The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why free ride?
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Citations
Cites
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232669 · Cited by 4,042
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Research works printed but not linked: 10
- Andreoni, 1987, Private charity, public goods, and the crowding out hypothesis, University of Wisconsin, Social Systems Research Institute, Working paper 8706
- Frank, 1985, The demand for unobservable and other nonpositional goods, American Economic Review, 75, 101
- Isaac, 1988, Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 53, 179, 10.2307/1882648 · DOI · Paper page
- Isaac, 1985, Public goods provision in an experimental environment, Journal of Public Economics, 26, 51, 10.1016/0047-2727(85)90038-6 · DOI · Paper page
- Isaac, 1984, Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations, Public Choice, 43, 113, 10.1007/BF00140829 · DOI · Paper page
- Kim, 1984, The free rider problem: Experimental evidence, Public Choice, 43, 3, 10.1007/BF00137902 · DOI · Paper page
- Marwell, 1981, Economists free ride, does anyone else?, Journal of Public Economics, 15, 295, 10.1016/0047-2727(81)90013-X · DOI · Paper page
- Selten, 1986, End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames: A learning theory approach, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7, 47, 10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1 · DOI · Paper page
- Stark, 1985, On private charity and altruism, Public Choice, 46, 325, 10.1007/BF00124430 · DOI
- Sugden, 1984, Reciprocity: The supply of public goods through voluntary contributions, Economic Journal, 94, 772, 10.2307/2232294 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746
Metadata
- Authors
- Andreoni, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1988-12
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 291-304
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1606176548
- Cited by
- 1,118
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 16.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why free ride? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0047-2727(88)90043-6
- The paper
- Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride? Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(88)90043-6
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
