The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
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Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Introduction to automata theory, languages and computation
(1981) · Mathematics and Computers in Simulation · doi:10.1016/0378-4754(81)90068-9 · Cited by 10,699
(1976) · Cited by 10,423
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511806292 · Cited by 6,922
Introduction to automata theory, languages, and computation
(1980) · Computer Languages · doi:10.1016/0096-0551(80)90011-9 · Cited by 6,824
Connolly, T., & Axelrod, R. (1984) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392957 · Cited by 3,890
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
Rubinstein, A. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90021-9 · Cited by 594
Cited by
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?
Kirman, A. P. (1992) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.6.2.117 · Cited by 1,595
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Evolution of the Social Contract
Skyrms, B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139924825 · Cited by 743
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1177418 · Cited by 715
Metadata
- Authors
- Binmore, K. G., & Samuelson, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1992-08
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 278-305
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1984093548
- Cited by
- 368
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 23.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Binmore, K. G., & Samuelson, L. (1992). Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-i
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
