The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Citations
Cites
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
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Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Research works printed but not linked: 10
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Cited by
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
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Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
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Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
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Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11467 · Cited by 1,334
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Keser, C., & Van Winden, F. (2000) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00182 · Cited by 800
Group Size and Incentives to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia
Zhang, X. (., & Zhu, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1601 · Cited by 499
Normative foundations of human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schurtenberger, I. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5 · Cited by 434
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Economic games on the internet: the effect of $1 stakes
Amir, O., Rand, D. G., & Gal, Y. K. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031461 · Cited by 364
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION GAMES: EFFICIENT PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
Bagnoli, M., & Mckee, M. (1991) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1991.tb01276.x · Cited by 322
The assurance problem in a laboratory market
Isaac, R. M., Schmidtz, D., & Walker, J. M. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf02337743 · Cited by 252
Reciprocity and the tragedies of maintaining and providing the commons
Gächter, S., Kölle, F., & Quercia, S. (2017) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0191-5 · Cited by 147
What’s mine is a hologram? How shared augmented reality augments psychological ownership
Carrozzi, A., Chylinski, M., Heller, J., Hilken, T., Keeling, D. I., & de Ruyter, K. (2019) · Journal of Interactive Marketing · doi:10.1016/j.intmar.2019.05.004 · Cited by 132
The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, A., & Gallier, C. (2020) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-019-09629-8 · Cited by 75
Jung, J., Bapna, R., Golden, J. M., & Sun, T. (2020) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2019.0873 · Cited by 71
Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games
Burton-Chellew, M. N., Nax, H. H., & West, S. A. (2015) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.2678 · Cited by 63
Chung, D., Yun, K., Kim, J. H., Jang, B., & Jeong, J. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017044 · Cited by 19
Leveraging Token Economies for Public Goods
Shilina, M. (2026) · The Impact of Blockchain in Token Economies · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-3371-7.ch009
Metadata
- Authors
- Andreoni, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1988-12
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 291-304
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1606176548
- Cited by
- 1,118
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 16.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
