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Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy

Open access
Placani, Adriana · 2024 · AI and Ethics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 38 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

This essay focuses on anthropomorphism as both a form of hype and fallacy. As a form of hype, anthropomorphism is shown to exaggerate AI capabilities and performance by attributing human-like traits to systems that do not possess them. As a fallacy, anthropomorphism is shown to distort moral judgments about AI, such as those concerning its moral character and status, as well as judgments of responsibility and trust. By focusing on these two dimensions of anthropomorphism in AI, the essay highlights negative ethical consequences of the phenomenon in this field.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This essay argues that anthropomorphism in AI functions both as hype—exaggerating and misrepresenting AI capabilities—and as a fallacy that distorts moral judgments about AI. It illustrates these claims through examples from robotics, deep neural networks, and large language models, and through four moral judgments: moral character, moral status, responsibility, and trust.

Key findings

  • Anthropomorphism is a constitutive part of AI hype because it attributes human-like traits to systems that do not possess them, thereby overinflating AI capabilities and performance.
  • As a fallacy, anthropomorphism involves factually erroneous or unwarranted attributions of human characteristics to non-humans, which can distort moral reasoning about AI.
  • The essay argues that anthropomorphism distorts four central moral judgments about AI: judgments of moral character, moral status, responsibility, and trust.
  • In one cited example, a cross-sectional study of 195 randomly drawn patient questions found ChatGPT responses were rated significantly higher for empathy than physician responses, with a 9.8 times higher prevalence of empathetic or very empathetic responses for the chatbot; almost half of ChatGPT responses were considered empathetic (45%) compared to less than 5% of physician responses.

Methods

  • Design: conceptual/philosophical essay, not an empirical study.
  • Data or sample: no original dataset; the argument draws on examples and cited literature, including a cited cross-sectional study of 195 patient questions comparing physicians and ChatGPT.
  • Main analysis: conceptual argument distinguishing anthropomorphism as hype and as fallacy, then applying this to moral judgments about AI’s moral character, moral status, responsibility, and trust.

Limitations

  • The paper states that an exhaustive analysis of the negative ethical consequences of anthropomorphism would be virtually impossible, that it cannot provide an exhaustive account of the phenomenon or its connection to hype, and that a full treatment of the extensive moral issues discussed is not possible.
  • Evident from the text: the essay does not collect or analyze original empirical data, and its claims rely on selected examples and secondary literature rather than a systematic review or empirical test.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s43681-024-00419-4

Cites

48 of 48 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

9 Valid · 1 Not valid · 21 Not checked · 61 Own results and interpretations

41 more claims

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 34

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Citations

Cites

Show all 48 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Davidson, D.: The essential Davidson. Oxford University Press, New York (2006)

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Placani, A.
Affiliations
University of Lisbon (PT)
Corresponding author
Placani, Adriana
Venue
AI and Ethics
Published
2024-02-05
Volume
4
Issue
3
Pages
691-698
ISSN
  • 2730-5953 (ISSN-L)
  • 2730-5961
OpenAlex
W4391532364
Cited by
170
References
38
Citations by year
2026: 88 · 2025: 69 · 2024: 13
FWCI
58.86
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • AI and Ethics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (CEECIND/02135/2021)
  • Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
anthropomorphism, artificial intelligence, hype, logical fallacies, moral status of AI, responsibility, trust

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s43681-024-00419-4
The paper
Placani, A. (2024). Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy. AI and Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-024-00419-4

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.