Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 38 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
This essay focuses on anthropomorphism as both a form of hype and fallacy. As a form of hype, anthropomorphism is shown to exaggerate AI capabilities and performance by attributing human-like traits to systems that do not possess them. As a fallacy, anthropomorphism is shown to distort moral judgments about AI, such as those concerning its moral character and status, as well as judgments of responsibility and trust. By focusing on these two dimensions of anthropomorphism in AI, the essay highlights negative ethical consequences of the phenomenon in this field.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This essay argues that anthropomorphism in AI functions both as hype—exaggerating and misrepresenting AI capabilities—and as a fallacy that distorts moral judgments about AI. It illustrates these claims through examples from robotics, deep neural networks, and large language models, and through four moral judgments: moral character, moral status, responsibility, and trust.
Key findings
- Anthropomorphism is a constitutive part of AI hype because it attributes human-like traits to systems that do not possess them, thereby overinflating AI capabilities and performance.
- As a fallacy, anthropomorphism involves factually erroneous or unwarranted attributions of human characteristics to non-humans, which can distort moral reasoning about AI.
- The essay argues that anthropomorphism distorts four central moral judgments about AI: judgments of moral character, moral status, responsibility, and trust.
- In one cited example, a cross-sectional study of 195 randomly drawn patient questions found ChatGPT responses were rated significantly higher for empathy than physician responses, with a 9.8 times higher prevalence of empathetic or very empathetic responses for the chatbot; almost half of ChatGPT responses were considered empathetic (45%) compared to less than 5% of physician responses.
Methods
- Design: conceptual/philosophical essay, not an empirical study.
- Data or sample: no original dataset; the argument draws on examples and cited literature, including a cited cross-sectional study of 195 patient questions comparing physicians and ChatGPT.
- Main analysis: conceptual argument distinguishing anthropomorphism as hype and as fallacy, then applying this to moral judgments about AI’s moral character, moral status, responsibility, and trust.
Limitations
- The paper states that an exhaustive analysis of the negative ethical consequences of anthropomorphism would be virtually impossible, that it cannot provide an exhaustive account of the phenomenon or its connection to hype, and that a full treatment of the extensive moral issues discussed is not possible.
- Evident from the text: the essay does not collect or analyze original empirical data, and its claims rely on selected examples and secondary literature rather than a systematic review or empirical test.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
9 Valid · 1 Not valid · 21 Not checked · 61 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“However, according to two of the most prevalent conceptions of trust, AIs are not capable of being trusted [39].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [39] Ryan, M.: In AI we trust: ethics, artificial intelligence, and reliability. Sci. Eng. Ethics 26, 2749–2767 (2020) source
The Introduction states that AI lacks the emotive states and capacity for responsibility required by the affective and normative accounts of trust. The Theories of Trust section identifies those as two of the three dominant accounts and says AI meets only the rational account, which the author considers reliance rather than trust. (LLM, conf=0.93)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“the proportion of responses rated empathetic or very empathetic was significantly higher for the chat bot than for physicians, amounting to a 9.8 times higher prevalence of empathetic or very empathetic responses for the chat bot [21].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [21] Ayers, J., Poliak, A., Dredze, M., Leas, E., Zechariah, Z., Kelley, J., Dennis, F., Aaron, G., Christopher, L., Michael, H., Davey, S.: Comparing physician and artificial intelligence chatbot responses to patient questions posted to a public social media forum. JAMA Intern. Med. 183(6), 589–596 (2023) source
The Results report that 45.1% of chatbot responses and 4.6% of physician responses were rated empathetic or very empathetic, a 9.8-fold difference. They also report significantly higher empathy ratings for chatbot responses (P < .001). (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates an associationn = 195- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“This means that almost half of responses from ChatGPT were considered to be empathetic (45%) compared to less than 5% of those from physicians.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [21] Ayers, J., Poliak, A., Dredze, M., Leas, E., Zechariah, Z., Kelley, J., Dennis, F., Aaron, G., Christopher, L., Michael, H., Davey, S.: Comparing physician and artificial intelligence chatbot responses to patient questions posted to a public social media forum. JAMA Intern. Med. 183(6), 589–596 (2023) source
The Results report that 45.1% of chatbot responses and 4.6% of physician responses were rated empathetic or very empathetic. Those figures match the claim’s rounded percentages; the study used ChatGPT (GPT-3.5) to generate the chatbot responses. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plainstates an associationn = 195- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“However, AI lacks the capacity to be moved by trust or a sense of goodwill since it lacks any emotive states [39].”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [39] Ryan, M.: In AI we trust: ethics, artificial intelligence, and reliability. Sci. Eng. Ethics 26, 2749–2767 (2020) source
In “Interpersonal Trust and AI,” Ryan says AI does not have emotions or the capacity to feel anything toward the person placing trust in it. The same passage says narrow AI cannot be moved by that trust or motivated by goodwill toward that person. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, blaming or praising an AI would be futile given the absence of any kind of understanding of such moral responses on the part of AI systems.”
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“We fear that because of the prevalent sci-fitisation, as well as anthropomorphism (Placani, 2024;Salles et al., 2020) and hyping (Sloane et al., 2024) in the discourse on AI (the three categories are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they can be considered complementary), the”
From There is no such thing as conscious artificial intelligence (2025) · cites this paper as Placani, 2024
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
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Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Placani, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Lisbon (PT)
- Corresponding author
- Placani, Adriana
- ORCID
- Placani, Adriana
- Venue
- AI and Ethics
- Published
- 2024-02-05
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 691-698
- ISSN
- 2730-5953 (ISSN-L)
- 2730-5961
- OpenAlex
- W4391532364
- Semantic Scholar
- 19e60f81aed3c0e10757860cd31e54b1f374e337
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 88 · 2025: 69 · 2024: 13
- FWCI
- 58.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Update notices
- correction (2026-04-09)
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- AI and Ethics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (CEECIND/02135/2021)
- Universidade Nova de Lisboa
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- anthropomorphism, artificial intelligence, hype, logical fallacies, moral status of AI, responsibility, trust
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