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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 12 of the 106 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Geopolitical competition, online radicalisation, and organisational culture as vectors of the evolving insider threat

Open access
Wood, Paul · 2026 · Discover Global Society

Abstract

Abstract Contemporary geopolitical competition, online radicalisation, and macroeconomic coercion have expanded insider threat typologies beyond the reach of detection-centred security models. This article is an integrative conceptual perspective: its contribution is theoretical rather than empirical. Drawing on counterintelligence studies, behavioural threat assessment, situational crime prevention, and organisational behaviour, it develops a causal-mechanism typology distinguishing four emergent vectors (state-sponsored infiltration, economically coerced insiders, violence-fixated employees, and identity-fabricated operatives termed manufactured insiders) and advances an integrated mitigation framework. The framework combines a deter-and-disrupt model, addressing opportunity structures through proactive intelligence, proportionate monitoring, continuous risk assessment, and security mindedness, with a caring security culture model, addressing motivational precipitators through psychological safety, perceived organisational support, and organisational justice. Following Wortley’s extension of situational crime prevention, the two models are positioned not as alternatives but as complementary stages of a single criminological architecture. The analytical claim is that the integrated framework accommodates precisely those cases, namely the manufactured insider and the violence-fixated actor, at which either model alone reaches its explanatory boundary. The framework is specified through testable propositions and accompanied by implementation and measurement indicators to support empirical evaluation.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This is a conceptual perspective, not an empirical study: it argues that insider threat now comprises multiple causally distinct vectors rather than one unitary problem. The paper proposes an expanded typology, including a “manufactured insider,” and a two-part mitigation architecture combining deter-and-disrupt controls with a caring security culture.

Key findings

  • The article identifies four emergent insider-threat vectors: state-sponsored infiltration, economically coerced insiders, violence-fixated employees, and identity-fabricated operatives called “manufactured insiders.”
  • It defines the “manufactured insider” as someone whose threat intent predates employment, whose identity is fabricated, who is directed by a state or state proxy, and who exploits digitised hiring channels.
  • The paper argues that the traditional malicious/negligent/compromised classification is insufficient because it is descriptive, not causal; the new typology is designed around motivation timing, access acquisition, and enabling conditions.
  • It reports that CPNI’s insider data collection study found that more than 75% of insider acts were committed by individuals whose circumstances changed after recruitment, and cites Herbig’s analysis of US espionage prosecutions as showing financial motivation and ideological affinity as dominant drivers of insider espionage.

Methods

  • Conceptual perspective / integrative conceptual synthesis; no original data were collected or analysed.
  • The argument is built from structured literature searches and synthesis of peer-reviewed research, government and intelligence assessments, and practitioner/industry reports, with the search window restricted to English-language publications from 2000–2025 plus foundational earlier works.
  • The main analysis is a causal-mechanism framework that integrates counterintelligence studies, behavioural threat assessment, situational crime prevention, and organisational behaviour into an expanded insider-threat typology and a proposed mitigation architecture.

Limitations

  • The paper states that direct empirical evidence linking caring-culture interventions to reduced insider-threat incidence is underdeveloped, and that no large-scale controlled studies have tested integrated deterrence and caring-culture interventions.
  • It acknowledges boundary conditions: situational crime prevention was developed mainly for opportunistic and street-level crime, so applying it to state-sponsored espionage stretches core assumptions.
  • It notes implementation risks for proportionate monitoring, including false positives, mistrust, disproportionate effects on minority or neurodivergent employees, and legal challenge.
  • Evident from the text: because the paper is conceptual and explicitly says no datasets were generated or analysed, its propositions remain untested and its claims are theoretical rather than empirical.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s44282-026-00510-7

Cites

25 of 25 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

11 Valid · 2 Not valid · 72 Not checked · 66 Own results and interpretations

65 more claims · 5 with their cited sources checked

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 54
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 37

