An Embodied Predictive Processing Theory of Pain Experience
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for explaining the subjective character of pain experience in terms of what we will call ‘embodied predictive processing’. The predictive processing (PP) theory is a family of views that take perception, action, emotion and cognition to all work together in the service of prediction error minimisation. In this paper we propose an embodied perspective on the PP theory we call the ‘embodied predictive processing (EPP) theory. The EPP theory proposes to explain pain in terms of processes distributed across the whole body. The prediction error minimising system that generates pain experience comprises the immune system, the endocrine system, and the autonomic system in continuous causal interaction with pathways spread across the whole neural axis. We will argue that these systems function in a coordinated and coherent manner as a single complex adaptive system to maintain homeostasis. This system, which we refer to as the neural-endocrine-immune (NEI) system, maintains homeostasis through the process of prediction error minimisation. We go on to propose a view of the NEI ensemble as a multiscale nesting of Markov blankets that integrates the smallest scale of the cell to the largest scale of the embodied person in pain. We set out to show how the EPP theory can make sense of how pain experience could be neurobiologically constituted. We take it to be a constraint on the adequacy of a scientific explanation of subjectivity of pain experience that it makes it intelligible how pain can simultaneously be a local sensing of the body, and, at the same time, a more global, all-encompassing attitude towards the environment. Our aim in what follows is to show how the EPP theory can meet this constraint.
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Citations
Cites
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The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 2×
“The predictive processing (PP) theory is a family of views that take perception, action, emotion and cognition to all work together in the service of prediction error minimisation (Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013 2015; Barrett 2017; Seth 2015, 2021).”
BackgroundNagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
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“We will argue that the subjectivity of pain is to be understood in terms of its embodiment by a bodily self—the body that each person experiences as their own body (Merleau-Ponty 1945 /2012; Legrand 2006; Gallagher 2000; Zahavi 2005; Ciaunica & Fotopoulou 2017; Tsakiris & Foto-poulou 2017).”
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Cited by
The neurobiology of interoception and affect
Feldman, M. J., Bliss-Moreau, E., & Lindquist, K. A. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.009 · Cited by 101
“These processes begin in the periphery but escalate in the brain.”
Expectancies and avoidance: Towards an integrated model of chronic somatic symptoms
Nadinda, P. G., van Laarhoven, A. I. M., Van den Bergh, O., Vlaeyen, J. W. S., Peters, M. L., & Evers, A. W. M. (2024) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105808 · Cited by 15
“These predictions not only include conscious verbalizable expectations, but also implicit expectations that can be embodied through autonomic responses and activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (Kiverstein et al., 2022).”
BackgroundEditorial: Predictive Processing and Consciousness
Miller, M., Clark, A., & Schlicht, T. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00666-6 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Kiverstein, J., Kirchhoff, M. D., & Thacker, M.
- Venue
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Published
- 2022-03-18
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 973-998
- ISSN
- 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
- 1878-5166
- OpenAlex
- W4220851827
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 7.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Kiverstein, J., Kirchhoff, M. D., & Thacker, M. (2022). An Embodied Predictive Processing Theory of Pain Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00616-2
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