The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 12 of the 106 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Geopolitical competition, online radicalisation, and organisational culture as vectors of the evolving insider threat
Open accessAbstract
Abstract Contemporary geopolitical competition, online radicalisation, and macroeconomic coercion have expanded insider threat typologies beyond the reach of detection-centred security models. This article is an integrative conceptual perspective: its contribution is theoretical rather than empirical. Drawing on counterintelligence studies, behavioural threat assessment, situational crime prevention, and organisational behaviour, it develops a causal-mechanism typology distinguishing four emergent vectors (state-sponsored infiltration, economically coerced insiders, violence-fixated employees, and identity-fabricated operatives termed manufactured insiders) and advances an integrated mitigation framework. The framework combines a deter-and-disrupt model, addressing opportunity structures through proactive intelligence, proportionate monitoring, continuous risk assessment, and security mindedness, with a caring security culture model, addressing motivational precipitators through psychological safety, perceived organisational support, and organisational justice. Following Wortley’s extension of situational crime prevention, the two models are positioned not as alternatives but as complementary stages of a single criminological architecture. The analytical claim is that the integrated framework accommodates precisely those cases, namely the manufactured insider and the violence-fixated actor, at which either model alone reaches its explanatory boundary. The framework is specified through testable propositions and accompanied by implementation and measurement indicators to support empirical evaluation.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This is a conceptual perspective, not an empirical study: it argues that insider threat now comprises multiple causally distinct vectors rather than one unitary problem. The paper proposes an expanded typology, including a “manufactured insider,” and a two-part mitigation architecture combining deter-and-disrupt controls with a caring security culture.
Key findings
- The article identifies four emergent insider-threat vectors: state-sponsored infiltration, economically coerced insiders, violence-fixated employees, and identity-fabricated operatives called “manufactured insiders.”
- It defines the “manufactured insider” as someone whose threat intent predates employment, whose identity is fabricated, who is directed by a state or state proxy, and who exploits digitised hiring channels.
- The paper argues that the traditional malicious/negligent/compromised classification is insufficient because it is descriptive, not causal; the new typology is designed around motivation timing, access acquisition, and enabling conditions.
- It reports that CPNI’s insider data collection study found that more than 75% of insider acts were committed by individuals whose circumstances changed after recruitment, and cites Herbig’s analysis of US espionage prosecutions as showing financial motivation and ideological affinity as dominant drivers of insider espionage.
Methods
- Conceptual perspective / integrative conceptual synthesis; no original data were collected or analysed.
- The argument is built from structured literature searches and synthesis of peer-reviewed research, government and intelligence assessments, and practitioner/industry reports, with the search window restricted to English-language publications from 2000–2025 plus foundational earlier works.
- The main analysis is a causal-mechanism framework that integrates counterintelligence studies, behavioural threat assessment, situational crime prevention, and organisational behaviour into an expanded insider-threat typology and a proposed mitigation architecture.
Limitations
- The paper states that direct empirical evidence linking caring-culture interventions to reduced insider-threat incidence is underdeveloped, and that no large-scale controlled studies have tested integrated deterrence and caring-culture interventions.
- It acknowledges boundary conditions: situational crime prevention was developed mainly for opportunistic and street-level crime, so applying it to state-sponsored espionage stretches core assumptions.
- It notes implementation risks for proportionate monitoring, including false positives, mistrust, disproportionate effects on minority or neurodivergent employees, and legal challenge.