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Citations

Cites

Show all 19 references

Research works printed but not linked: 24

  1. Calhoun FS, Weston SW. Contemporary threat management: a practical guide for identifying, assessing, and managing individuals of violent intent. San Diego: Specialized Training Services; 2003.
  2. Cappelli DM, Moore AP, Trzeciak RF. The CERT guide to insider threats: how to prevent, detect, and respond to information technology crimes. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Addison-Wesley; 2012.
  3. Clarke RV, editor. Situational crime prevention: successful case studies. 2nd ed. Albany, NY: Harrow and Heston; 1997.
  4. Cornish DB, Clarke RV. Opportunities, precipitators and criminal decisions: a reply to Wortley’s critique of situational crime prevention. Crime Prev Stud. 2003;16:41–96.
  5. CPNI (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure). Insider data collection study: report of main findings. London: CPNI; 2013.
  6. Ekblom P. Gearing up against crime: a dynamic framework to help designers keep up with the adaptive criminal in a changing world. Int J Risk Secur Crime Prev. 1997;2(4):249–65.
  7. ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity). ENISA threat landscape 2024. Athens: ENISA; 2024.
  8. ISD (Institute for Strategic Dialogue). Online radicalisation and the nexus to violence in the US: 2024 year in review. London: ISD; 2025.
  9. Jones T. Remarks at national insider threat awareness month launch event, 2 September. Washington, DC: Department of Defense; 2021.
  10. Martin P. Insider risk and personnel security: an introduction. Abingdon: Routledge; 2024.
  11. NCSC (National Counterintelligence and Security Center). Bystander engagement. National insider threat awareness month bulletin. Washington, DC: NCSC; 2023.
  12. NPSA (National Protective Security Authority). Ongoing personnel security: a good practice guide. London: NPSA; 2024.
  13. NPSA (National Protective Security Authority). Personnel security maturity assessment. London: NPSA; 2024.
  14. ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence). Annual threat assessment of the US intelligence community, 2025. Washington, DC: ODNI; 2025.
  15. Ponemon Institute. 2024 Cost of insider risks global report. Traverse City, MI: Ponemon Institute; 2024.
  16. Rid T. Active measures: the secret history of disinformation and political warfare. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 2020.
  17. Romano SJ, Levi-Minzi ME, Rugala EA, Van Hasselt VB. Workplace violence prevention: readiness and response. FBI Law Enforc Bull. 2011;80(1):1–36.
  18. Sarbin TR, Carney RM, Eoyang C, editors. Citizen espionage: studies in trust and betrayal. Westport, CT: Praeger; 1994.
  19. Schenkkan N, Linzer I. Out of sight, not out of reach: the global scale and scope of transnational repression. Washington, DC: Freedom House; 2021.
  20. Shaw ED, Ruby KG, Post JM. The insider threat to information systems. Security awareness bulletin, 2-98. Department of Defense Security Institute. 1998.
  21. SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association). Cyber security insider threat best practices guide. 3rd ed. New York: SIFMA; 2024.
  22. Parliament UK. Home affairs committee, combatting new forms of extremism, written evidence submissions. London: House of Commons; 2025.
  23. Verizon. 2024 data breach investigations report. New York: Verizon Enterprise Solutions; 2024.
  24. Wood P. Who cares? An executive’s guide to considering the security human factor: Self-published; 2025. p. 2025.

Metadata

Authors
Wood, P.
Corresponding author
Wood, Paul
Venue
Discover Global Society
Published
2026-07-26
Volume
4
Issue
1
ISSN
2731-9687 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7171287991
Cited by
0
References
19
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Discover Global Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
Keywords
insider threats, online radicalization, geopolitical competition, organizational culture, situational crime prevention, psychological safety, perceived organizational support, organizational justice, insider threat mitigation, counterintelligence

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Geopolitical competition, online radicalisation, and organisational culture as vectors of the evolving insider threat. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s44282-026-00510-7
The paper
Wood, P. (2026). Geopolitical competition, online radicalisation, and organisational culture as vectors of the evolving insider threat. Discover Global Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44282-026-00510-7

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.