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On Equilibrium Properties of the Replicator–Mutator Equation in Deterministic and Random Games

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Duong, Manh Hong, Han, The Anh · 2020 · Dynamic Games and Applications

Abstract

In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator–mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Descartes’ rule of signs, we provide a formula to compute the number of equilibria in multi-player games via the number of change of signs in the coefficients of a polynomial. For two-player social dilemmas (namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snow Drift, Stag Hunt and Harmony), we characterize (stable) equilibrium points and analytically calculate the probability of having a certain number of equilibria when the payoff entries are uniformly distributed. For multi-player random games whose pay-offs are independently distributed according to a normal distribution, by employing techniques from random polynomial theory, we compute the expected or average number of internal equilibria. In addition, we perform extensive simulations by sampling and averaging over a large number of possible payoff matrices to compare with and illustrate analytical results. Numerical simulations also suggest several interesting behaviours of the average number of equilibria when the number of players is sufficiently large or when the mutation is sufficiently small. In general, we observe that introducing mutation results in a larger average number of internal equilibria than when mutation is absent, implying that mutation leads to larger behavioural diversity in dynamical systems. Interestingly, this number is largest when mutation is rare rather than when it is frequent.

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Fig. 1 Plot of sn for some randomly chosen payoff matrices. (We adopted q = 0 . 1 in all cases.) We indicate the number players d in the game, the payoff matrix used for small d (for the sake of representation given large sizes of the payoff matrices for large d ), and the number of internal equilibria, N . For sufficiently large n , sn decreasingly converges to the corresponding value of N
Fig. 1 Plot of sn for some randomly chosen payoff matrices. (We adopted q = 0 . 1 in all cases.) We indicate the number players d in the game, the payoff matrix used for small d (for the sake of representation given large sizes of the payoff matrices for large d ), and the number of internal equilibria, N . For sufficiently large n , sn decreasingly converges to the corresponding value of NCC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 2 Probability of having two equilibrium points for Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Stag Hunt (SH) games, according to analytical results obtained in Sect. 3. Both functions are increasing; p PD 2 is always bigger than p SD 2 ; the maximum of p PD 2 is 1 while the maximum of p SD 2 is 1 / 2. These results also corroborate the simulation results using samplings in Fig. 3
Fig. 2 Probability of having two equilibrium points for Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Stag Hunt (SH) games, according to analytical results obtained in Sect. 3. Both functions are increasing; p PD 2 is always bigger than p SD 2 ; the maximum of p PD 2 is 1 while the maximum of p SD 2 is 1 / 2. These results also corroborate the simulation results using samplings in Fig. 3CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 3
CC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 4 (Left panel) Analytical vs. simulation sampling results of the average number of internal equilibrium points ( E ) for varying q and for different values of d . The solid lines are generated from analytical ( A ) formulas of E . The solid diamonds capture simulation ( S ) results obtained by averaging over 10 6 samples of the payoff entries (normal distribution). Analytical and simulations results are in accordance with each other. (Right panel) Plot of E for increasing d and for different values of q . In general, E increases with d . E is always larger when q > 0 than when q = 0. Also, E is largest when q is close to 0 (i.e. rare mutation). All results are obtained using Mathematica
Fig. 4 (Left panel) Analytical vs. simulation sampling results of the average number of internal equilibrium points ( E ) for varying q and for different values of d . The solid lines are generated from analytical ( A ) formulas of E . The solid diamonds capture simulation ( S ) results obtained by averaging over 10 6 samples of the payoff entries (normal distribution). Analytical and simulations results are in accordance with each other. (Right panel) Plot of E for increasing d and for different values of q . In general, E increases with d . E is always larger when q > 0 than when q = 0. Also, E is largest when q is close to 0 (i.e. rare mutation). All results are obtained using MathematicaCC-BY · From the PDF
Fig. 5 Plot of log ( E )/ log ( d + 1 ) for varying d . For different values of q , this quantity converges to the same value. All results are obtained using Mathematica
Fig. 5 Plot of log ( E )/ log ( d + 1 ) for varying d . For different values of q , this quantity converges to the same value. All results are obtained using MathematicaCC-BY · From the PDF

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Metadata

Authors
Duong, M. H., & Han, T. A.
Affiliations
  • University of Birmingham (GB)
  • Teesside University (GB)
Corresponding author
Duong, Manh Hong
Venue
Dynamic Games and Applications
Published
2019-11-27
Volume
10
Issue
3
Pages
641-663
ISSN
  • 2153-0785 (ISSN-L)
  • 2153-0793
OpenAlex
W2979697513
Cited by
7
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1
FWCI
2.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Dynamic Games and Applications (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Teesside University Research Portal (Teesside University) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
Future of Life Institute (RFP2-154)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
Keywords
number of equilibria, evolutionary game theory, multiplayer games, two-strategy games, Descartes' rule of signs, social dilemmas, prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift game, stag hunt, genetic mutations, random payoffs, behavioral diversity

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On Equilibrium Properties of the Replicator–Mutator Equation in Deterministic and Random Games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13235-019-00338-8
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Duong, M. H., & Han, T. A. (2020). On Equilibrium Properties of the Replicator–Mutator Equation in Deterministic and Random Games. Dynamic Games and Applications. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00338-8

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