalisms such as computational models that implement, attune and validate the conceptual notions put forward. Here, we examine how computational modelling approaches have been used to refine the theoretical proposals linking active inference and consciousness, with a focus on the extent and success to which they have been developed to accommodate different facets of consciousness and experimental paradigms, as well as how simulations and empirical data have been used to test and improve these computational models. While current attempts using this approach have shown promising results, we argue they remain preliminary in nature. To refine their predictive and structural validity, testing those models against empirical data is needed i.e., new and unobserved neural data. A remaining challenge for active inference to become a theory of consciousness is to generalize the model to accommodate the broad range of consciousness explananda; and in particular to account for the phenomenological aspects of experience. Notwithstanding these gaps, this approach has proven to be a valuable avenue for theory advancement and holds great potential for future research.
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“Some of these properties are emphasized by many theories; for example, sensorimotor [45], active inference [ 46], neurorepresentationalist [ 47], and midbrain [48 ] theories all emphasize l inks between agency and conscio usness.”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [46]
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“The key idea here is to exploit the resources availed by a domain-general modelling framework such as Active Inference to construct computational models of paradigmatic phenomena in consciousness science (e.g., binocular rivalry; Doerig et al., 2021), and to compare the properties of these models such that salient commonalities and particularities may be identified (Vilas et al., 2022; Whyte et al”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Vilas et al., 2022
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Cites
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.3.231 · Cited by 11,317
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 2×
“The Free Energy Principle states that all adaptive biological agents seek to minimize long-term surprise (i.e. entropy) (Friston 2010).”
BackgroundJournal of Consciousness Studies
(2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201 · Cited by 6,832
Friston, K. J., Harrison, L., & Penny, W. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00202-7 · Cited by 4,583
Colman (2022) · doi:10.1073/pnas · Cited by 4,370
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: biological sciences
(2026) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb · Cited by 2,876
Canonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding
Bastos, A. M., Usrey, W. M., Adams, R. A., Mangun, G. R., Fries, P., & Friston, K. J. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.038 · Cited by 2,421 · cited 1×
“…that maximize the probability of the observation, which corresponds to perception and is typically modelled by predictive coding schemes (Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Bastos et al. 2012); or by sampling or acting in the world to increase the chance of meeting those predictions (Friston et al. 2016).”
BackgroundFacing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727
Cited by
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Colombo, M., & Piccinini, G. (2023) · doi:10.1017/9781009183734 · Cited by 107
Metzinger, T. K. (2024) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/15196.001.0001 · Cited by 100
Active inference models do not contradict folk psychology
Smith, R. S., Ramstead, M. J. D., & Kiefer, A. B. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03480-w · Cited by 61
“…hierarchical inference, the necessity of cognitive action (e.g., selective attention through control of sensory precision), as well as interoceptive/emotional factors (e.g., see Clark et al., 2019; Limanowski & Friston, 2018; Nikolova et al., 2021; Smith et al., 2019a; Vilas et al., 2021).”
BackgroundIdentifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems
Butlin, P., Long, R., Bayne, T., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Chalmers, D., Constant, A., Deane, G., Elmoznino, E., Fleming, S. M., et al. (2026) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.10.011 · Cited by 56
Metadata
- Authors
- Vilas, M. G., Auksztulewicz, R., & Melloni, L.
- Affiliations
- Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Vilas, Martina G.
- Venue
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Published
- 2021-08-10
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 859-878
- ISSN
- 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
- 1878-5166
- OpenAlex
- W3192813290
- Cited by
- 28
- References
- 92
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 2.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Research Publications (Maastricht University) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Max-Planck-Institute
- Marie Skłodowska-Curie Global Fellowship (750459)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- active inference, consciousness, computational models of consciousness, predictive processing, phenomenology
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- Vilas, M. G., Auksztulewicz, R., & Melloni, L. (2022). Active Inference as a Computational Framework for Consciousness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00579-w
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