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The evolution of one-shot cooperation: An experiment
Open accessAbstract
Can people rationally advance their own material interests by cooperating in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas, even when there is no possibility of being punished for defection? We outline a model that describes how such cooperation could evolve if the presence of a cooperative disposition can be discerned by others. We test the model's key assumption with an experiment in which we find that subjects who interacted for thirty minutes before playing one-shot prisoner's dilemmas with two others were substantially more accurate than chance in predicting their partner's decisions.
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Citations
Cited by
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The psychological consequences of money
Vohs, K. D., Mead, N. L., & Goode, M. R. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1132491 · Cited by 1,337
Interdependence, Interaction, and Relationships
Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2003) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145059 · Cited by 1,235
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
Henrich, J. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5 · Cited by 1,096
Haley, K. J., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2005) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.01.002 · Cited by 1,073
Metadata
- Authors
- Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T., & Regan, D. T.
- Venue
- Ethology and Sociobiology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1993-07
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 247-256
- ISSN
- 0162-3095 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2029990227
- Cited by
- 348
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 139.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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