- Evident from the text: because the paper is conceptual and explicitly says no datasets were generated or analysed, its propositions remain untested and its claims are theoretical rather than empirical.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
11 Valid · 2 Not valid · 72 Not checked · 66 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“in operational settings, radicalisation indicators overlap substantially with psychosocial distress [13].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [13] Corner E, Gill P. A false dichotomy? Mental illness and lone-actor terrorism. Law Hum Behav. 2015;39(1):23–34. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results (p. 7) associate some lone-actor behaviours with mental illness and chronic stress, and the Discussion and Conclusions (p. 10) say agencies could use associated antecedent behaviours when monitoring attack plotting. The paper does not establish that radicalisation indicators generally overlap substantially with psychosocial distress in operational settings. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Hannas and Tatlow document the Thousand Talents Programme and successor initiatives as mechanisms through which long-term relationships with researchers and technology professionals can transition from cooperative academic exchange to intelligence asset without a clear inflection point [26, 40].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [26] Hannas WC, Tatlow DK, editors. China’s quest for foreign technology: beyond espionage. London: Routledge; 2020. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
- Not matchedcites [40] ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence). Annual threat assessment of the US intelligence community, 2025. Washington, DC: ODNI; 2025.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Corner and Gill's analysis of loneactor terrorism demonstrates that mental illness, personal grievance, and ideological commitment co-occur in patterns that resist clean categorisation”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [13] Corner E, Gill P. A false dichotomy? Mental illness and lone-actor terrorism. Law Hum Behav. 2015;39(1):23–34. source
The Discussion and Conclusions (p. 9) link mental illness with single-issue ideologies and describe how a grievance can become a fixation on a target. The introduction (p. 1) rejects a clean division between rational terrorists and mentally unstable individuals, while the paper’s summary (p. 1) calls for a multivariate understanding of lone-actor terrorism. Together, these support the citing sentence’s broad paraphrase. (LLM, conf=0.86)
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Public reporting and peer-reviewed analyses characterise China's approach as integrating licit and illicit acquisition methods.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [26] Hannas WC, Tatlow DK, editors. China’s quest for foreign technology: beyond espionage. London: Routledge; 2020. source
The book-review text (page not supplied) explicitly describes Chinese actors using both legitimate and illicit means to acquire technology. It also describes acquisition through open sources and intelligence networks, supporting the paraphrase. (LLM, conf=0.92)
- Not matchedcites [40] ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence). Annual threat assessment of the US intelligence community, 2025. Washington, DC: ODNI; 2025.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The peer-reviewed radicalisation literature converges on a picture more complex than classical ideological typologies admit.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [35] Moghaddam FM. The staircase to terrorism: a psychological exploration. Am Psychol. 2005;60(2):161–9. source
- Supportedcites [3] Borum R. Radicalization into violent extremism I: a review of social science theories. J Strateg Secur. 2011;4(4):7–36. source
The Abstract states that 'to focus narrowly on ideological radicalization risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy—or at least a necessary precursor—for terrorism, though we know this not to be true,' and that different pathways and mechanisms operate differently for different people, with radicalization 'best viewed as a set of diverse processes' — i.e. a picture more complex than ideological typologies allow. The 'Radicalization as a Process' section adds that 'prior research and analysis supports the general proposition that no single pathway or explanatory theory exists that would apply to all types of groups or to all individuals,' and the 'Potentially Promising Theories' section quotes Cable, Walsh and Warland on assuming multiple models rather than a single one. Borum is himself a peer-reviewed review of the social science literature, so the attribution fits; his caveats about definitional disagreement concern the meaning of 'radicalization', not the complexity conclusion. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Partly supportedcites [13] Corner E, Gill P. A false dichotomy? Mental illness and lone-actor terrorism. Law Hum Behav. 2015;39(1):23–34. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The introduction (p. 1) argues that a simple rational-terrorist versus mentally-unstable-individual dichotomy is too clear-cut, and the Discussion (pp. 8–9) reports differences among lone actors. But the paper does not establish a convergence of the peer-reviewed radicalisation literature or argue that classical ideological typologies are inadequate; its principal critique concerns mental illness and terrorist motivation. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Citations
Cites
Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams
Edmondson, A. (1999) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2666999 · Cited by 12,026 · cited 6×
“Outcome indicators include insider incidents per capita, time-to-detection, and scores on validated instruments—Edmond-son’s psychological safety scale [16], the Survey of Perceived Organizational Support [17, 30], and Colquitt’s organisational justice scales [12].”
InfluentialPerceived organizational support.
Eisenberger, R., Huntington, R., Hutchison, S., & Sowa, D. (1986) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-9010.71.3.500 · Cited by 10,023
Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2094589 · Cited by 8,856
Justice at the millennium: A meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice research.
Colquitt, J. A., Conlon, D. E., Wesson, M. J., Porter, C. O. L. H., & Ng, K. Y. (2001) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-9010.86.3.425 · Cited by 5,942 · cited 7×
“Outcome indicators include insider incidents per capita, time-to-detection, and scores on validated instruments—Edmond-son’s psychological safety scale [16], the Survey of Perceived Organizational Support [17, 30], and Colquitt’s organisational justice scales [12].”
InfluentialPerceived organizational support: a meta-analytic evaluation of organizational support theory.
Kurtessis, J. N., Eisenberger, R., Ford, M. T., Buffardi, L. C., Stewart, K. A., & Adis, C. S. (2017) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206315575554 · Cited by 2,354 · cited 6×
“Outcome indicators include insider incidents per capita, time-to-detection, and scores on validated instruments—Edmond-son’s psychological safety scale [16], the Survey of Perceived Organizational Support [17, 30], and Colquitt’s organisational justice scales [12].”
InfluentialThe Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration.
Moghaddam, F. M. (2005) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.60.2.161 · Cited by 1,208 · cited 1×
“Moghaddam’s staircase model posits progressive narrowing through stages of radicalisation [35], but the contemporary online environment compresses and accelerates these stages [3].”
