The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect’
Overview
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Integrity signals
Registry
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Claims the paper makes
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Citations
Cites
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
Hirsch, M. W. (1976) · Graduate Texts in Mathematics · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-9449-5 · Cited by 2,520
Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories
Wittman, D. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956016 · Cited by 844
The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition
Shepsle, K. A. (1972) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957799 · Cited by 614
Eaton, B. C., & Lipsey, R. G. (1975) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296817 · Cited by 599
Sequential Location among Firms with Foresight
Prescott, E. C., & Visscher, M. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003293 · Cited by 518
Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
Wittman, D. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90091-6 · Cited by 403
A dynamical model of political equilibrium
Kramer, G. H. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90011-4 · Cited by 387
Cited by
Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L., & Glasgow, G. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00199.x · Cited by 709
An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
Snyder, J. M., & Ting, M. M. (2002) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/3088416 · Cited by 532
The disadvantaged incumbents: estimating incumbency effects in Indian state legislatures
Uppal, Y. (2009) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9336-4 · Cited by 273
Leech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Bernhardt, M. D., & Ingerman, D. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1985-06
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 47-67
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2036245447
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 6.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect’. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0047-2727(85)90028-3
- The paper
- Bernhardt, M. D., & Ingerman, D. E. (1985). Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect’. Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(85)90028-3
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
