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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 78 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 30 of the 74 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence

Open access
Porębski, Andrzej, Figura, Jakub · 2025 · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications

Abstract

The claim that so-called artificial intelligence (AI) can gain consciousness is on the verge of becoming mainstream. The thesis of this conceptual study is simple: There is no such thing as conscious AI. We argue that the association between consciousness and the computer algorithms used today (primarily large language models, LLMs), as well as those that would be invented in the foreseeable future, is deeply flawed. We believe that these flawed associations arise from a lack of technical knowledge and the way several new technologies (especially LLMs) work, which can create the illusion of consciousness. Moreover, we argue that the public discourse about AI is skewed by “sci-fitisation”, which involves the unsubstantiated influence of fictional content on perceptions of this technology. To justify our claim, we reveal the incoherence in the argument that several computer algorithms are treated differently from other computer algorithms despite congruent modes of operation and a reliance on binary code and semiconductors. We believe that mathematical algorithms implemented on graphics cards cannot become conscious because they lack a complex biological substrate. We emphasise that the recognition of the consciousness of LLMs on the basis of their assertions is flawed because the language usage of LLMs is strictly probabilistic. Unfortunately, because the remarkable linguistic abilities of LLMs are increasingly capable of misleading people, people may attribute imaginary qualities to LLMs. Thus, a socially dangerous phenomenon referred to as “semantic pareidolia” is reinforcing.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This conceptual paper argues that there is no such thing as conscious AI, including current and foreseeable LLMs, because AI lacks a complex biological substrate and its language use is probabilistic. It attributes beliefs in AI consciousness to sci-fitisation, semantic pareidolia, and misunderstandings of how algorithms work.

Key findings

  • The paper’s central thesis is that conscious AI does not exist; every subsequent GPT version and other advanced AI in the foreseeable future will be “as conscious as GPT-3 (that is, as conscious as an old typewriter).” It aligns with Gams and Kramar (2024) and Andrews (2024).
  • The biological argument holds that AI computations run on GPUs using binary code and semiconductors; mathematical algorithms implemented on graphics cards cannot become conscious because they lack a complex biological substrate. Human consciousness is grounded in the nervous system, biochemical processes, and embodied cognition.
  • LLM linguistic ability does not indicate consciousness: LLMs generate probable wording, not truth; self-claims of consciousness are side effects of probabilistic sentence generation and context; passing the Turing test only shows successful imitation. In Huckle and Williams’ benchmark, average human accuracy was approximately 85%, versus approximately 75% for advanced models such as Gemini 2.5 Pro or OpenAI o3, approximately 40% for GPT-4o, and approximately 60% for Gemini 2.5 Flash.
  • Public-belief figures cited include: only one-third of US adults (n = 300, July 2023) firmly rule out any form of LLM consciousness; approximately 20% of US adults (n = 2268, April–July 2023) said sentient AI systems currently exist; and a 2024 survey found approximately 17% of AI researchers and 18% of US adults believe at least one AI system has subjective experience, while approximately 8% and 10%, respectively, believe at least one has self-awareness (n AI = 582; n adults = 838).

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical study; no datasets were generated or analysed. It clarifies the concepts of AI and consciousness, sets boundary conditions for consciousness and a general definition of AI, then presents a biological argument against AI consciousness and critical remarks on arguments for LLM consciousness.
  • The analysis is argumentative, drawing on literature, popular-culture examples, survey findings, and technical descriptions of LLMs and GPUs. It also addresses potential limitations—black-box complexity and anthropocentrism—and discusses practical implications for education and regulation.

Limitations

  • Stated: the authors do not precisely know what consciousness is, and the concepts of “AI” and “consciousness” do not lend themselves to comprehensive and precise representation; “AI” is vague and open-textured. They limit claims to actual AI in 2025 and the foreseeable future, not to purely philosophical possibilities or unknown future technologies such as biological mechanisms or new forms of computation.
  • Stated: they address potential limitations/objections—algorithmic black-box complexity and anthropocentrism—and argue these do not undermine the thesis; they also note that their energy analysis focuses on task performance and does not analyse training and fine-tuning energy in detail.
  • Evident: no empirical data were generated or analysed; the argument is conceptual and depends on a biological-substrate criterion and definitions that critics may dispute; the cited survey figures concern public and researcher beliefs, not direct evidence about AI consciousness.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1057/s41599-025-05868-8

Cites

78 of 78 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

27 Valid · 1 Not valid · 29 Not checked · 44 Own results and interpretations

38 more claims · 9 with their cited sources checked

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 23
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 48
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 2

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

  • Deep learning

    LeCun, Y., Bengio, Y., & Hinton, G. (2015) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature14539 · Cited by 84,126

  • BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding

    Devlin, J., Chang, M.-W., Lee, K., & Toutanova, K. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and Short Papers) · doi:10.18653/v1/n19-1423 · Cited by 54,325 · cited 1×

    “For example, bidirectional encoder representations from transformers (BERT) model, which is based almost only on encoders, cannot generate new text but is rather used for text classi fi cation and language understanding tasks (Devlin et. al.”
  • I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE

    TURING, A. M. (1950) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/lix.236.433 · Cited by 10,290 · cited 2×

    “” (1968); (2) the Terminator from the fi lm “ The Terminator ” (1984); (3) superintelligent robots from the fi lm “ I, Robot ” (2004), partly inspired by the works of Isaac Asimov, as compiled in “ I, Robot ” anthology (1950).”
  • On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big? 🦜