Coping With Systems Risk: Security Planning Models for Management Decision Making1
Straub, D. W., & Welke, R. J. (1998) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/249551 · Cited by 1,120
Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security
Chesney, R., & Citron, D. K. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3213954 · Cited by 880 · cited 1×
“The category sits at the intersection of two trajectories anticipated in the academic literature: Brundage and colleagues’ analysis of the malicious use of artificial intelligence [4] and Chesney and Cit-ron’s analysis of synthetic media as a vector for deception in security-relevant contexts [8].”
The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation
Brundage, M., Avin, S., Clark, J., Toner, H., Eckersley, P., Garfinkel, B., Dafoe, A., Scharre, P., Zeitzoff, T., Filar, B., et al. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.07228 · Cited by 849
Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories
Borum, R. (2011) · Journal of Strategic Security · doi:10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1 · Cited by 835 · cited 1×
“Moghaddam’s staircase model posits progressive narrowing through stages of radicalisation [35], but the contemporary online environment compresses and accelerates these stages [3].”
Research works printed but not linked: 24
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- Cappelli DM, Moore AP, Trzeciak RF. The CERT guide to insider threats: how to prevent, detect, and respond to information technology crimes. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Addison-Wesley; 2012.
- Clarke RV, editor. Situational crime prevention: successful case studies. 2nd ed. Albany, NY: Harrow and Heston; 1997.
- Cornish DB, Clarke RV. Opportunities, precipitators and criminal decisions: a reply to Wortley’s critique of situational crime prevention. Crime Prev Stud. 2003;16:41–96.
- CPNI (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure). Insider data collection study: report of main findings. London: CPNI; 2013.
- Ekblom P. Gearing up against crime: a dynamic framework to help designers keep up with the adaptive criminal in a changing world. Int J Risk Secur Crime Prev. 1997;2(4):249–65.
- ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity). ENISA threat landscape 2024. Athens: ENISA; 2024.
- ISD (Institute for Strategic Dialogue). Online radicalisation and the nexus to violence in the US: 2024 year in review. London: ISD; 2025.
- Jones T. Remarks at national insider threat awareness month launch event, 2 September. Washington, DC: Department of Defense; 2021.
- Martin P. Insider risk and personnel security: an introduction. Abingdon: Routledge; 2024.
- NCSC (National Counterintelligence and Security Center). Bystander engagement. National insider threat awareness month bulletin. Washington, DC: NCSC; 2023.
- NPSA (National Protective Security Authority). Ongoing personnel security: a good practice guide. London: NPSA; 2024.
- NPSA (National Protective Security Authority). Personnel security maturity assessment. London: NPSA; 2024.
- ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence). Annual threat assessment of the US intelligence community, 2025. Washington, DC: ODNI; 2025.
- Ponemon Institute. 2024 Cost of insider risks global report. Traverse City, MI: Ponemon Institute; 2024.
- Rid T. Active measures: the secret history of disinformation and political warfare. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 2020.
- Romano SJ, Levi-Minzi ME, Rugala EA, Van Hasselt VB. Workplace violence prevention: readiness and response. FBI Law Enforc Bull. 2011;80(1):1–36.
- Sarbin TR, Carney RM, Eoyang C, editors. Citizen espionage: studies in trust and betrayal. Westport, CT: Praeger; 1994.
- Schenkkan N, Linzer I. Out of sight, not out of reach: the global scale and scope of transnational repression. Washington, DC: Freedom House; 2021.
- Shaw ED, Ruby KG, Post JM. The insider threat to information systems. Security awareness bulletin, 2-98. Department of Defense Security Institute. 1998.
- SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association). Cyber security insider threat best practices guide. 3rd ed. New York: SIFMA; 2024.
- Parliament UK. Home affairs committee, combatting new forms of extremism, written evidence submissions. London: House of Commons; 2025.
- Verizon. 2024 data breach investigations report. New York: Verizon Enterprise Solutions; 2024.
- Wood P. Who cares? An executive’s guide to considering the security human factor: Self-published; 2025. p. 2025.
Metadata
- Authors
- Wood, P.
- Corresponding author
- Wood, Paul
- Venue
- Discover Global Society
- Published
- 2026-07-26
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 2731-9687 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W7171287991
- Semantic Scholar
- e87b836145191459acc1124a5e57dc86b8b1159c
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Discover Global Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
- Keywords
- insider threats, online radicalization, geopolitical competition, organizational culture, situational crime prevention, psychological safety, perceived organizational support, organizational justice, insider threat mitigation, counterintelligence
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- Wood, P. (2026). Geopolitical competition, online radicalisation, and organisational culture as vectors of the evolving insider threat. Discover Global Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44282-026-00510-7
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