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Cited by 1,966Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of ScienceEmbodied and Extended Cognition

Facing up to the problem of consciousness

Chalmers, David J.·1996·Toward a Science of Consciousness
DOI 10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003
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Abstract

To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information.

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Crossref · 10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003

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2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • In contrast to GNWT, IIT, RPT, and PP/NREP all primarily try to address the Hard Problem.

    “Thus, in contrast to GNWT, the other theories (IIT, RPT, and PP/NREP; for dendritic integration theory (DIT), see below) all primarily try to address the ''Hard Problem, 1 ''”

    From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [1]

  • To truly explain consciousness would require solving what Chalmers calls the hard problem of consciousness.

    “To truly explain consciousness would require solving what Chalmers calls the hard problem of consciousness [20,54].”

    From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [54]

  • Classical frameworks have not resolved how subjective, unified, first-person experience emerges from distributed biological computation.

    “Classical frameworks have elucidated the mechanisms by which neurons communicate, networks oscillate, and cognitive processes unfold, yet these accounts have not resolved how subjective, unified, first-person experience emerges from distributed biological computation.”

    From Quantum-Inspired and Non-Classical Approaches to Consciousness: Models, Evidence and Constraints (2026) · cites this paper as [1]

  • The mathematical structures underlying quantum physics possess an expressive power well suited to modelling cognition at levels of complexity where classical architectures saturate [1].

    “They do not imply that the brain literally implements tensor contractions, but they demonstrate that the mathematical structures underlying quantum physics possess an expressive power well suited to modelling cognition at levels of complexity where classical architectures saturate [1].”

    From Quantum-Inspired and Non-Classical Approaches to Consciousness: Models, Evidence and Constraints (2026) · cites this paper as [1]

  • This provides good evidence that consciousness is complex, with complex causes, and is not simply caused by one fundamental, or psychic, force of nature.

    “This provides good evidence that consciousness is complex, with complex causes, and is not simply caused by one fundamental, or psychic, force of nature as some have claimed (Chalmers, 1996; Velmans, 2008; Skrbina, 2009; Goff et al., 2017).”

    From Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap (2020) · cites this paper as Chalmers, 1996

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Authors
Chalmers, D. J.
Affiliations
Washington University in St. Louis (US)
Corresponding author
Chalmers, David J.
ORCID
Chalmers, David J.
Venue
Toward a Science of Consciousness
Publisher
The MIT Press
Published
1996-03-26
Pages
4-27
DOI
10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003
OpenAlex
W3210699874
Cited by
1,966
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 240 · 2024: 225 · 2023: 191 · 2022: 188 · 2021: 133 · 2020: 118 · 2019: 185 · 2018: 114 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 55 · 2015: 59 · 2014: 42 · 2013: 44 · 2012: 29
FWCI
27.91
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
problem of consciousness, hard problem of consciousness, reductive explanation, naturalism, structural coherence, philosophy of mind

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