    Bender, E. M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A., & Shmitchell, S. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3442188.3445922 · Cited by 6,988 · cited 2×

    “Lacking intention and embeddedness in a communicative community, their language use is stripped of reference to meanings (those existing in the world rather than represented numerically in the vectors), making them comparable to stochastic parrots (Bender et al., 2021).”
  • Minds, brains, and programs

    Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954 · cited 2×

    “2 The term “ strong AI ” was introduced by Searle (1980) in his famous paper presenting the “ Chinese Room ” argument.”
  • LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models

    Touvron, H., Lavril, T., Izacard, G., Martinet, X., Lachaux, M.-A., Lacroix, T., Rozière, B., Goyal, N., Hambro, E., Azhar, F., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2302.13971 · Cited by 4,602 · cited 1×

    “Since we mention ChatGPT, we should also mention other related AI systems, such as Gemini by Google (Pichai and Hassabis, 2023), Llama by Meta (Touvron et al., 2023; Gratta fi ori et al., 2024), and Claude by Anthropic (Anthropic, 2024).”
  • ELIZA—a computer program for the study of natural language communication between man and machine

    Weizenbaum, J. (1966) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/365153.365168 · Cited by 4,452 · cited 3×

    “…in the discourse for decades and has manifested itself in, for example, in the attribution of human-like qualities to the simple chatbot ELIZA (Weizenbaum, 1966; Berry, 2023) or in the anthropomorphisation of the language used to describe AI algorithms, which McDermott (1976) warned against…”
    Influential
  • Machine learning and deep learning

    Janiesch, C., Zschech, P., & Heinrich, K. (2021) · Electronic Markets · doi:10.1007/s12525-021-00475-2 · Cited by 2,959 · cited 1×

    “…can (and even should) replace “ AI ” with more precise terms that describe speci fi c classes of technology such as machine learning (Por ę bski, 2023) or deep learning (Goodfellow et al., 2016; for an introduction, see LeCun et al., 2015; for a less technical overview, see Janiesch et al., 2021).”
  • GPT-3: Its Nature, Scope, Limits, and Consequences

    Floridi, L., & Chiriatti, M. (2020) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-020-09548-1 · Cited by 2,519 · cited 3×

    “However, according to our conclusions, Floridi and Chiriatti ’ s (2020) paper remains highly relevant because one thing has not changed.”
    Influential
  • Equal numbers of neuronal and nonneuronal cells make the human brain an isometrically scaled-up primate brain

    Azevedo, F. A. C., Carvalho, L. R. B., Grinberg, L. T., Farfel, J. M., Ferretti, R. E. L., Leite, R. E. P., Filho, W. J., Lent, R., & Herculano‐Houzel, S. (2009) · Journal of Comparative Neurology · doi:10.1002/cne.21974 · Cited by 2,337 · cited 1×

    “It is estimated that the brain has 86 billion neurons (Azevedo et al., 2009; Ray, 2024).”

Show all 70 references

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Chalmers D (2023) Could a large language model be conscious? Boston Review. Retrieved January 16, 2025, from https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/could-a-large-language-model-be-conscious
  2. Goodfellow I, Bengio Y, Courville A (2016) Deep learning (1st ed.). The MIT Press
  3. Huckle J, Williams S (2025) Easy problems that LLMs get wrong. In Arai K (ed.), Advances in Information and Communication. FICC 2025. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, 1283 (pp. 313–332). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-84457-7_19 · DOI · Paper page
  4. McCarthy J (1979) Ascribing mental qualities to machines. In Ringle M (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence.Humanities Press
  5. Ragni M, Kola I, Johnson-Laird PN (2017) The Wason selection task: a meta-analysis. In Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 980–985). Cognitive Science Society
  6. Searle JR (2009) What is language: some preliminary remarks. Etica Politica 11(1):173–202
  7. Vaswani A, Shazeer N, Parmar N, Uszkoreit J, Jones L, Gomez AN, Kaiser Ł, Polosukhin I (2017) Attention is all you need. In Proceedings of the 31st International Conference of Neural Information Processing Systems (pp. 6000–6010). Curran Associates Inc
  8. Volokh E (2023) Large libel models? Liability for AI output. J Free Speech Law 3(2):489–557
  9. Waismann F (1945) Verifiability. Proc Aristotelian Soc Suppl Volumes 19:119–150
  10. Wasiewicz A, Szuba T (1990) The idea of consciousness for intelligent machines as the frame for the future software construction. In Proceedings of the IMACS International Symposium on Mathematical and Intelligent Models in System Simulation (MIM-S2), Brussels

Cited by

See all 20

Metadata

Authors
Porębski, A., & Figura, J.
Affiliations
Jagiellonian University (PL)
Corresponding author
Porębski, Andrzej
Venue
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Published
2025-10-28
Volume
12
Issue
1
ISSN
  • 2055-1045 (ISSN-L)
  • 2662-9992
OpenAlex
W4415619269
Cited by
20
References
70
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 1
FWCI
21.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Homo Politicus (Academy of Humanities and Economics in Lodz) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Jagiellonian University Repository (Jagiellonian University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
Narodowe Centrum Nauki (2022/45/N/HS5/00871)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Keywords
artificial consciousness, large language models, computational algorithms, public discourse on AI

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1057/s41599-025-05868-8
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Porębski, A., & Figura, J. (2025). There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-05868-8

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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