The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
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Citations
Cites
Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes.
Freimer, M., & Howard, R. A. (1961) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2282268 · Cited by 3,378
Shapley, L. S. (1953) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095 · Cited by 2,382
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
Friedman, J. W. (1971) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296617 · Cited by 1,778
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912767 · Cited by 1,692
Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes.
Kaufman, H., & Howard, R. A. (1961) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2312519 · Cited by 638
Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
Radner, R. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911017 · Cited by 382
Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
Porter, R. H. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90050-9 · Cited by 282
An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
Radner, R., Myerson, R., & Maskin, E. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297591 · Cited by 167
Cited by
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?
Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1996) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033427 · Cited by 1,540
Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior
Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555490 · Cited by 1,300
Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)02005-4 · Cited by 1,271
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938299 · Cited by 1,203
Self-citationSolidarity Networks in Preindustrial Societies: Rational Peasants with a Moral Economy
Fafchamps, M. (1992) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/452001 · Cited by 559
Metadata
- Authors
- Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1986-06
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 251-269
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2162070285
- Cited by
- 665
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 16.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1
- The paper
- Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1986). Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.